Concept
Compensatory Damages for Personal Harm
Remedies and damages for intentional torts
Compensatory Damages for Personal Harm
Memphis Community School District v. Stachura set damages for a constitutional tort by borrowing the common law of torts, and the Supreme Court used the occasion to say what compensatory damages are for. Punitive damages aside, tort damages exist to compensate the plaintiff for the injury the defendant's breach of duty caused.1 Compensation reaches past out-of-pocket loss and other monetary harm to injuries such as impairment of reputation, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.2 That description fits the intentional torts to the person (assault, battery, false imprisonment, and infliction of emotional distress), because they injure the plaintiff's sense of security and dignity as well as the plaintiff's body. Earlier sections showed that a plaintiff who proves the invasion but no loss receives only a token sum. This section asks what the law counts as compensation once the plaintiff can prove a loss.
Compensation aims to restore the plaintiff, so far as money can, to the position held before the tort.3 A court cannot undo a dislocated shoulder or a humiliating confrontation, so money is the only substitute it can offer. Two consequences follow. Every loss, including the non-economic ones, must be translated into dollars, because a loss that cannot be priced cannot be paid. And the plaintiff recovers all past and future damages from the injury in one lump sum in one lawsuit, which spares the defendant piecemeal suits over the same harm and requires the plaintiff to prove future consequences at that trial.4 Because the measure follows the plaintiff's loss, the injury sets it and the defendant's culpability does not. Culpability belongs to the separate punitive layer taken up later in this chapter.5
Three questions organize what follows: which concrete expenses and lost earnings, past and future, can be documented; how the law values suffering that leaves no receipt, such as pain, fright, and indignity; and how far an intentional tortfeasor answers for consequences much worse than the tortfeasor intended. The first comes next.
Economic Losses
Horton v. Suzuki shows economic loss at work on a compact set of facts. A karate instructor struck a student on the cheek after class had been dismissed. The blow cut the inside of the student's mouth, and the cut became infected and cost $1,500 to treat.6 The Franklin Court of Appeal affirmed $7,500 in compensatory damages, made up of $1,500 for medical expenses and $6,000 for pain and suffering, and stated the governing rule: compensatory damages for an intentional tort such as battery may include medical expenses, lost wages, and pain and suffering.7 The first two items are the economic losses, the money the plaintiff spent or failed to earn because of the injury, and a plaintiff documents them with bills, receipts, and pay records. The third item comes in the next subsection, where proof works without receipts.
The law reimburses the past and future pecuniary losses and out-of-pocket expenses that the injury caused. The recoverable items usually fall into four groups.8
- Reasonable medical expenses, including doctor, hospital, and nursing charges, tests, medicines, devices, physical therapy, and the travel needed to obtain those services.
- Lost wages, earnings, or profits.
- The cost of substitute labor hired to do work the plaintiff cannot perform because of the injury.
- The cost of custodial care when the injury leaves the plaintiff largely incapable of self-care.
Each group measures one thing: the money the tort took or made the plaintiff spend. That explains why the award tracks the underlying figures so closely. A plaintiff who pays a hospital $1,500 is poorer by exactly that sum than if the tort had never happened, so repaying it restores the plaintiff's earlier financial position. A larger award would leave the plaintiff better off than before the wrong, and a smaller one would leave part of the loss uncompensated.9
Lost earnings need more care than medical bills, because they involve time and prospects as well as past paychecks. A plaintiff wholly or partly unable to work because of the injury recovers the wages and fringe benefits already lost and those that will be lost in the future. Evidence of earnings before and after the injury is relevant, provided the plaintiff also shows that the reduction was a proximate result of the injury.10 Pre-injury pay can understate the loss, because raises the plaintiff reasonably expected, whether from general gains in productivity or from ordinary career advancement, are lost along with the base pay.11 In some circumstances a plaintiff may claim lost earning capacity in place of actual or prospective earnings, which reflects the value of the work the plaintiff could have done but for the injury.12 The earnings measure follows what the plaintiff actually earned, while the capacity measure follows what the injury took from the plaintiff's ability to earn.
