Concept
MacPherson v. Buick
Foreseeable and unforeseeable plaintiffs
MacPherson v. Buick
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (N.Y. 1916) ended the privity defense in negligence actions against manufacturers.1 A manufacturer now owes a duty of due care to any foreseeable plaintiff, including users, consumers, and bystanders, and the injured person’s lack of a contract with the maker is no defense.2
Under the older rule, courts demanded privity in negligence unless the product fit a recognized exception for things “inherently dangerous” or placing human life in “imminent danger,” and they struggled to say what separated those products from merely defective ones.3 Cardozo stopped sorting. Lack of privity is no defense when it is foreseeable that a negligently made product is likely to injure a class of persons that includes the plaintiff. That is essentially the ordinary test for negligence, so the exception swallowed the rule.4
The opinion makes three moves, and each carries its own element. Cardozo widened the thing-of-danger exception to reach products that are reasonably certain to imperil life and limb when carelessly made. He added the maker’s knowledge that people other than the buyer will use the product without new tests. And he placed the source of the resulting duty in the law, not in the sales contract. The sections below take the moves in that order, after the facts on which each depends.
Facts and Procedural Path
Buick manufactured automobiles and sold one to a retail dealer, who resold it to Donald MacPherson, a stone cutter and gravestone dealer from a small village near Saratoga Springs, New York, who bought his Buick Runabout in 1911.5 While MacPherson was in the car, it suddenly collapsed and threw him out. One wheel was made of defective wood, and its spokes crumbled into fragments.6 The jury could find that the wheel was defective when it left Buick’s hands, and the car was being prudently operated at eight miles an hour.7
Buick did not make the wheel. As Chief Judge Bartlett’s dissent recounts, Buick bought it ready-made from the Imperial Wheel Company of Flint, Michigan, a reputable maker that had supplied eighty thousand wheels, none of which had failed before this accident, and Buick ran no tests of its own, relying on Imperial.8 Cardozo found evidence that reasonable inspection would have discovered the defect and that no inspection was made.9 He rejected the reputable-supplier excuse. Buick was not merely a dealer in automobiles but a manufacturer, responsible for the finished product, and it was not free to put that product on the market without subjecting its component parts to ordinary and simple tests.10 The carelessness alleged is therefore an omitted inspection.
MacPherson’s only contract ran to the dealer; he had none with Buick. That gap mattered because liability for negligent manufacture had been confined to the immediate vendee, with exceptions only for articles dangerous to life or limb in their ordinary use.11 The dealer’s position as a reseller matters again below, because it tells us whom Buick should expect to drive its cars.
MacPherson did not allege that Buick knew of the defect and willfully concealed it. His case, Cardozo said, fell outside the rule of Kuelling v. Lean Mfg. Co., and the charge was negligence, not fraud.12 His claim therefore stood on carelessness alone.
Cardozo put the question narrowly: did Buick owe “a duty of care and vigilance to any one but the immediate purchaser”?13 If it did not, an omitted inspection gives a stranger to the sale no remedy, however plainly careless. Chief Judge Bartlett’s statement of the prior law pointed to the answer no. A vendor of a manufactured article was not liable for negligence to strangers injured by its defects, and the New York exceptions covered only articles inherently dangerous in their ordinary use.14
The trial judge refused to bar the claim for lack of privity, the jury returned a verdict of $5,000 for MacPherson, and the intermediate appellate court affirmed.15 The trial instruction fell between the old categories. An automobile is not inherently dangerous, the judge told the jury, but it may become so when equipped with a weak wheel; the maker is chargeable with knowledge of defects that reasonable inspection and tests would reveal; and its liability extends to a subpurchaser like the plaintiff.16 The Court of Appeals affirmed. Judges Hiscock, Chase, and Cuddeback joined Cardozo, Judge Hogan concurred in the result, Judge Pound did not vote, and Chief Judge Bartlett dissented.17
Bartlett’s dissent made two arguments. First, the judgment stretched vendor liability beyond the recognized exceptions, since the trial judge had himself said an automobile is not inherently dangerous.18 Second, he relied on an earlier decision that rejected a subvendee’s negligence suit against an automobile manufacturer for failing to discover a defective wheel. The dissent in that case had urged that stagecoach rules are archaic for automobiles and that the law should change. Bartlett answered that any change belongs to the legislature, not the courts, because courts across the country had uniformly refused to broaden the exceptions.19 The sections that follow show why neither argument carried the day.
