Concept
Forensic Reports
Right to confront witnesses
Forensic Reports
A laboratory analyst’s written account of what a test showed is an out-of-court statement, and Crawford treats it like any other accusation: if the statement is testimonial, the prosecution may offer it only when the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. A plurality of the Court has described the Clause as providing two protections, the right physically to face the witnesses and the right to conduct cross-examination.1 The Court has also described the right to cross-examine, and the right to exclude out-of-court statements, as rights reasonably implicit in the Clause’s words and not narrowly and explicitly set out in them.2 The forensic cases rest on those implicit rights. Many procedures that keep the witness in the defendant’s presence raise no substantial problem of their own,3 so the dispute here is not where the analyst stands but whether the analyst appears at all.
Three decisions apply Crawford to laboratory evidence, and the defense won the first two.4 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts held that a sworn certificate reporting the results of a forensic analysis of seized substances is testimonial.5 Bullcoming v. New Mexico held that the prosecution cannot satisfy the Clause by presenting a signed report through a witness who did not sign it or perform or observe the test.6 Williams v. Illinois affirmed a conviction in which an expert relied on a DNA profile made by an outside laboratory, but no rationale for that result drew five votes.
Classification is rarely the hard part. A statement is testimonial when its primary purpose, viewed objectively, is to prove past events relevant to a later criminal prosecution,7 and a report prepared after a seizure, at police request, to show what a substance turned out to be meets that description. It resembles an accuser’s account far more closely than it resembles a record kept for routine purposes.
The hard parts are two: whether the prosecution offers the analyst’s statement for its truth, and who must take the stand to answer for it. Both turn on one point. Cross-examination tests the person who made a statement, and a sponsor can supply that test only by having done the work. In Bruton the Court objected that the declarant “does not testify and cannot be tested by cross-examination,” and it suggested that no confrontation problem would have arisen had the codefendant been subject to cross-examination.8 A laboratory presents the same issue in concrete form. Cross-examination probes a mishandled sample, a skipped step, or a misread result, and only the person who did the work can be questioned about them. A colleague can read the figures aloud but cannot say what happened at the bench.
Certificates as Testimony
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, a drug prosecution, the State offered three sworn “certificates of analysis” from a state laboratory reporting that seized bags contained cocaine. A Massachusetts statute made each certificate prima facie evidence of the substance’s composition, so no analyst testified. Melendez-Diaz objected under Crawford, and the Supreme Court held that admitting the certificates violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.9
The Court placed the certificates in the core class of testimonial statements because they were, in Justice Thomas’s words, “quite plainly affidavits.”10 An affidavit says on paper what its maker would say on the stand, and the fact these affidavits asserted, that the substance was cocaine, was exactly what the analysts would have testified to. The Clause reaches such a document for the reason it reaches live testimony: each is an accusation that someone must be available to test.
Purpose completed the analysis. That a statute required the laboratory to prepare the certificates changed nothing,11 and neither did the absence of police interrogation of the analysts;12 the certificates’ primary purpose was to provide evidence at trial.13 Purpose cuts the other way as well. A mandatory-reporting statute alone does not turn a teacher’s conversation with a student into a law-enforcement mission,14 and a 911 call describing an ongoing emergency is not testimonial although statements made after the emergency ends are, because the government’s primary purpose, viewed objectively, has shifted to proving past events.15 A statutory duty to create a record settles nothing. The purpose of the record decides.
Justice Thomas joined the opinion only because the documents were affidavits, and his vote shows why formality matters in this area. The Court has said that “formality is . . . essential to testimonial utterances,” and it generally finds formality in statements made to known police investigators outside ongoing emergencies. Justices Thomas and Alito, however, adhere to a much more exacting standard, which became important when the Court later divided sharply.16 Sworn certificates satisfy even that standard.
Massachusetts and the dissent offered four reasons to exempt laboratory analysts from the Clause, and none succeeded.
