Concept
Significant Harm
Private nuisance: elements, protected interest, and significant harm
Significant Harm
Section 821F of the Restatement (Second) of Torts sets the harm element of private nuisance: liability runs only to those to whom the nuisance causes significant harm, of a kind that a normal person in the community, or property in normal condition and used for a normal purpose, would suffer.1 That one sentence imposes two requirements. The harm must be significant, which sets a floor beneath which the law ignores interference. And the harm is measured against a normal person and normal property, which keeps the plaintiff’s own sensitivities out of the calculation. A plaintiff who holds a qualifying interest in the land has shown the right to sue, but that status says nothing about whether the interference mattered enough.
Almost every use of land sends something across the lot line: cooking smells, the whine of a mower, headlights sweeping a driveway. If any neighbor could sue over any such effect, courts would referee every petty irritation, and owners could not tell what they were free to do on their own parcels. A floor on harm screens those complaints out before the court examines the defendant’s conduct at all. The objective yardstick does a second job. If significance depended on how easily a given plaintiff was upset, the most sensitive neighbor would set limits for everyone nearby, and the same activity could be lawful toward one household and a nuisance toward the next. The threshold also fits a broader feature of tort law: compensation is one of its goals, but courts have not adopted strict liability across the board, and fault remains the most common basis for liability.2
Harm is only half the plaintiff’s case. The Restatement’s liability rule supplies the other half: one is subject to liability for private nuisance if, but only if, his conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable3 or unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules for negligent or reckless conduct and for abnormally dangerous conditions or activities.4 A plaintiff can therefore lose on harm against a defendant who acted deliberately, because the court asks first whether the harm clears the floor.
The four subsections that follow take the harm element in turn: how much harm is enough, who sets the yardstick, what baseline the yardstick assumes for land, and what happens when the plaintiff complains of fear or a lower price instead of an interference the plaintiff can feel.
The Significance Threshold
Private nuisance liability begins with a floor: the interference must cause significant harm.5 One court explains that the first additional requirement for recovering damages on a nuisance theory is proof that the invasion caused the plaintiff “substantial actual damage.” The Restatement calls the same requirement “significant harm” and defines it variously as “harm of importance,” a “real and appreciable invasion of the plaintiff’s interests,” and an invasion that is “definitely offensive, seriously annoying or intolerable.”6 Each formula excludes trifles. A slight inconvenience or petty annoyance, however irritating to the person who endures it, is not a harm of importance.
Neighbors must tolerate modest friction between their uses. Once a use is more than modestly incompatible with another, a court must make a judgment call, often described as balancing the equities, and what counts as substantial depends on all the circumstances, including the nature of the neighborhood.7
The kind of harm determines how hard the threshold is to apply. When the physical condition of property is affected, a court has little trouble telling the substantial from the insubstantial. Personal inconvenience, annoyance, and discomfort are harder, and there the standard is the ordinary member of the community with normal sensitivity and temperament.8 That is why the formula for annoyance demands more than irritation: the invasion must be definitely offensive, seriously annoying, or intolerable.9
The annoyance cases are easiest to learn by comparing neighbors on opposite sides of the line. One neighbor flies radio-controlled model airplanes over the plaintiff’s yard. The planes annoy, but they leave the yard usable and the household’s conversation and sleep intact. Another neighbor belongs to a garage band whose practice shakes the windows next door and keeps the family from carrying on a normal conversation; a court could find that the music substantially interferes with the family’s daily (or nightly) use and enjoyment of their home.10 The planes add an irritant and take nothing away, so they fall below the line. The band takes away the ability to talk and live in the house.
The kennel case against Wiggins sits at the far end. The trial court found the barking noise substantial and found the neighbors not unduly sensitive. Wiggins disputed how much barking occurred and offered conflicting evidence, but the trial court, as trier of fact, determined the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, and the appellate court could not say that the finding of a substantial invasion was unsupported by the facts presented at trial.11
Duration matters only in a limited way. Nuisance law does not require that an interference continue or recur, and a single interference of short duration can count. Some interferences, however, are substantial only because they continue or recur, and an injunction requires a threat of future harm.12 Because no formula converts annoyance into a number, significance is a question of fact that turns on the circumstances of each case.13 An exam answer should therefore tie its conclusion to the stated facts (windows that shake, conversation that stops, sleep that fails night after night) and not just call the interference “annoying” or “severe.”