The opinion’s account of the facts is tidier than the underlying record. Commentary reports that the facts had already been manipulated by the time the case reached the Court of Appeals, and that Cardozo then elided them altogether while reshaping products liability. The car, for one thing, “was not new, or even nearly new”; the MacPhersons had owned it for over a year and had put it to hard use.20 For exam purposes, work from the opinion’s version, a sudden collapse at eight miles an hour.
The Thing-of-Danger Test
Cardozo’s first move widens the old exception. He held that the principle of Thomas v. Winchester is not limited to poisons, explosives, and things of like nature, things that in their normal operation are implements of destruction.22 His test looks to what a careless maker causes, not to what the product ordinarily does: if the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is a thing of danger.23 A poison qualified under the old rule because injury was its ordinary function. Under Cardozo’s rule a product qualifies when carelessness in making it is likely to injure people. The nature of such a thing, he added, gives warning of the consequences to be expected.24 That places the test at the maker’s own vantage point, since a manufacturer who knows what the product is can see what a defect in it would do.
Cardozo reached the definition through decisions that had already stretched Thomas v. Winchester. In Devlin v. Smith, a contractor built a scaffold for a painter. He knew that the scaffold, improperly built, was a most dangerous trap, knew that the painter’s workmen would use it, and built it for that very purpose. He therefore owed the workmen, irrespective of his contract with their master, a duty to build it with care.25 Cardozo then passed over intermediate cases to the latest decision of the court following Thomas, Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co. A coffee urn installed in a restaurant exploded when heated and injured the plaintiff, and the manufacturer was liable because the urn was “of such a character inherently that, when applied to the purposes for which it was designed, it was liable to become a source of great danger to many people if not carefully and properly constructed.”26
Neither a scaffold nor a coffee urn exists to destroy. Each becomes a source of great danger only when carelessly built. Buick argued that things imminently dangerous to life are poisons, explosives, and deadly weapons, things whose normal function is to injure or destroy. Cardozo answered that whatever the rule in Thomas v. Winchester may once have been, it no longer had that restricted meaning.27 Once scaffolds and urns qualified, normal function could not define the category, and the one thing the cases shared was the peril a careless maker creates.
Cardozo applied the test to a car with a defective wheel and sustained liability. Precedents drawn from the days of stagecoach travel, he wrote, “do not fit the conditions of travel to-day.” The principle that the danger must be imminent does not change, but the things subject to it do, and they are whatever the needs of life in a developing civilization require them to be.28 In this way MacPherson broadened the category of “inherently” or “imminently” dangerous products far enough to abolish the privity requirement in negligence cases.29
Looking to consequences makes sense because privity sat uneasily with the principles of negligence. A pedestrian has no contract with a coach driver, yet she recovers for the driver’s negligence. The old rule nonetheless required a contract between the victim of a defective product and the seller.30 A test keyed to the harm a defect foreseeably threatens removes that anomaly, while a test that sorts products by whether injury is their purpose ignores the danger the maker actually created.
Cardozo built a limit into the test. The maker must know of a danger that is probable, not merely possible, because it is possible to use almost anything in a way that makes it dangerous if defective.31 He also noted that whether a given thing is dangerous may sometimes be a question for the court and sometimes for the jury.32
The caution about probability has little independent force in current practice. Once the duty was tied to the harm a defect foreseeably threatens, the exception swallowed the rule, and the danger element now operates mostly as part of the ordinary inquiry into whether injury to the plaintiff’s class was a foreseeable result of carelessness.33 The Restatement frames the same inquiry by asking whether the actor’s conduct was negligent with respect to the plaintiff or the class of persons to which the plaintiff belongs.34 On an exam, treat the thing-of-danger label as a way of asking whether a careless defect would probably injure people in the product’s ordinary use. Reserve the probable-versus-possible limit for products whose only route to injury is an unusual misuse.