The first reason was that analysts are not “conventional” witnesses, like the accusers whose ex parte statements were used at Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial.17 The majority agreed that Raleigh’s trial is a paradigmatic confrontation violation but replied that the paradigm identifies the core of the right, not its limits.18 The Court has likewise refused to give “against” a narrow and unrealistic reading: the right to confront those who give damaging testimony does not depend on technicalities such as who called the witness.19 An analyst who swears that a substance is cocaine gives damaging testimony against the accused.
The second reason was that neutral scientific testing makes cross-examination pointless. That is a reliability argument, and reliability was the premise of the Ohio v. Roberts regime, which treated out-of-court statements as suspect because they lack the conventional indicia of reliability: no oath, no cross-examination, and no chance for the jury to assess demeanor.20 Crawford rejected that reliability-centered regime,21 and the Clause guarantees one method of testing evidence, cross-examination, which a court may not replace with another method it judges more effective.
The third reason was that the certificates were business or public records. Business and public records generally come in without confrontation, but not because they fit a hearsay exception; they come in because they were created to administer an entity’s affairs and not to prove a fact at trial, so they are not testimonial. Statements prepared specifically for the defendant’s trial are testimony whether or not they qualify as official records.22 Hearsay law draws a parallel line: Palmer v. Hoffman refused to treat a railroad’s accident report, prepared with litigation in view, as an ordinary business record. And fitting a hearsay exception never ends the confrontation inquiry, because in every Confrontation Clause case the statement is admissible under some hearsay exception and probative of guilt.23
The fourth reason was that the defendant could have subpoenaed the analysts. Subpoena power, whether it comes from state law or the Compulsory Process Clause, is no substitute for confrontation, because it does the defendant no good when the witness is unavailable or simply refuses to appear. The Clause burdens the prosecution to present its witnesses and does not make the defendant bring adverse witnesses to court, so a system in which the State offers affidavits and waits for the defendant to subpoena the affiants does not preserve the right.24
The holding has limits. Documents prepared in the regular course of equipment maintenance may well be nontestimonial, and medical reports created for treatment purposes are not testimonial.25 When an interview serves both medical and forensic goals, the medical objective is not testimonial and the forensic objective is.26
The practical burden is also smaller than it first appears. Only some forensic tests figure in prosecutions, and only a small fraction of prosecutions reach trial, since nearly 95 percent of convictions come from guilty pleas. Many States already follow the rule or let the defendant assert, or forfeit by silence, the right after notice, and there is no evidence that the criminal justice system has ground to a halt where defendants can insist on the analyst’s appearance.27 The right may also be waived, including by failing to object.28
Notice-and-demand statutes survive. The prosecution gives notice that it will offer an analyst’s report, and the defendant has a set time to demand the analyst’s live appearance or forfeit the objection. Such a statute shifts no burden, because the defendant always bears the burden of raising a confrontation objection and the statute governs only the time within which he must do so; States are free to adopt procedural rules governing objections.29 A subpoena rule differs in where the duty to produce the witness lands. It puts the duty on the accused, while a notice-and-demand rule leaves it with the prosecution once the defendant demands the analyst and treats only silence as forfeiture.30
A defendant who causes the analyst’s absence stands differently. Forfeiture by wrongdoing, codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), applies only when the defendant engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing intended to, and that did, procure the declarant’s unavailability.31
A fact pattern that offers a notarized laboratory certificate as a business or public record is testing the testimonial question, and the hearsay label does not answer it. Ask what the document was made to do.
Surrogate Witnesses
Bullcoming v. New Mexico asks what the Clause requires when the prosecution offers a forensic report but puts a different person on the stand. Donald Bullcoming was tried for aggravated drunk driving, and the principal evidence was a signed laboratory report certifying a blood-alcohol concentration above the legal threshold. The analyst who signed it, Caylor, did not testify, and the State never claimed he was unavailable. It called instead a colleague, Razatos, who knew the testing machine and the laboratory’s procedures but had neither taken part in nor watched the test on Bullcoming’s blood.34 The Court held that surrogate testimony does not meet the constitutional requirement, because the accused’s right is to confront the individual who made the statement the prosecution seeks to introduce.35 Crawford’s two conditions, unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine, were not met, for the State never asserted that Caylor was unavailable and Bullcoming never questioned him.
