Concept
Third-Party Claims
Intentional infliction of emotional distress
Third-Party Claims
Every element covered so far assumes that the defendant aimed the outrageous conduct at the plaintiff. Section 46(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is written that way: one who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is liable for that distress, and for any bodily harm that results from it.1 A third-party claim arises when the defendant aimed at one person and someone else suffered.
Section 46(2) governs that case and screens plaintiffs through two filters. Where the conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is liable if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress2 to a member of that person’s immediate family who is present at the time, whether or not the distress results in bodily harm,3 or to any other person who is present at the time, if the distress results in bodily harm.4 Presence is the first filter, and the plaintiff’s relationship to the victim is the second.
The filters answer a problem of reach. An act aimed at one person seldom touches only that person: witnesses see it, relatives hear of it, and any of them may suffer. Yet the intent element asks what the defendant wanted or knew about the person who is suing, and a defendant who set out to hurt one victim has not necessarily set out to hurt every onlooker. If every sufferer could recover, a single outrageous act would expose the defendant to claims from an audience of unpredictable size. Presence ties the plaintiff to the event, so the claim rests on what the plaintiff perceived as it happened. Relationship then sets the plaintiff’s burden of proof. A member of the immediate family is the person whose anguish an actor can most readily expect, so § 46(2) asks that plaintiff for no physical consequence. Any other person who is present must show bodily harm, a result that someone other than the plaintiff can observe and that answers the old worry that distress is easy to claim and hard to test.
A separate rule reaches the plaintiff who becomes ill. Section 312, covered earlier for the plaintiff whom the actor targeted, makes an actor liable for illness or bodily harm caused by distress that he intentionally and unreasonably inflicted, and clause (b) applies the rule irrespective of whether the act is directed against the other or a third person.5 That clause sets no presence or kinship condition, though it still demands actual illness or bodily harm. This unit takes up § 46(2) first, in three steps: conduct aimed at another, present family members, and other present bystanders. It then turns to § 312(b) and closes with the settings in which courts relax the presence requirement.
Conduct Directed at Another
The lead-in clause of § 46(2) carries the weight in every third-party claim, because its adverbs attach to a specific object. The actor must intentionally or recklessly cause severe emotional distress, and the distress he must cause is the plaintiff’s own.6 What the defendant intended toward the person he attacked, threatened, or deceived therefore does not complete a bystander’s claim. The plaintiff must tie the defendant’s state of mind to the plaintiff’s own suffering.
In an ordinary § 46(1) claim that tie comes with the facts, because the defendant aimed the conduct at the plaintiff. A third-party claim starts one step further back, and the usual definitions of the mental states do the work. A defendant intends distress by desiring it or knowing that it is substantially certain to occur, and acts recklessly by going ahead in conscious disregard of a high probability that distress will follow.7 Applied to a bystander, those definitions ask whether the defendant wanted, expected, or consciously risked that person’s suffering. A man who beats a stranger in a parking lot has chosen the stranger’s pain, but whether he has chosen anything about the stranger’s brother depends on whether he knew the brother was watching. Without that knowledge, nothing in the defendant’s mind connects him to the brother.
Presence and knowledge of presence are therefore separate facts, one about where the plaintiff stood and the other about what the defendant perceived. Many jurisdictions require, for any bystander claim, that the conduct be intentional and outrageous and also be directed at the plaintiff or take place in the plaintiff’s presence with the defendant’s awareness.8 The California Court of Appeal, quoting Christensen v. Superior Court, put the rule this way: “It is not enough that the conduct be intentional and outrageous. It must be conduct directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware.”9 The rule bites hardest on recklessness. Recklessness is conscious disregard of a high probability of distress, and no one can consciously disregard a risk to a person he does not know is there. California accordingly observes that when reckless conduct is the basis for recovery, the plaintiff is usually present and known by the defendant to be present.10
A relative who learns of an outrage afterward lacks the presence that anchors this claim. In Koontz v. Keller, an Ohio appellate court denied recovery where the defendant murdered the plaintiff’s sister and the plaintiff later discovered the body.11 The murder was extreme and the grief real, but the plaintiff met the event only after it ended.
A plaintiff whom the defendant set out to hurt stands differently, because the limits on presence and relationship never come into play. The defendant’s design supplies what presence would otherwise supply.