Danger identifies only the hazard. It does not yet say who may sue, and that is the work of the knowledge element.
Knowledge of Use by Others
Cardozo’s second element ties the duty to what the maker knows about how the product will be used. If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger must make it carefully.36 Each part of that knowledge does separate work. Knowledge that the danger will in the usual course of events be shared by others than the buyer identifies who stands in the path of a defect.37 Knowledge that the product will be used without new tests explains why the maker’s care matters so much: when nobody downstream will examine the product again, the maker’s inspection is the last chance to catch a defect.
A plaintiff need not prove what the maker thought about any particular driver. Cardozo wrote that such knowledge may often be inferred from the nature of the transaction.38 Buick sold the car to a dealer whose business was to resell it. The dealer, Cardozo observed, was the one person of whom it could be said with some approach to certainty that he would not use the car, yet Buick would have the law say he was the one person it was bound to protect, a conclusion he called inconsequent.39 A duty running only to the buyer would thus shield the party least exposed to the danger and leave unprotected the people the sale was arranged to reach.
The same inference explains why the plaintiff need not be someone the maker could name. The contractor in Devlin v. Smith invited the owner’s workmen to use the scaffold he built, and the manufacturer who sells a car to a dealer likewise invites the dealer’s customers to use it. The invitation runs in the one case to determinate persons and in the other to an indeterminate class, but in each it is equally plain and its consequences must be the same.40 A class can be foreseeable although no member of it is identifiable in advance.
Cardozo also quoted Lord Esher’s formulation in Heaven v. Pender, while noting that it did not command the full assent of Lord Esher’s associates. Lord Esher would reach goods that would in all probability be used at once, before a reasonable opportunity for discovering any defect, and whose condition, if handled without ordinary care or skill, would probably cause danger to the person or property of the user. He would exclude goods supplied in circumstances in which it would be a chance by whom they would be used, or whether they would be used at all, or whether they would be used before a defect could probably be noticed.41 What separates an indeterminate class from a matter of chance is that the transaction itself defines the class. The dealer’s customers are exactly the people a sale of cars to a dealer is arranged to reach.
The second part of the knowledge element is easiest to see where it is missing. In surveying the early cases, among them Losee v. Clute, Cardozo observed that the finality of the test bears on the measure of diligence owed to persons other than the purchaser. He read those cases as suggesting a narrow construction of the rule, one that later decisions had abandoned for a more liberal spirit.42 The inference is that a maker who knows someone further along the chain will test the product again has reason to expect that its own work is not the last word. MacPherson sits on the other side of that line. Buick made the finished product and put it on the market to be used without inspection by its customers, and a maker in that position who is negligent where danger is to be foreseen is liable.43 The dealer’s customers would drive the car without retesting the wheel, so Buick’s inspection of the components was the safeguard on which they depended.
Cardozo found an analogy in the law of landlords. A lease of a building to be used at once as a place of public entertainment is governed by a different rule from an ordinary lease, because injury to persons other than the lessee is to be foreseen, and foresight of the consequences involves the creation of a duty, as he noted in citing Junkermann v. Tilyou R. Co.44 The landlord has a contract with the lessee in either case. What changes is what the landlord knows about the use. That is why Cardozo saw nothing anomalous in a rule that imposes on A, who has contracted with B, a duty to C and D according as A knows or does not know that the subject-matter of the contract is intended for their use.45
Knowledge of danger and of use does not settle every case. Cardozo warned that even such knowledge will not always be enough, because the proximity or remoteness of the relation is a factor to be considered.46 His holding concerned the manufacturer of the finished product. He left open whether it is legitimate to go back of that manufacturer and hold the makers of component parts. An independent cause must often intervene, he noted, with the maker of the finished product failing in its own duty of inspection, before a component maker’s negligence becomes a cause of imminent danger, and in those circumstances the earlier maker’s negligence may be too remote to be actionable as to the ultimate user.47 A later section takes up component-part makers.