The trial court admitted the report as a business record. The New Mexico Supreme Court accepted that the report was testimonial but upheld the conviction on two grounds: Caylor was a mere scrivener who had transcribed a result generated by a gas chromatograph, and Razatos, as an expert on the machine and the laboratory’s procedures, could be cross-examined about how the machine worked and what the results meant. The Supreme Court rejected both.
The scrivener theory treated the machine as the only accuser, and Caylor’s certification said more than a machine-generated number. He certified that he received the sample intact with its seal unbroken, that the report number and the sample number corresponded, and that he performed the test by a precise protocol, and by leaving the remarks section blank he represented that nothing compromised the sample or the analysis. Each is a statement about a past event or a human act that a chromatograph’s printout does not show, and the Court called such representations “meet for cross-examination.” A mislabeled vial or a skipped step would never appear on the printout, so the person who certified that neither happened must be answerable. The reliability of machine-produced data does not change this, because the Clause requires that reliability be tested by cross-examination, and analysts must be made available even if they possess “the scientific acumen of Mme. Curie and the veracity of Mother Teresa.”
The same logic governs ordinary police work. An officer who did not see the number on a radar gun’s display cannot report it, however well he understands the technology and his department’s procedures.
The second ground failed because Razatos knew how the instrument and the laboratory worked in general, while the report made assertions about one sample on one day. A surrogate of that kind cannot convey what Caylor knew or observed about the test he ran, and cannot expose his lapses or lies. Caylor probably would not have remembered this particular test, given how many tests analysts run, but his sworn testimony would have let defense counsel raise questions about his proficiency, his care, and his veracity, including why he had been placed on unpaid leave.36 Forgetfulness does not defeat confrontation. As the Court reasoned in California v. Green, nothing in the Clause bars reliance on a witness’s prior testimony when he takes the stand and is tendered for cross-examination, even if he claims a loss of memory, invokes a privilege, or refuses to answer.37
That reasoning shows what the prosecution must do. If the analyst takes the stand, the Clause is satisfied: it does not bar a witness’s own prior statements when the accused has a fair opportunity to cross-examine him about both the statements and his present testimony.38 The Court has said that the Clause does not require excluding the prior statements of a witness who may be asked to defend or explain them, thereby opening himself to full cross-examination,39 and it makes no difference whether he admits, denies, or qualifies them.40 It would be untenable to bar a declarant’s prior testimony when he is present, exposed to the defendant and the factfinder, and subject to cross-examination, while admitting it when he never appears.41
The Court also refused to accept a substitute witness as good enough. A right of this substance should not yield to a technicality,42 and the Court found the logic of the right to counsel instructive: United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez had rejected the argument that denial of counsel of choice is harmless when substitute counsel performs adequately. If a substitute lawyer does not satisfy the Sixth Amendment, a substitute witness does not either.
The State’s fallback was that an unsworn report is not testimonial. The Court disagreed. Caylor’s report was formalized in a signed document, an officer had supplied seized evidence to a state laboratory required by law to assist police investigations, and the report form carried a legend referring to court rules that provide for admitting certified blood-alcohol analyses, so the formalities were more than adequate without a notary.43 A signature can thus supply the formality that a notary’s seal supplied in Melendez-Diaz, which fits the statement that formality is essential to testimonial utterances.44 Formality is not the sole touchstone of the primary-purpose inquiry, but it can shed light on whether a statement’s primary purpose was use at trial.45
Hypothetical stems usually give the substitute witness impressive credentials: years in the laboratory, mastery of the instrument, familiarity with every protocol. Those facts answer the wrong question. The inquiry is whether the witness signed the certification or performed or observed the test, because only that witness can be questioned about what happened to this sample.
