Concept
Failure to Release
False imprisonment
Failure to Release
Every means of confinement in the last section involved something the defendant did: locking a door, laying hands on the plaintiff, voicing a threat, announcing an arrest. A plaintiff may instead enter freely, or be lawfully held, and later become entitled to leave while the defendant does nothing except decline to let go. Because false imprisonment requires that the defendant's act directly or indirectly result in the confinement, a passive defendant seems to fall outside the tort.1 Section 45 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts closes that gap. If the actor is under a duty to release the other from confinement, or to aid in such release by providing a means of escape, the actor's refusal to do so with the intention of confining the other is a sufficient act of confinement.2
The duty carries the rule. Section 45 does not make every refusal to let a person go a confining act; it reaches only a refusal by someone who owes release or help in escaping, so the first question in any failure-to-release problem is what the defendant owed. The second question is intent. The refusal must be made with the intention of confining, and a defendant who overlooks a request or is merely slow to answer it has formed no such intention. Once the intention is there, good motive is no defense. In Eilers v. Coy, a deprogramming case in which the defendants intended to confine the plaintiff for at least a week, the court said that it is not a defense that the defendants acted with good motives and that malice toward the person confined is not an element.3
The cases and notes show duties to release arising in four recurring ways. The clearest is an agreement to let the plaintiff go. In the yacht case, a woman told the defendant she feared he would not let her off the yacht until she was “won to the movement again.” He assured her repeatedly that under no circumstances would she be detained, and she sailed for America aboard it. At port he refused to furnish a boat so that she could leave, saying it was up to her husband; her husband said it was up to the defendant, who led the sect and owned the yacht. She stayed aboard nearly a month while the two of them tried to persuade her to rejoin the sect.4 The court found the duty in the agreement itself. Neither party could have understood it to mean only that he would bring her to an American harbor. The agreement implied that she would go ashore, and since the yacht's boats were the only practical way, he had promised to land her or to let her reach land by that means. His refusal of a boat was wrongful, and he plainly had the power to control the boats.5 The promise supplied the duty, and the refusal supplied the act.
A second source is the limited scope of the plaintiff's consent to be in the defendant's control. In Noguchi v. Nakamura, a woman told her boyfriend she did not want to see him anymore but agreed to ride with him just to the store and back. When they returned to her parents' house and she opened the car door, he suddenly started the car off, making it dangerous for her to get out. The Hawaii appellate court recognized that the driver had a duty to let her exit if her limited consent had expired.6 Consent to a ride is consent to that ride, and when the ride ends the permission to hold the passenger ends with it. The chapter returns to consent and its limits near the end.
A third source is the defendant's own closing of the way out, and the duty may then be one to show the exit rather than to open it. In the ticket-enclosure case, a man got into an enclosure where tickets were being sold but could not reach the stands. The defendant closed the entrance gates behind him to prevent injuries from the crush. Another exit existed, but no one told him of it, and he stayed inside for more than an hour. The verdict for him was affirmed: the defendant might have been justified in closing the gates, but it was then under a duty to inform him of the other exit.7 Section 45 reaches that duty through its language on aiding release by providing a means of escape, and one statement of the rule adds that the defendant may provide or show the means of egress.8 Closing the gates was defensible; the wrong lay in the silence afterward.
A refusal to restore a ladder poses the same question about providing a means of escape. In a secondary-source example, Amil enjoyed the view at first but tired after five minutes and told Logan to put the ladder back up. Logan refused, told him to “just jump,” and kept taunting him until Amil jumped and broke his ankle.9 Logan's refusal is a confining act only if he owed Amil the ladder and refused with the intention of confining him. The excerpt does not say how Amil came to be up there or who took the ladder down, and those are the facts that would show whether a promise, a limited permission, or nothing at all stood behind the refusal.
The fourth source is the end of a lawful confinement. A person who was properly restrained and is now entitled to leave is owed release, and an intentional failure to perform that duty, or to provide or show a means of egress, is actionable.10 “Properly restrained” includes confinements the law privileges. In many circumstances an arrest on a warrant or reasonable suspicion of a crime is privileged, though where the privilege does not apply the arrest is actionable false imprisonment.11 A store's detention of a suspected shoplifter follows the same pattern. Employees who had reasonable cause to believe a customer took jeans without paying, because the tags remained on them, probably could detain her for a reasonable period to investigate. The reasonableness of the length depends on the facts of each case, but twenty minutes is probably reasonable to resolve most shoplifting disputes.12
The duty cuts the other way when none exists. A note case asks whether an airline is liable for refusing to let a passenger leave the airplane after it had pulled away from the gate, after it had sat on the tarmac for an hour, or somewhere above New Jersey. In Abourezk v. New York Airlines, the court found no duty to release the passenger until the plane reached New York, absent exigent circumstances, which the case did not present.13 The contrast with the yacht is instructive. There the agreement itself implied that the woman would go ashore, and the yacht's boats were the only way. Here no duty to release arose before arrival, so the airline's refusal was not a confining act. The reservation for exigent circumstances shows that the line can move with the facts.
A plaintiff owed release need not take it by force. A person who is grabbed may use force in self-defense, since the grab is a battery, and the common law also recognizes a privilege to use self-defense to prevent false imprisonment. The Restatement gives the grabbed person the choice not to. He may submit and sue, and the defendant cannot argue that there was no false imprisonment because the plaintiff could have broken loose.14 The same logic answers a defendant who says the plaintiff could simply have pushed past the gangway or the door.
Two errors follow from losing sight of the duty. One treats every refusal to let a person go as false imprisonment, which skips the question of what the defendant owed. The other treats a broken promise as the tort itself, when the promise matters only because it fixed the duty that makes the refusal a confining act.
The second step does most of the work, since the first and third are usually plain on the facts. The fourth matters when the defendant's inaction looks callous but nothing shows a promise, a limited consent, or a confinement that has run its course.