Knowledge of use is the form the foreseeable-plaintiff requirement takes inside MacPherson. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 281 states the general principle that the actor’s conduct must be negligent with respect to the other person or to a class of persons within which that person is included.48 Buick’s knowledge that dealers’ customers would drive its cars put MacPherson inside the class toward which its carelessness was directed, although Buick could not have named him in advance. On an exam, do not demand proof that the maker knew who the user would be. Ask instead whether the nature of the product and of the sale told the maker that people other than the buyer would use it before anyone checked it again. If so, the remote plaintiff is a foreseeable member of the class. The Palsgraf sections below take up the plaintiff who falls outside the class the defendant’s conduct endangered.
Duty Imposed by Law
Cardozo’s third move relocates the source of the duty, and the passage in which he does so contains the best-known sentences in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.: “We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else. We have put the source of the obligation where it ought to be. We have put its source in the law.”50
The passage distinguishes two possible sources of obligation, and the distinction explains how the privity bar could fall in negligence at all. The obligations a seller incurs in a product sale may be defined exclusively by the contract or implied by law as a matter of public policy.51 The privity cases had treated the maker’s duty to build with care as one more term of the contract. Cardozo placed it in the second category.
The case that anchored the contract view was a weak foundation for it. In Winterbottom v. Wright, the defendant had undertaken to provide a mail coach and was not its manufacturer, the court decided the case on a demurrer, and, as Lord Esher pointed out, the declaration did not fairly suggest any duty apart from the special contract on which the plaintiff mainly relied.52 The case involved nonfeasance, yet it was universally read as covering any negligence, including careless making, and many decisions held that the seller of a chattel owed no liability, in contract or in tort, to anyone but his immediate buyer. Professor Bohlen identified that error in a 1905 article.53
A tort duty does a different job from a contractual one. A contract duty carries out what two parties agreed. A tort duty guards against the careless creation of danger, and the danger is the same whether or not the maker promised anything to the person it injures. A coach driver owes a pedestrian care without any contract between them, and the same logic reaches the maker of a product.54 What fixes the duty is therefore the foreseeable physical harm from a defect together with the maker’s knowledge that others will meet it, the two elements covered above. The sale to the dealer neither creates that duty nor confines it.
Modern doctrine states the same idea generally. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 281 makes an actor liable for an invasion of another’s interest when the actor’s conduct is negligent with respect to the other or to a class of persons within which the other is included, the conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and the other has not so conducted himself as to disable himself from bringing an action.55 Nothing in that formulation asks whether the actor and the plaintiff ever made a bargain.
The change mattered because MacPherson’s only contract ran to the dealer, while the carelessness charged was Buick’s. Buick, a manufacturer responsible for the finished product, put the car on the market without subjecting the component parts to ordinary and simple tests.56 Placing the duty in the law let MacPherson sue Buick directly in negligence, and his contract with the dealer had no bearing on that claim.
The shift leaves warranty law where it was, so an exam question built on MacPherson often tests whether you see that only one of two counts changed.
The counts diverge because the sale of a product is a contractual transaction, and the obligations a seller incurs can be defined by the contract itself.57 Dean Prosser saw Henningsen as the fall of the “citadel of privity” in implied warranty, and many courts now dispense with vertical privity in personal injury cases, some in property damage cases, and a few even for economic loss. Because implied warranty claims lie in contract, however, many courts have not fully let go of the requirement.58 The usual error is to reason that because the duty comes from the law in negligence, it comes from the law under every theory against the remote maker. Analyze the warranty count separately under the forum’s privity rule. A later section on warranty privity takes up the contrast.