Concept
Multiple Sufficient Causes
Concurrent causes and the substantial factor test
Multiple Sufficient Causes
The but-for test fails when two forces are each enough to cause the harm. Take away either one and the harm still occurs, so neither is necessary, and a mechanical application of the test excuses both. A plaintiff injured by negligence then recovers from no one.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 432(2) closes that gap. When two forces are actively operating, one because of the actor's negligence and the other not because of any misconduct on the actor's part, and each of itself is sufficient to bring about harm to another, the actor's negligence may be found to be a substantial factor in bringing it about.1 Three phrases define its reach. Actively operating requires both forces to be moving toward the harm when it occurs, so a hazard that had already spent itself, or that never reached the plaintiff, does not qualify. Each of itself sufficient requires that either force alone would have produced the harm, a stronger showing than that each force contributed something. May be found hands the conclusion to the factfinder without making it automatic.
The exception is limited to forces that are each sufficient. If two forces had to combine to produce the harm, each is necessary, both satisfy the but-for test, and § 432(2) never comes into play. The two subsections that follow differ only in the second force: first a force that owes nothing to the defendant's misconduct, as § 432(2) is written, then a force supplied by another negligent actor.
Negligent and Innocent Forces
Section 432(2) applies when two forces bear down on the same interest of the plaintiff. One is there because of the defendant's negligence, the other for a reason that involves no misconduct by the defendant, and either alone would have brought about the harm.3 The defendant's negligence may then be found a substantial factor even though the harm would have happened without it. The provision asks only whether the second force traces to the defendant's misconduct. It does not care whether that force is a natural event, a fire of unknown origin, or something else.
The standard illustration is Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., in which two fires burned toward the plaintiff's property. One was due to the railroad's negligence; the other was a fire of unknown origin. The property would probably have burned in the other fire anyway, so the plaintiff could not show that but for the railroad's fire it would still be standing. The court responded with a less stringent test: the railroad was a cause in fact if the jury found that its fire was a “material or substantial element” in producing the damage. The railroad was held liable even though the property would probably have burned regardless.4
Unlike the but-for test, the substantial factor test is a matter of degree. The jury must make an intuitive judgment about what degree of causation is substantial and whether the defendant's negligence reaches that level, which leaves more leeway to the jury than the but-for test does.5 The first Restatement worded the exception the same way, saying that the actor's negligence may be held by the jury to be a substantial factor.6
The first three steps are plain on the facts of Anderson: two fires burned toward the property together, one traced to the railroad's negligence, and the other did not. Students most often go wrong at the fourth step. The exception asks what each force could have done alone and whether both were at work together. It does not ask which force contributed more. If the fire of unknown origin were twice the size of the railroad's, the exception would still apply so long as the railroad's fire alone was enough.
The exception exists because of what the but-for test does to the plaintiff here. Remove the innocent force and the defendant's fire still destroys the property; remove the defendant's fire and the innocent force still does. The but-for question therefore labels the defendant's negligence unnecessary, and the plaintiff bears the whole loss in a case where a wrongdoer's conduct was enough to cause it. Only the coincidence that another force arrived at the same moment would stand between the wrongdoer and liability. Section 432(2) removes that windfall by treating sufficiency, together with a negligent force that was really at work, as enough to make the negligence a candidate for causal responsibility. The wording is permissive, so the question stays with the factfinder.
The words actively operating keep the exception from swallowing the baseline rule: a force that never reached the plaintiff's interest, or reached it after the harm was complete, caused nothing.
A second hazard in an exam stem therefore does not by itself call for § 432(2). The question is whether that hazard was genuinely at work on the plaintiff's interest when the harm occurred. The same discipline applies to the defendant's own force. If the defendant's negligence supplied only part of what the harm required, and the innocent force alone would have produced all of it, the defendant's force was not itself sufficient. The fourth step fails, and the baseline but-for test decides the case.
Two Negligent Actors
The same reasoning governs when the second sufficient force is another wrongdoer's negligence. Where torts are independent of each other but each may have produced the result, each is a substantial factor in the damage, as the court said in Mahoney v. Beatman.9
Corey v. Havener is the standard illustration. Two motorcyclists passed the plaintiff's horse together, and the noise of either cycle alone was enough to frighten it.10 Put the but-for question to each rider in turn. The first can say that the horse would have bolted at the second rider's noise even without him. The second can say the same of the first. Neither act is a sine qua non, a thing without which the harm would not have happened, so a strict but-for approach would release both.11 Courts instead treat each independent negligent act that could alone have produced the harm as a substantial factor in it.12
Each rider's argument is accurate in its own terms, yet together the two arguments excuse a pair of wrongdoers on the strength of each other's wrong. A rule that leaves the injury uncompensated because two people were careless where one would have sufficed makes recovery depend on a coincidence unconnected with either rider's fault. Treating each sufficient force as a substantial factor puts the plaintiff in the same position whether one careless rider passed or two. The holding settles only cause in fact: each defendant's negligence counts as a cause. How the loss is divided between them is a separate question, taken up in the treatment of divisible and indivisible harm.
Sufficiency separates the two creeks. The exception reaches a negligent actor whose force could have done the whole job alone, and it leaves an actor whose contribution the harm did not need under the baseline rule. A stem with two negligent defendants therefore calls for three questions, asked in order:
- Did the harm require both forces? Then each is a but-for cause, and no exception is needed.
- Would either force alone have sufficed? Then the exception applies, and each is a substantial factor.
- Would only one force have sufficed? Then the other defendant contributed nothing the harm required, and the baseline rule decides in that defendant's favor.
Summers v. Tice resembles the motorcycle case on the surface and falls on the other side of the line. Both defendants were negligent toward the plaintiff, and the negligence of one of them injured him, but the plaintiff could not say which.15 Only one defendant's negligence caused the injury, so it is untrue that two forces were operating on him and each was enough. The question is which negligent actor produced the force that did. The doubt in the motorcycle case is conceptual: everyone knows what happened, and the but-for test simply gives the wrong answer. The doubt in Summers is a gap in proof, because the plaintiff cannot identify which defendant caused the harm. The court reasoned that the defendants, both wrongdoers, had put the injured plaintiff in the unfair position of pointing to which of them caused the harm, and it shifted the burden to each defendant to absolve himself if he could.16 That response departs from the ordinary rule that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's tortious conduct caused the harm,17 and it belongs to the later discussion of the burden of proof rather than to the analysis of multiple sufficient causes.