Susan is not a bystander at all. The defendant made her the object of his conduct, so hers is an ordinary § 46(1) claim. The limits in § 46(2) screen out the remote and unlimited circle of people who hear of outrageous acts, and a plaintiff the defendant singled out is not remote. The subject of the ad parody in Hustler shows the direct claim in its plain form: he sued as the target and won a jury verdict on this tort, with compensatory and punitive damages, although the First Amendment limits discussed later in this chapter govern whether such a verdict stands.12
Decided cases follow the same line. In Knierim v. Izzo, the defendant threatened a woman that he would murder her husband and then carried out the threat outside her presence, and the Illinois court permitted her to recover.13 A later subsection on absent plaintiffs returns to that case. Pleading turned on the same pivot in Catsouras v. Department of California Highway Patrol. The family did not allege that they were present when the e-mails were sent, and the court said that a complaint alleging only reckless conduct would fail under California law. The family also alleged that the defendants intended to cause them distress, and the court found those allegations enough to survive demurrer.14
Transfer of intent offers a further route to a plaintiff who was never the target. Where the defendant intends to distress A and takes steps to do so, but unforeseen events leave B traumatized instead, B should have a cause of action.15 The purpose route has a price. The plaintiff must prove the defendant’s actual aim or knowledge as to the plaintiff, which can be hard when the defendant knew nothing about the plaintiff, as the earlier discussion of purpose and substantial certainty showed.
An exam stem that places a relative in the crowd has supplied only one of the two facts the reckless route needs. The answer also needs something showing that the defendant perceived the plaintiff. A stem that says only that the defendant should have realized someone might be watching describes negligence, which does not satisfy this tort.
Family Members Present
Present members of the victim’s immediate family hold the easiest bystander claim, because § 46(2) asks of them only the family tie, presence, and a culpable defendant. Where conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is liable if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to a member of that person’s immediate family who is present at the time, whether or not the distress results in bodily harm.17 The clause has three working parts. The plaintiff must belong to the victim’s immediate family, must have been present when the conduct occurred, and must be someone whose own distress the defendant intended or recklessly caused, as the previous subsection explained. The closing phrase separates this category from § 46(2)(b): a family member who proves those three things needs no physical consequence, while any other person who is present must show that the distress resulted in bodily harm.18
Each limit has its own reason. The family tie does the job that bodily harm does elsewhere. Distress is easy to claim and hard to test, and a physical injury gives an outside observer something to check. But when a spouse or child watches a loved one attacked, the closeness of the relationship makes severe distress so predictable that the circumstances themselves supply the assurance. Presence does a different job, which is to control who can sue. The presence requirement shields defendants from unwarranted liability, helps ensure that compensation goes to victims with genuine claims, and gives courts a manageable line that protects them from a flood of claims.19 Without it, one beating would expose the defendant to suits from every relative, friend, and neighbor who later heard of it and was upset.
Presence means contemporaneous perception, and sight is only one way to have it. In Bevan v. Fix, the court described presence as “sensory and contemporaneous observance of defendant’s acts,” a formulation that reaches hearing as well as sight.20 The reason follows from what the requirement protects. A child behind a closed door who hears the blows lives through the event as it unfolds, and the shock the tort addresses comes from that experience. A relative who learns of the same attack from a telephone call that evening has received a report. That is why the plaintiff who found a murdered sister’s body afterward could not recover in Koontz v. Keller.21 A later subsection returns to the exceptions some courts make for absent relatives.
Knowledge of the plaintiff’s presence is the element that most often fails. The lead-in clause requires that the defendant intentionally or recklessly cause the plaintiff’s own distress, and no one can desire, expect, or consciously disregard the suffering of a person he has no reason to think is there. In Taylor v. Vallelunga, a daughter who alleged that she was present and witnessed the defendants beat her father sued for her own emotional distress, and the California court affirmed dismissal.22 The complaint did not allege that the defendants knew she was present, that the beating was administered to cause her distress, or that they knew severe distress to her was substantially certain to result.23 She argued that such facts might be proved at trial, but she had been given leave to amend and had not, so the only question was whether the complaint as filed stated a cause of action.24 The family tie and her presence were already on the page. The dismissal rested on the missing allegations about the defendants’ knowledge and purpose, which is where claims in this category are lost.
The Restatement illustration the court quoted supplies the missing fact. A wife sits on her front porch watching her husband, who stands on the sidewalk, and a man who hates the husband, is friendly to the wife, and knows she is there stabs the husband to death. He is liable to her for her mental anguish, grief, and horror.25 His friendliness toward her does not matter, because he knew she was there. Recklessness leads to the same place, since a defendant who goes ahead with an attack in front of a family member he knows is present consciously disregards a high probability of distress.26
The daughter and the wife in the examples above show how far the clause reaches, and it stops at the immediate family. A friend, neighbor, or co-worker who is present falls under § 46(2)(b) and must show bodily harm. A fact pattern that says where the relative stood without saying whether the defendant knew it has planted the knowledge issue, and the right answer notes the gap.