Because these items are concrete, pleading rules treat them as a group. Medical expenses and lost wages are special damages: a plaintiff must plead them specifically so that the defendant has notice that they will be claimed, and personal-injury lawyers often call them specials.13 Pain and suffering is a general damage that follows naturally from a battery causing bodily harm, so a complaint alleging only great bodily harm or a broken leg traditionally sufficed to prove it.14 A plaintiff's attorney's fees, though a real expense of the suit, are not recoverable absent a statute.15
The arithmetic in these cases is mostly addition. In Horton the economic component came straight from the treatment invoice, so the court had no valuation to perform for the $1,500 and exercised its discretion only on the $6,000 for pain and suffering, which has no mathematical formula.16 A practice problem built on the same rules shows the dollar-for-dollar treatment across several categories. Miller's shoulder was dislocated and her phone broke. She recovers $5,000 for medical bills, $100 for a week of lost wages at a part-time cafeteria job, and $500 to replace the phone, a total of $5,600 in economic items before any award for pain and suffering.17
Every item must be proved with reasonable certainty, which means the plaintiff must supply a rational basis for computing the loss. The law does not demand mathematical precision.18 The requirement works in two layers. The plaintiff must first establish with reasonable certainty that the tort caused the claimed loss, and the plaintiff carries the burden of tracing each item to the defendant's conduct. Once entitlement to some recovery is established, courts tolerate less exactitude in measuring the amount.19 The reason is that a wrongdoer should not profit from uncertainty that the wrongdoing itself created, so a plaintiff who has proved a real loss is not sent away empty-handed because the exact figure is hard to fix.20 Because the plaintiff must recover past and future damages in a single suit,21 future items get the same treatment as past ones. The jury need only find it more probable than not that a future loss or expense will be incurred, and it needs a reasonable basis beyond sheer speculation for computing it.22
The avoidable-consequences doctrine supplies the second limit. It bars recovery for any loss that the plaintiff could have prevented by reasonable effort or expenditure after the tort, and it awards damages as if the plaintiff had minimized the loss, even when the plaintiff in fact suffered a larger one through unreasonable inaction.23 The reasoning follows from the rightful-position idea above: a plaintiff who could have avoided part of a loss and recovers for it anyway ends up better off than if the tort had never happened. The standard illustration involves a broken leg. The victim unreasonably fails to seek treatment, the leg becomes gangrenous and must be amputated, and recovery covers the broken leg but not the amputation that reasonable care would have prevented.24 The initial injury stays fully compensable, and only the aggravated portion drops out. The doctrine also protects a plaintiff who acts sensibly, since expenses reasonably incurred to minimize damages are themselves recoverable.25 A victim who promptly pays for treatment that limits the harm recovers that cost, while a victim who unreasonably declines treatment forfeits the extra harm that follows, so a fact pattern that mentions skipped follow-up care raises the question whether skipping it was unreasonable.
Every figure in this analysis ties to a bill, a pay record, or a projection built from one, so a court can compute the economic award by arithmetic. Pain, fright, and indignity leave no receipt, and the next subsection shows how the law values them.
Pain, Suffering, and Distress
Horton v. Suzuki defines pain and suffering in an intentional tort case as physical pain together with mental suffering such as insult and indignity, hurt feelings, and fright caused by the battery.29 The court listed that item beside medical expenses and lost wages as a component of compensatory damages, so it is part of the award in its own right. Medical bills and pay records can be added up, but pain and humiliation cannot, and yet a large share of the injury in an intentional tort case is this intangible harm. That is why plaintiffs routinely claim far more than their out-of-pocket costs.30 The Supreme Court describes compensatory damages the same way in Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, where they reach past monetary loss to injuries such as personal humiliation and mental anguish and suffering.31
Physical pain is the simpler half. A plaintiff recovers for pain endured before trial and for chronic pain that medical experts predict will continue, and the pain must have been felt, so a period of unconsciousness produces no award for that interval.32 A practice problem built on these rules shows the component at work. Trapp dislocated Miller's shoulder. Miller may recover for the pain when the shoulder was dislocated, the pain when the doctor popped it back into place, and the pain during and after the time she wore her arm in a sling.33 Each stage is a separate period of suffering, which is why a damages analysis lists the stages and does not treat the injury as a single event.
Mental suffering is the half that makes intentional torts distinctive, because the wrong is committed against a person's dignity and sense of security as well as the person's body. The California Supreme Court, in Thing v. La Chusa, traced how the law came to protect that interest. Emotional distress first entered the law as an item of damages in intentional tort actions, and in assault, battery, false imprisonment, and defamation the mental suffering frequently becomes the principal element of damages.34 The compensable range includes fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, shock, humiliation, and indignity.35 Because mental suffering is often the main injury, the court called it anomalous to deny recovery merely because the defendant's intentional misconduct fell short of producing a physical injury. It also reasoned that the defendant's own conduct frequently proves a serious invasion of mental tranquility better than the presence or absence of physical symptoms does.36 A plaintiff in battery, assault, or false imprisonment therefore recovers for distress without showing a physical injury.37
A justice writing separately in Clift v. Narragansett Television would extend the same freedom to claims for infliction of distress. Conduct outrageous enough to support liability makes severe distress likely, so a claim is less likely to be disingenuous, and the justice would resolve doubts about a claimed emotional injury by letting the factfinder decide, not by letting the accused wrongdoer block the claim at the outset for want of evidence of bodily injury.38
The factfinder also does not need direct testimony about every feeling. Horton permits mental suffering to be inferred from proof of fright caused by a sudden, unprovoked, and unjustifiable battery, since a person struck without warning or reason ordinarily experiences alarm and indignity whatever the physical result.39
Infliction of emotional distress is where distress stops being an item of damages and becomes the injury the claim requires. Brandon v. County of Richardson shows the requirement at work. The court held as a matter of law that the defendant's conduct, in a case involving an interview of a rape and assault victim, was extreme and outrageous, beyond all possible bounds of decency, and that the district court erred in holding otherwise.40 The court then turned to a separate element, whether Brandon suffered as a result, because liability arises only when emotional distress has in fact resulted and is severe.41 A plaintiff who proves outrageous conduct but no resulting severe distress cannot recover on that claim. In battery, assault, and false imprisonment the claim is complete without any distress, and distress adds to the recovery without conditioning it.