Significance must also be kept apart from unreasonableness, which students often blur because both words describe how bad an interference was. Significance asks how much harm the plaintiff’s interest suffered. Unreasonableness asks whether the gravity of the harm outweighs the social utility of the defendant’s conduct, a weighing the Restatement structures in §§ 826-831; like significance, it is judged objectively and decided by the trier of fact.14 The Wiggins trial court took the steps in order. It first found the barking substantial, then separately weighed the gravity of the harm to the neighbors against the utility of the kennels and the suitability of their location, and found the noise unreasonable.15 The value of a defendant’s business thus does nothing to shrink the plaintiff’s harm; it matters at the second step.
Not every state follows the Restatement’s two-step structure. Many still use the traditional, pre-Restatement approach to unreasonableness. Some equate unreasonableness with serious injury to the plaintiff, a view that harkens back to the gravity-of-harm approach. Others apply a multi-factor test whose factors vary from state to state, such as the character of the neighborhood, the nature of the wrongful conduct, its proximity to the plaintiff’s property, its frequency, continuity, and duration, and the nature and extent of the injury. A number of states also treat the utility of the defendant’s conduct as one factor.16 In those states the questions “how bad was the harm?” and “is the invasion unreasonable?” overlap, so check which approach your jurisdiction uses before you separate them.
The remaining question is whose sensitivities define “seriously annoying.” The next subsection takes up the yardstick.
The Normal Person Standard
Section 821F answers the question “significant to whom?” by pointing to the normal person in the community: the harm must be of a kind that such a person would suffer.18 The test is objective. A court asks what effect the invasion would have on persons of normal health and sensibilities living in the same community, and it does not ask how this plaintiff fared.19 The Restatement comment states the consequence plainly: “If normal persons in that locality would not be substantially annoyed or disturbed by the situation, then the invasion is not a significant one, even though the idiosyncracies of the particular plaintiff may make it unendurable to him.”20 Because the reference group is the locality, and the nature of the neighborhood is among the circumstances that fix what counts as substantial,21 the same noise can count for more in one neighborhood than in another.
Rogers v. Elliott is the classic application. The defendant operated a large church bell in a small Massachusetts town and rang it regularly each day. The plaintiff was recovering from a serious sunstroke in a house not far from the church, and one Saturday he suffered severe convulsions that his physician attributed to the bell. The physician warned the defendant that more convulsions would follow if the bell rang the next day. The defendant answered that he would ring it as usual, and would do so even if his own sister or brother were ill.22 The court would not let the plaintiff’s condition control. Whatever humanity might have counseled the defendant to do, the plaintiff “could not put himself in a place of exposure to noise, and demand as of legal right that the bell should not be used.”23
The court explained its yardstick by analogy. When an act extends its influence to those in the vicinity and its legal quality depends on the effect of that influence, “it is as important that the rightfulness of it should be tried by the experience of ordinary people, as it is, in determining a question as to negligence, that the test should be the common care of persons of ordinary prudence, without regard to the peculiarities of him whose conduct is on trial.”24 The practical consequence follows directly. A test keyed to the most easily affected neighbor would let the lawfulness of the same ringing vary with whoever happened to live nearby. Section 821F approves Rogers explicitly.25
The objective measure sets nuisance apart from trespass and negligence, where the general rule is that the defendant takes the victim as he finds him.26 In nuisance, the harm threshold is itself the screen that separates actionable interference from the ordinary friction of neighbors, and a screen set by the most easily upset plaintiff would screen out nothing. The Rogers note asks a follow-up worth holding in mind: if ordinary persons would have suffered substantial discomfort but no physical injury, could the plaintiff recover for the full extent of his own injuries?27 The standard decides whether there is a nuisance; that question concerns what a sensitive plaintiff recovers once there is one.
Unusual sensitivity therefore cannot create a nuisance. Jenkins v. CSX Transportation, Inc. reached the same result for a plaintiff with an extremely rare allergy to fumes from railroad ties near his land: his suffering was real, but it came from his own unusual sensitivity.