Other Bystanders With Bodily Harm
Clause (b) of § 46(2) reaches every present plaintiff outside the victim’s immediate family. Where conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is liable if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to any other person who is present at the time, if the distress results in bodily harm.28 The two clauses ask for the same things in most respects: the plaintiff must have been present, the conduct must be extreme and outrageous, and the defendant must have intentionally or recklessly caused the plaintiff’s own severe distress. The stranger carries one further burden, which is to show that the distress produced bodily harm. A present immediate family member recovers without it.29
Bodily harm does for the stranger what the family relationship does for a spouse or child. Distress cannot be seen, so a claim for it is cheap to assert and hard to test. A spouse or child watching a loved one attacked is almost certain to suffer severely, so the circumstances themselves vouch for the claim. An onlooker with no tie to the victim offers no such assurance, because horror at violence is a common reaction among witnesses and the plaintiff’s own account is the only proof. Requiring bodily harm supplies what is missing. A miscarriage or a physical illness can be confirmed by someone other than the plaintiff, and it shows that the reaction went beyond transient upset. The requirement also limits the number of claims, since a shocking event in a public place may have many witnesses and only those whose distress injured the body can sue.
Hill v. Kimball illustrates the route. The defendant inflicted a bloody battery on two people in the presence of a pregnant woman, and she suffered a miscarriage as a result of her mental disturbance.30 The Second Restatement allows recovery on facts of that kind when the defendant knows of the bystander’s presence and the bystander suffers bodily harm as a result of her distress.31 The miscarriage fits the clause for two reasons. A physician can confirm it without relying on how she described her feelings, and it was something her horror did to her body, which supplies the causal link the clause demands. The other requirements stay in place: the defendant must have known she was present, the conduct must be outrageous, and her distress must be severe. Had the blows landed on her, she would have an ordinary claim for the physical injury. The bystander clause gives her a claim for what the sight did to her.
Presence and awareness of presence remain separate facts to establish before bodily harm matters. Taylor v. Vallelunga shows a bystander claim failing on that ground. The daughter who watched the defendants beat her father did not allege that they knew she was present or meant to distress her, and her family tie made a missing physical injury beside the point. A plaintiff with no kinship to the father who pleaded the same facts would have faced two gaps, the missing knowledge and the missing bodily harm.
The physical-harm filter belongs to the Second Restatement, and the trend in emotional-distress law generally runs against it. A large number of cases have dropped the requirement of physical symptoms or manifestations, or hold that it does not apply when the facts tend to show the reality of the plaintiff’s emotional harm.32 The Restatement Third directly disavows a requirement of physical manifestations of distress and limits claims instead to serious emotional disturbance, whether or not physical manifestations accompany it.33 An exam answer should apply the bodily-harm requirement as the Second Restatement states it for a stranger in the crowd, and it may note that modern authority has loosened it.
The difference between the man and the woman is a single fact, whether the distress reached the body. The difference between the woman and the son is the family tie. Exam stems often describe a bystander as tearful, horrified, or angry, and those words describe the distress itself. They do not supply bodily harm, which must be an injury or illness of the body that results from the distress, such as the miscarriage in Hill. A bystander struck by the attacker has a separate claim for that direct injury, and the stranger’s claim under clause (b) needs harm that the distress produced. A bystander who falls ill may also have a second route under § 312(b), which applies whether the act is directed against the plaintiff or a third person, and the next subsection compares the two.34
Section 312 and Third Persons
Clause (b) of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 312 carries the illness rule across the line that § 46(2) draws around bystanders. Section 312 makes an actor liable for illness or other bodily harm when he intentionally and unreasonably subjects another to emotional distress that he should recognize as likely to result in such harm, and the distress is a legal cause of the harm.36 Clause (a) removes any need that the actor intended the harm itself, and clause (b) removes any need that the act be aimed at the plaintiff: the liability applies “irrespective of whether the act is directed against the other or a third person.”37 A plaintiff who watches or hears of an attack on someone else may therefore sue for a resulting illness. The rule is best learned beside § 46(2), which handles the same bystander problem under tighter limits.
Section 46(2) screens bystanders by status. A member of the victim’s immediate family who is present recovers for severe distress even without bodily harm, and any other present person recovers only if the distress results in bodily harm.38 Those limits answer two worries at once: that one outrageous act could expose the defendant to claims from an audience of unpredictable size, and that a claim of distress is easy to assert and hard to test. Section 312(b) imposes no kinship or presence condition, so other conditions must answer the same worries. The comparison comes down to four points:
- Section 46(2) limits plaintiffs to present family members and to other present persons who suffer bodily harm; § 312(b) states no kinship or presence condition.