The decision leaves the prosecution real choices, and they show where the burden sits. New Mexico law required the laboratory to preserve samples, so the State could have had Razatos retest Bullcoming’s blood and testify to his own result, which would have raised no confrontation problem. The State argued that the defendant should have asked for the retest, but the Clause puts the burden of presenting witnesses on the prosecution.46 Notice-and-demand statutes remain available.47 Nor must every person named on a report testify, because the prosecution decides which steps in the chain of custody are crucial enough to need evidence.48
Bullcoming was a five-to-four decision. Justice Kennedy’s dissent was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Breyer and Alito.49 The majority read the dissent as objecting less to applying Crawford and Melendez-Diaz to these facts than to those decisions themselves.50 A separate concurrence from a Justice in the majority stressed how narrow the holding was and pointed to circumstances the case did not present. Read with the majority opinion, it leaves four situations unresolved:
- A report prepared for a purpose other than creating trial evidence, such as medical treatment, because the State suggested no other purpose for this report; a medical objective is not testimonial even when a forensic one is.51
- A testifying supervisor, reviewer, or other person with a personal but limited connection to the test, as when a supervisor who watched the analyst conduct the test testifies about the results, because the Court did not decide how much involvement suffices.
- An expert who gives an independent opinion about testimonial reports that are not themselves admitted into evidence, because Razatos offered no independent opinion about Bullcoming’s blood-alcohol concentration.
- A prosecution that offers only machine-generated results, because the majority stressed that Caylor certified more than a machine-generated number.
An exam answer should present each of these as unresolved by Bullcoming, name the fact that would matter, such as how closely the supervisor watched the testing, and argue from purpose: the closer the witness stands to the actual testing, the more the witness can say about what happened at the bench. The third question is the subject of the next subsection, which begins with the divided decision in Williams and ends with the Court’s later answer.
A confrontation violation is subject to harmless-error review. Bullcoming, like Melendez-Diaz, expressed no view on harmlessness and left the question for remand.52 The Court has applied harmless-error analysis to other confrontation violations,53 and it has said that harmlessness is judged on the remaining evidence, not on speculation about whether the witness’s testimony or the jury’s assessment would have changed had there been confrontation.54
Experts and Report Bases
A forensic report can reach a jury a third way: an expert gives an opinion that rests on the report, and its findings arrive as the basis of the opinion. Williams v. Illinois tested that route. A four-Justice plurality found no violation where an expert relied on a DNA profile made by a non-testifying outside laboratory, reasoning that the report was offered to explain the basis of the opinion and not for its truth, and that it was not prepared primarily to accuse a targeted individual.56 Bullcoming had left the question open because its testifying analyst gave no independent opinion. Williams yields a result without a rule, because no rationale drew five votes, and a later decision has removed the plurality’s central premise. The facts come first, then the plurality’s two rationales, then the votes.
Williams was tried without a jury for rape. An Illinois State Police expert, Sandra Lambatos, testified that a DNA profile produced by an outside laboratory, Cellmark, matched a profile her own laboratory had produced from Williams’s blood. She said nothing about what happened inside Cellmark and did not vouch for its work. The Cellmark report was neither admitted nor shown to the judge, and no Cellmark analyst testified. The defense attacked one phrase, her answer to a question that described the Cellmark profile as derived from semen on the victim’s swabs, a fact she had no first-hand knowledge of.
The plurality’s first rationale was that the Clause reaches only statements offered for their truth. An expert may rest an opinion on facts she assumes, leaving the party who calls her to prove them by other evidence, and disclosing the basis can help the factfinder judge the expert’s reasoning without proving the underlying facts. Its purpose is to show that the reasoning was not illogical and that the opinion’s weight does not depend on premises unsupported by other evidence in the record.57 Because the factfinder was a judge, the plurality presumed that the limited purpose was understood. It also pointed to safeguards: judges may, and in most circumstances must, instruct that out-of-court statements cannot be accepted for their truth and that an expert’s opinion is only as good as the independent evidence behind its premises, and an opinion earns no weight if the prosecution cannot independently prove the foundational facts.58
The difficulty lies in the link between basis and opinion. Lambatos’s match meant something only if Cellmark’s profile really came from the victim’s swabs, and the plurality’s own safeguards concede that an opinion is only as good as the independent evidence behind its premises. The dissent answered that statements introduced to explain the basis of an opinion lack a plausible nonhearsay purpose, because a factfinder who uses the basis to evaluate the opinion must consider whether it is true.59 Five Justices, Justice Thomas among them, rejected the plurality’s reasoning, though only four joined the dissent.60 If the prosecution could label an absent analyst’s finding a basis, any report could enter through an expert, and the analyst would escape the cross-examination that Bullcoming required.