No formula converts suffering into dollars. Pain, suffering, and mental anguish cannot be reduced to a precise monetary equivalent, so the amount goes to the jury, subject to control by the court.42 Horton says the same of the trier of fact: there is no mathematical formula, and the valuation rests in the factfinder's sound discretion.43 Two reasons support this latitude. Injuries such as pain and emotional distress are inherently less capable of empirical proof than a hospital invoice, and a wrongdoer should not profit from the uncertainty his own conduct created.44 A rule demanding that a victim price a deliberate wrong to the dollar would shift its cost onto the victim. The latitude has edges. Once pain and suffering is proved, a verdict that awards exactly the economic losses and nothing for the suffering is inadequate as a matter of law.45 An exam answer that totals the receipts and stops has therefore skipped a category that is often the largest.
Courts keep that discretion from becoming arbitrary by comparing awards. The Horton court found the $7,500 total, of which $6,000 was for pain and suffering, in conformity with awards in battery cases involving minimal injuries.46 Other verdicts show how widely the figures spread. In Polk, a jury awarded $1,000 for the humiliation of having a defendant forcibly take the plaintiff's dinner plate and shout that the plaintiff could not be served in a private club, a loss that was entirely dignitary. In Little v. Franklin Chargers Inc., the plaintiff received $40,000 for a dislocated shoulder and humiliation in front of a fiancée and a stadium full of fans. In Cook v. Matthews Garage, the plaintiff received $50,000 after an employee screamed and cursed at him and broke his arm by pushing him to the floor. In Alma v. Burgess, the plaintiff received $400,000 after being stabbed and hospitalized.47 Humiliation alone anchors the low end, and the figures climb with the seriousness of the bodily injury and the publicity or abuse that accompanies it.
The limit on that latitude is now visible. It governs how precisely the amount must be proved, and the plaintiff must still put some suffering before the factfinder. Where a plaintiff establishes the violation of a right but cannot show damages with appropriate certainty, the trier of fact may limit the award to nominal damages.48 The inference from a sudden, unprovoked blow may carry some mental suffering without testimony, but it is an inference the factfinder may draw and need not draw, so Okonkwo's silence puts a larger award at risk.
Scope of Recoverable Harm
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 33 supplies the broad rule on how far an intentional tortfeasor answers for harm: a person who intentionally causes physical harm is liable for all its consequences, even those that were unintended, unlikely, or unforeseeable.53 The rule rests on a distinction between two things the word intent can describe. One is the intent to make a harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff's body, which battery requires. The other is the intent to produce the particular injuries the contact causes, which battery does not require.54 The first kind of intent decides liability, and the harm the contact actually produces decides damages. A defendant who meant only the contact cannot shrink the award by pointing out that the injury was worse than planned.
The two kinds of intent come apart cleanly in a tripping illustration. Brutus decides to humiliate Cassius by tripping him as he leaves the Senate building. Brutus acted with the purpose to trip Cassius, which is an offensive contact, and when Cassius tripped the battery was complete. From that point the law holds Brutus liable for all its consequences, whether Cassius suffers no injury, the injury Brutus expects, or one far worse.55 Suppose the fall carried Cassius sideways over a railing and down a flight of stairs, and he suffered a severe concussion. Brutus would answer for the concussion even though he did not act with the purpose of causing it and was not substantially certain that a trip would. The seriousness of the harm sets the size of the award, and Brutus's surprise at it plays no part.