The standard cuts the other way for the unusually hardy. In the Restatement’s illustration, a slaughterhouse gives off odors so offensive that life would be unendurable for any normal person living near it. The owner next door has no sense of smell and is not personally troubled, yet that owner can recover for private nuisance.28 A plaintiff’s toughness can no more defeat the claim than a plaintiff’s fragility can create it. Courts apply the measure in ordinary cases too. The Wiggins trial court assessed the kennel barking by its effect on a normal person of ordinary habits and sensibilities, and it found that the plaintiffs were not “unduly sensitive” and were not “delicate, fastidious, [or] pursuing a dainty way of life.”29
Normal Property, Normal Use
The second half of § 821F carries the objective yardstick from the plaintiff’s person to the plaintiff’s land: the harm must be of a kind that property “in normal condition and used for a normal purpose” would suffer.31 The first half asked how an ordinary person would react. This half asks how ordinary land put to an ordinary use would fare, so a plaintiff whose loss exists only because the land serves an unusually delicate purpose has not suffered harm of the required kind. Prosser states the principle in a passage that a dissenting judge quoted in the solar-access case Prah v. Maretti: “The plaintiff cannot, by devoting his own land to an unusually sensitive use, such as a drive-in motion picture theater easily affected by light, make a nuisance out of conduct of the adjoining defendant which would otherwise be harmless.”32
The rule follows from the plaintiff’s choice. When the defendant’s conduct would be harmless to land used in any ordinary way, the only link between the conduct and the loss is the delicate use the plaintiff selected. If that choice could enlarge the duties of everyone nearby, any owner could set limits for the whole block by picking a fragile use. The question is also local, since what counts as normal depends on the ordinary member of that community.33
The Restatement’s own illustration shows the screen at work. A runs a race track lit at night by floodlights directed downward, and B runs an open-air movie theater next door, screened off from the highway. The reflected glow equals the light of the full moon and would be harmless and unobjectionable to anyone making a normal use of adjoining land, yet it interferes so seriously with B’s pictures that B loses customers. B cannot recover for private nuisance.34 The theater’s lost business is real, but the standard asks what the glow would do to land used normally, and the answer is nothing.
The cases follow the illustration. In Belmar Drive-In Theatre Co. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Commission, a drive-in theater complained of light from a tollway service center, and the court denied relief by applying the extrasensitivity principle. Blue Ink, Ltd. v. Two Farms, Inc. relied on Belmar to affirm a judgment for a service station notwithstanding a jury verdict for a neighboring drive-in theater that complained of the station’s light.35 Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows likewise denied recovery to a drive-in theater whose screen was affected by the glow of a race track’s lights, treating an outdoor movie as an abnormally sensitive use.
Page County Appliance Center v. Honeywell, Inc. marks the other side of the line. The defendants argued that an appliance store’s display of television sets was a peculiarly sensitive use as a matter of law, in the manner of the outdoor theater cases. The court rejected the argument: “Clearly, the presence of televisions on any premises is not such an abnormal condition that we can say, as a matter of law, that the owner has engaged in a peculiarly sensitive use of the property.”36
In both lines the plaintiff’s business depended on a display that the defendant’s activity disrupted, and in both the plaintiff lost customers. What separates the lines is how ordinary the use is. A drive-in screen is an unusually sensitive use because it is easily affected by light, while the Page County court treated televisions as an ordinary condition of premises.
The sensitive-use argument also surfaced in Prah v. Maretti, where a landowner with a solar heating system objected to a neighbor’s planned house that would block the sunlight reaching it. The dissent concluded that the solar heating system was an unusually sensitive use, reasoning that the neighbor’s house, under ordinary circumstances, would not interfere with the use and enjoyment of the usual person’s property.37 The majority did not decide that question. It held that the plaintiff had stated a claim but left entitlement to relief open: the plaintiff must still prove the elements of actionable nuisance, and the defendant’s conduct is judged by the reasonable use doctrine.38 Whether a solar collector is an unusually sensitive use therefore remains an argument for a defendant. On an exam, present it as that argument, support it with facts about how common such collectors are in the community, and attribute it to the dissent and not to the holding.
Two slips are common with this half of § 821F. The first treats “sensitive” as a synonym for “commercial” or “valuable.” The plaintiff in Page County ran a business, and its use was ordinary, so the inquiry looks at how common the use is and not at its commercial character. The second assumes that any delicate use defeats the claim. The screen applies only when the defendant’s conduct would be harmless to land used in a normal way. If the same conduct would injure ordinary property too, the plaintiff’s extra delicacy adds nothing to the defense. And because the screen operates at the harm element, a plaintiff whose use is unusually sensitive loses before the court weighs the utility of the defendant’s conduct.