The plurality trusted limiting instructions to contain basis testimony. Elsewhere in confrontation law such instructions fare worse: in the Bruton setting a limiting instruction is treated as ineffective, so the codefendant’s confession remains testimonial hearsay against the defendant while its maker goes uncross-examined.61
The plurality’s second ground was independent of the first. The abuses that produced the Clause involved out-of-court statements whose primary purpose was accusing a targeted individual of criminal conduct, and formalized statements such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions; in all but one post-Crawford case finding a violation, both characteristics were present.62 The plurality distinguished the reports in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming as the equivalent of affidavits made to prove the guilt of a particular defendant, prepared after the suspects had been captured by technicians who must have realized their contents would be incriminating.63 The targeted-individual requirement was new, because the Davis formulation asks whether a statement’s primary purpose relates to prosecuting a past criminal event and says nothing of a targeted suspect.64 The dissent treated the report as plainly testimonial: it was prepared at police request in the investigation of a specific crime, the analysts knew the results would help identify and prosecute a suspect, and its primary purpose was to establish the donor’s identity for use in a prosecution.65
The votes explain why the case yields no clean rule. Justice Alito announced the judgment and wrote for four Justices, himself, the Chief Justice, and Justices Kennedy and Breyer, the same four who had dissented in Bullcoming.66 Justice Kagan’s dissent was joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor. Justice Thomas concurred only in the judgment. He would affirm because the Cellmark report lacked the formality and solemnity of a testimonial statement: it was neither sworn nor certified, and although law enforcement requested it, it was not the product of formalized dialogue resembling custodial interrogation.67 His test looks to the Marian examination practices the Clause was designed to prevent,68 which echoes an earlier separate opinion’s proposal to ask how closely an interrogation resembles the historical practices the Clause addressed instead of reconstructing the participants’ primary purpose.69 Justice Alito shares that exacting view of formality, and it proved important in the divisions that followed.70
Justice Breyer joined the plurality but suggested that States could create an exception that would presumptively allow introduction of DNA reports from accredited crime laboratories.71 The defendant would remain free to call laboratory technicians, and the presumption would disappear if there were significant reason to question the laboratory’s technical competence or neutrality. In his view such an exception would lie outside Crawford’s constitutional limits.72
Smith v. Arizona then adopted the five Justices’ reasoning in a majority opinion. The State had replaced the analyst who tested the seized substances with another expert, who testified from the first analyst’s notes and report, and the state court upheld the conviction because the absent analyst’s statements were offered only as the basis of the substitute’s opinion. The Supreme Court held that when an expert conveys an absent analyst’s statements in support of an opinion, and the statements support the opinion only if true, they come into evidence for their truth, so the defendant may cross-examine the person who made them.73 Whether the statements are testimonial remains a separate question, answered by the primary purpose test.74
An expert may still testify to her own work. Lambatos could testify from her own comparison that two profiles matched each other. The line runs between what the witness did or observed and what an absent person asserted about work the witness never saw. In Williams the expert’s own comparison carried the testimony and a judge was the factfinder. In Bullcoming the State offered the absent analyst’s certified report for its truth through a colleague who had neither performed nor observed the test, and the Court required the analyst. An exam stem that says only that the expert “relied on” a laboratory report invites the answer that reliance is not offering the report for its truth. After Smith, that answer fails unless the opinion would stand even if the absent statement were false.