- A present family member under § 46(2)(a) recovers for severe distress alone; § 312 compensates only illness or other bodily harm of which the distress is a legal cause.
- Section 46 demands extreme and outrageous conduct; § 312 demands only that the actor act unreasonably.
- Section 312 requires that the actor should recognize illness or bodily harm as a likely result; § 46(2) imposes no such condition.
Section 312 filters by the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s body instead of by the plaintiff’s status. The actor must intentionally and unreasonably subject “another” to distress, which requires that he have that person in view. He must recognize that the distress is likely to cause illness or bodily harm, and the plaintiff must actually fall ill. The word unreasonably excludes cases in which it is reasonable, even inevitable, to cause distress with serious physical consequences, such as informing even an ill woman of the death of a dearly loved relative.39 The illness requirement supplies the objective proof that a bystander’s own account of horror cannot. The comment explains the logic of the rule: the actor’s conduct is negligent not because it is intended to cause a mental disturbance but because it is likely to result in physical harm through that disturbance.40
The second mother marks the edge of § 312. The comment to the section says the rule does not give protection to “mental and emotional tranquillity,” and that a disturbance matters only so far as it carries a risk of bodily harm.41 Whether she has another route depends on § 46(2). As a present member of the immediate family of the person attacked, she could recover for severe distress alone if the creditor’s conduct was extreme and outrageous and he intentionally or recklessly caused her distress.42 A stranger in the same spot who suffered neither illness nor bodily harm would have a claim under neither rule. The two provisions are parallel doors with different keys: § 46(2) opens for status and outrage, and § 312(b) opens for illness that an intentional and unreasonable actor should have seen coming.
Reaching harm to a third person is a feature of the intentional version of the rule. The negligent counterpart, § 313, states that its rule has no application to illness or bodily harm caused by emotional distress arising solely from harm or peril to a third person, unless the actor’s negligence has otherwise created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the plaintiff.43 On an exam stem about a bystander who falls ill, check both § 46(2) and § 312. Let the facts about what the defendant knew of the plaintiff’s condition, whether the distress was intended, and whether it was justified decide whether § 312 is available.
Absent Plaintiffs and Corpses
Presence is the usual condition of a bystander claim, because § 46(2) grants recovery to a present family member or to a present bystander who suffers bodily harm.45 Courts have relaxed that condition in two settings. In the first, a close relative who was not at the scene recovers because the defendant’s conduct was aimed at that relative. In the second, next of kin recover for what was done to a dead body. Both are exceptions. Jurisdictions differ on how far they reach, and each carries a limit that keeps it narrow.
The D.C. Court of Appeals listed three jobs for the presence requirement in Republic of Sudan v. Owens. It shields defendants from unwarranted liability, helps ensure that compensation goes to victims with genuine claims of severe distress, and gives courts a judicially manageable standard that protects them from a flood of claims.46 Each job stands in for a fact the plaintiff would otherwise have to prove. Presence stands in for the defendant’s awareness of the plaintiff, since a defendant cannot desire or consciously disregard the distress of someone he never perceived. It stands in for the genuineness of the injury, since a person who watched or heard a loved one attacked is almost certain to suffer. And it draws the boundary of the plaintiff class, since only the people in the room can sue. A plaintiff who was absent but whom the defendant singled out supplies those facts another way. The defendant’s design shows awareness of the plaintiff, the class of plaintiffs is the one person the defendant meant to hurt, and a defendant who chose a relative as the target has given a court good reason to believe the harm was real. That is why courts can relax presence in these cases and still insist that the defendant’s mental state reach the plaintiff’s own distress.
Courts have generally required that the plaintiff witness the conduct and that the defendant know or have reason to know of the plaintiff’s presence, yet liability might extend to a close relative who was not present when the circumstances of the case justify it.47 In Knierim v. Izzo, the defendant threatened a woman that he would murder her husband and then carried out the threat outside her presence, and the Illinois court allowed her to recover.48 The threat made the difference. It was delivered to the wife herself, so the defendant knew exactly whom his words were meant to terrorize, and the killing then made good on the promise. Washington’s court applied similar logic in Schurk v. Christensen when it let the mother of a five-year-old recover against a teenage babysitter who molested the child, although she was not there.49 Commentary extends the same reasoning to the sexual abuse of a minor child by a predator and to terrorist attacks.50 In each setting a close relative bears a harm that is severe and predictable, and the wrong is of a kind whose effect on that relative the defendant can hardly miss.