Fear and Diminished Value
Section 821F asks for significant harm of a kind that a normal person in the community, or property in normal condition and used for a normal purpose, would suffer.40 That standard is easy to apply when the interference is something a neighbor can hear, smell, or feel. It is hard when the plaintiff has felt nothing yet, and two kinds of complaint raise the difficulty. In the first, the plaintiff fears that a condition on the defendant’s land will someday cause injury, though no noise, smoke, or fumes has crossed the line. In the second, the plaintiff’s land has lost market value because of the condition, though the plaintiff’s actual use is unchanged. Each complaint asks whether anxiety or a lower price is itself harm of the kind nuisance protects, and courts divide.
A fuel-storage problem shows the division. An airport leased land to Snafuel, which built three 300,000-gallon above-ground fuel storage tanks on the leased premises. Studies indicated that the tanks presented a severe and unnecessary risk of a potential disaster, and federal regulations stipulated that the tanks should have been placed underground.41 Office Park sits about 100 feet away. Its tenants fear that an explosion would burn them and their property to a crisp, and they worry that their insurance premiums will become unaffordable. Office Park adds that proximity to the tanks has decreased its property’s market value. It sues, for itself and its tenants, for private nuisance. The result depends first on whether the jurisdiction recognizes a private nuisance action when no interference or invasion has yet occurred.42
Some jurisdictions hold that a private nuisance action cannot be maintained for interference with use and enjoyment caused solely by fear of a future injury. They are most comfortable with that rule when, as here, an alternative exists: the neighbors can petition local or federal regulators to enforce the laws or regulations the tanks violate.43 A suit built on fear asks a court to act before anything has happened, while a regulator can order safer storage before anything happens. In such a jurisdiction Office Park loses, because it complains of a risk and not of an interference that has occurred.
Other jurisdictions entertain a nuisance claim before any invasion occurs, but even they may not find the interference substantial if the parties merely fear for their lives and property. When the fear is reflected in a decline in the property’s fair market value, many of these jurisdictions conclude that the interference would be substantial to the normal person in the community.44 Market value answers the objective yardstick in a way personal anxiety cannot. It shows what buyers will pay to be near the condition, so it takes the harm out of the present owner’s sensitivity.
Apply the second position to the tank facts. Office Park, having shown that the tanks lowered its fair market value, can satisfy the harm element, since the fear is priced into what buyers will pay. The tenants offer only their worry that an explosion will hurt them, and nothing in that showing suggests that normal people would pay less to be near the tanks, so their interference may not count as substantial even where no invasion is required.45 In a jurisdiction that bars fear-based claims, both plaintiffs lose.
A related line of decisions concerns a decline in value with nothing more. The usual list of interests in use and enjoyment names freedom from pollution, noise, odors, and smoke, and a casebook note asks whether the market value of the plaintiff’s property, by itself, belongs on that list.46 Many courts say it does not. Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co. reached that result in Michigan, and Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co. held in Utah that landowners’ inability to use their property as collateral for a mortgage loan, because of fears arising from contamination of adjacent properties, was not a substantial and significant interference with their use of the land. Smith v. Kansas Gas Service Co. states the requirement: the owner must show an interference with use and enjoyment that is separate and distinct from a claim that the property’s value has fallen because of marketplace fear or stigma. Price can fall because buyers hold a mistaken fear or react to stigma, and if a lower price alone were actionable, every unpopular neighbor would become a defendant.
The two lines of authority fit together once market value is assigned its proper role. Market value is evidence that harm is significant to a normal person, which is the work it does for Office Park under the second position. It is also a measure of loss, and Adkins itself recognized depreciation as a traditional element of damages once a nuisance is shown. Market value serves as a measure of loss elsewhere in property law too: when an oil and gas lessee breaches a contractual duty to release a terminated lease, the cause of action rests on breach of contract, malice need not be shown, and recovery may be had for the general loss of market value.47 What market value is not, in the many courts that reject depreciation alone, is a separate interest that nuisance protects. Courts that accept price as proof that fear is substantial still require a condition that interferes unreasonably with use and enjoyment.
Because the authorities split, an exam answer on facts like these should report the split and apply each position. Some courts bar claims resting solely on fear of a future injury. Others accept a hazardous condition as a nuisance but want the fear reflected in market value. Many refuse to treat a decline in value, without interference with actual use, as harm by itself. Concluding that the tanks are plainly a nuisance because they are dangerous skips the harm element, and concluding that Office Park loses because it has felt nothing ignores the jurisdictions that do not require an invasion.