Decided cases apply the same logic. In Lambertson v. United States, an inspector in a meatpacking plant ran up behind a worker, jumped on his back, and pulled the worker's hat over his eyes, apparently in horseplay. The worker stumbled forward onto meat hooks and was seriously injured, and the Second Circuit held the inspector liable for the facial injuries because the jump was itself an offensive contact.56 In Baker v. Shymkiv, a trespass to land led to an argument with the owner, the owner suffered a fatal heart attack during the argument, and the Ohio Supreme Court held the trespasser liable for the death as a consequence of the intentional tort.57 The inspector and the trespasser had little in common except structure. Each chose an invasion that was tortious by itself, and each answered for the unlooked-for harm that followed.
A dissenting opinion in Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters states the traditional common-law position in the same terms. Reasoning by analogy to tort law in an antitrust case, it observed that the victim of an intentional tort has long been assumed able to recover on proof that the conduct was a cause in fact of the injury. It added that an inquiry into proximate cause has traditionally been deemed unnecessary against intentional tortfeasors, and that in many situations the common law holds such a tortfeasor liable even for unforeseeable consequences.58 Because that is a dissent about antitrust standing, it shows how the common-law rule is conventionally stated and does not decide a damages question. It also shows what the plaintiff must still prove: that the tort was a cause in fact of each injury claimed.
The law shifts so much loss onto the intentional actor because of how these torts arise. An intentional tort requires a deliberate choice to invade another's rights, so the actor could have avoided every consequence by refraining from the invasion. When the invasion sets off harm no one expected, the loss falls either on the actor who chose it or on the innocent victim, and placing it on the actor also gives every would-be actor a reason not to invade in the first place.59 Negligence runs on a different footing. Liability there is limited to the foreseeable consequences of the defendant's act, and the greater culpability of intentional torts is the reason courts generally hold the defendant for all the ensuing consequences, foreseeable or otherwise.60 Contract law also limits recovery by anticipation, since damages are generally confined to what the parties contemplated or could reasonably have foreseen at formation, which lets them estimate their financial risk in advance.61 California's Civil Code § 3333, by contrast, measures damages for an obligation not arising from contract as all the detriment proximately caused, "whether it could have been anticipated or not."62
Everything above assumes that the contact is itself a tort, so the first question in any problem is whether the defendant intended a harmful or offensive contact at all. Suppose Romeo greets Juliet with his customary hug on an icy path. Given their relationship, he is justified in inferring that she will not find the contact offensive, and the reasonable person in her position would not. When she slips and breaks her arm, Romeo has committed no battery, because he intended no harmful or offensive contact, though he may face a negligence claim for hugging her where the footing was bad.63 The broken arm is as real as Cassius's concussion, but Brutus intended a contact that was a tort in its own right, and Romeo did not. The test of offensiveness is objective, so a plaintiff's unusual sensitivity cannot turn a socially acceptable contact into a battery.64 Once the contact is tortious, though, the defendant answers for the harm it actually causes, even harm greater than the defendant expected.65 The law of mistake allocates risk the same way. In Ranson v. Kitner, the defendant shot the plaintiff's dog, thinking it was a wolf, and the court held him liable, throwing the risk of the mistake on the defendant. The same allocation seems appropriate where the actor acts for the antisocial purpose of causing a harmful or offensive touching.66
The broad rule has an outer edge, and it appears when the harm arrives by an unforeseeable route. Suppose an assault sprains the victim's ankle and the victim later suffers a freak burn at the hospital. The assailant is certainly liable for the sprain, and the burn is the hard question.67 Had negligence caused the sprain, proximate cause would probably bar recovery for the unforeseeable burn. Courts often charge intentional tortfeasors with unexpected consequences, but there is probably some foreseeability limit for them as well. The Third Restatement recognizes such a limit: in deciding whether to impose liability for unexpected harm from an intentional tort, a court considers the actor's moral culpability, the seriousness of the harm the actor intended, and the degree to which the conduct deviated from appropriate care.68 Applied to the burn, a mild, spur-of-the-moment act sits next to severe consequences that occurred in an unexpected manner, so a court might well refuse to make the assailant pay for the burn even though the assault was an intentional tort.
The reasoning that supports the broad rule also explains the limit. Charging the intentional actor with unexpected harm is justified by the actor's culpability in choosing the invasion, so the justification weakens when the harm has no connection to what the actor chose. A freak accident in a hospital would saddle a spur-of-the-moment act with a burden out of proportion to it. One way to see the difference from the Baker heart attack is that the owner's death occurred during the very argument the trespass provoked, while the hospital burn comes from a separate event at a later stage. The Restatement's own summary of liability for intentional harm still states the broad rule without qualification, so the limit is best treated as a refinement that some courts apply to freakish aftereffects.69 An answer should therefore begin with full liability for the harm that followed the tortious contact and flag the limit only where the aftereffect is freakish and the defendant's act was mild. A stem that says the defendant never meant for anyone to be seriously hurt does not, by itself, defeat liability for a contact that was tortious.