Courts that make these exceptions describe them as narrow. In R.D. v. W.H., a decedent’s husband and minor child sued a man who allegedly abused the decedent before her suicide. The Wyoming court stressed that the better practice limits recovery to plaintiffs who were present during the outrageous conduct, and it recognized only a narrow exception for that case.51
The terrorism cases push the idea furthest. In Republic of Sudan v. Owens, the D.C. Court of Appeals held that presence is not required in terrorism suits against foreign sovereigns. The facts that justify stripping a sovereign of its immunity already answer the concerns presence addresses, and insisting on it would leave compelling claims uncompensated. The court invoked the Restatement Second’s own caveat to reach that result.52 The holding rests on the same logic as the threat-then-killing exception: the setting does the work that presence ordinarily does.
Not every court goes this way. California states a stricter rule, drawn from Christensen v. Superior Court. Intentional and outrageous conduct is not enough by itself, because the conduct must be directed at the plaintiff or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware, and when recklessness is the basis for recovery the plaintiff is usually present and known to be.53 A family that alleges neither that the conduct was directed at them nor that it occurred in their presence does not satisfy that rule when the claim rests on recklessness. The rule follows from what recklessness is. Recklessness means consciously disregarding a high probability of distress, and presence is what ordinarily gives the defendant someone to be conscious of. An absent family that the defendant never identified gives recklessness nothing to attach to, while a defendant who aims the conduct at the family is tied to them without any presence.
The pleading in Catsouras v. Department of Cal. Highway Patrol shows the distinction at work. The family of a deceased accident victim sued over e-mails that spread photographs of the victim, and they did not allege that they were present when the e-mails were sent.54 The Court of Appeal said that had the family alleged only reckless conduct, the complaint would fail under current California law. But the family also alleged intent to cause them distress. Liberally construed, that allegation asserted that the defendants directed their conduct toward the plaintiffs, and since the severe distress and causation were undisputed, the trial court should have overruled the demurrers.55
The pleading mattered because the missing link in a recklessness claim is the defendant’s awareness of the plaintiff. The family pointed to facts that could supply the connection. The highway patrol knew, at least from the time the father identified himself at the accident scene, that he was the decedent’s father, and the family argued that the e-mails must have carried identifying information, since Internet users had targeted them.56 The court treated those allegations as enough at the pleading stage, so the ruling did not decide whether the defendants actually meant to harm the family. Intent aimed at the family can carry a claim without presence because the defendant’s own purpose supplies what presence otherwise supplies, a connection between the defendant’s state of mind and these particular plaintiffs.
The second exception is older than the general tort. A dead body cannot itself be distressed, so when a defendant abuses one, the wrong falls on the relatives who care for it. Intentional or reckless mishandling of a corpse accordingly gives the emotionally distressed next of kin a cause of action.57 Before courts recognized intentional infliction of emotional distress as a separate tort, a number of them allowed recovery for mental distress at the intentional mutilation or disinterment of a dead body or at interference with proper burial. In one case an autopsy was performed without the widow’s consent, and in another a priest ordered a late wife’s grave moved to another part of the cemetery without notifying the husband.58 Alabama’s court has called it long the law of that state that mistreatment of burial places and human remains supports damages for mental suffering.59 In Papieves v. Lawrence, a driver whose car killed a boy hid and buried the body instead of telling the police or the parents. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized the family’s claim, but because of the procedural posture and the extraordinary facts, it did not define the scope of the newly recognized tort further.60
A corpse claim needs no presence because the wrong falls on the survivors whether or not they watch it. A defendant who hides a body, holds it for payment, or discards remains knows that the people who will absorb the injury are the family. The foreseeable and often the intended victims are therefore the living relatives, and the shocking character of the act gives strong assurance that their distress is real. The requirement that the mishandling be intentional or reckless does the narrowing work that presence does elsewhere. A defendant who simply botches a task never consciously disregarded a high probability of distress, and a plaintiff who sues for carelessness must look to negligence law, which a later section compares with this tort. Courts that follow California’s stricter formulation add one more filter, because the family must plead that the conduct was directed at them, which is why the allegation of intent in Catsouras was decisive.
A stem about a relative who was not there should be sorted by what the defendant aimed at. If the defendant threatened the relative, made demands of the family, or sent the harm toward the family, the claim fits the exception for conduct aimed at the plaintiff and can succeed in courts that excuse presence. If the stem says only that the defendant acted recklessly toward a victim and that the relative heard about it later, the stricter approach defeats the claim for want of presence. An answer should state presence as the general requirement, name the exception that fits the facts, and note that jurisdictions differ on how far the exceptions reach.