Concept
Legislation and Zoning Compliance
Defenses and limits on nuisance liability
Legislation and Zoning Compliance
Nuisance law supplies no systematic mechanism for supervising pollutant discharges. Just as most communities have supplemented the common law with land use planning and zoning, they have had to supplement it with legislation on pollution control.1 Each supplement invites a defense: the defendant points to the ordinance, the permit, or the statute and argues that the government has already approved what the plaintiff calls a nuisance.
The defenses covered so far turn on what the plaintiff did. When a nuisance results from the defendant's negligent conduct, the plaintiff's contributory negligence is a defense to the same extent as in other negligence actions, although most states have adopted comparative negligence, which reduces damages by the plaintiff's percentage of negligence.2 Assumption of risk is a defense to the same extent as in other tort actions.3 A plaintiff who acquired or improved land after the interference began is not barred for that reason alone, though the timing is a factor in deciding whether the nuisance is actionable.4 The defense in this part comes from the defendant's side of the case: the use complies with zoning, the operator holds a permit, or a statute authorizes the activity.
Government approval is relevant to a nuisance claim and usually not conclusive, because the approval and the claim answer different questions. A legislature or agency that classifies land or licenses an activity speaks in general terms, typically before any neighbor has been affected, and it addresses the use as a category. A private nuisance claim asks whether this operation, as conducted, substantially and unreasonably interferes with this plaintiff's use and enjoyment of land.5 An approval can answer the first question and leave the second open.
Approvals differ in who issues them and what they decide. A local zoning classification speaks to a district, a statute or permit speaks to a particular activity, and federal law that preempts or displaces state nuisance law speaks to the claim itself and can end it outright. The kind of claim also matters, because a permitted use is more readily insulated from public nuisance than from private nuisance. When a problem calls the defendant's use lawful, permitted, or licensed, ask three questions: who approved it, what the approval decided, and whether that decision reaches the interference the plaintiff complains of.
Zoning Compliance
A use that complies with local zoning can still be a private nuisance, because compliance is no defense to a claim that the use interferes with a particular neighbor's use and enjoyment of land.6 In Maykut v. Plasko, homeowners sued to enjoin a neighbor's noise cannon, which the neighbor used to frighten birds away from a garden. The neighbor held a valid permit for the cannon under both a state statute and the local zoning law. The Connecticut court enjoined further use anyway, holding that permission under the zoning law is no defense to an activity that otherwise interferes with a particular neighbor's use and enjoyment of property.7 The permit settled whether the use was allowed in the district. It did not settle whether these neighbors could still enjoy their own land, and that second question is the one a nuisance claim asks.
The rule holds for an unremarkable use as well. In Prah v. Maretti, the plaintiff sought to enjoin construction of a home on the neighboring lot, alleging that it would interfere with access to sunlight for his solar panels. The builder complied with all zoning laws, and the Wisconsin court held that compliance did not automatically bar the private nuisance claim.8 A house is the ordinary use of a residential lot, yet the ordinance's approval of houses in the district says nothing about whether this house, on this lot, impairs this owner's use of his panels. Between them the two cases show the defense failing for an unusual device and for an ordinary building, which is what happens when the ordinance answers a different question from the one the neighbor raises.
The rule follows from the different jobs zoning and nuisance law perform. A zoning ordinance sets standards for a whole district, describing the uses the legislature considers generally harmonious with the district's character.9 It speaks in categories, so it cannot test each permitted use against each nearby parcel. A private nuisance action supplies that test: an individual owner can prove that a permitted use substantially and unreasonably interferes with the owner's own use and enjoyment of land.10 Because the two inquiries have different objects, an answer to the first leaves the second open.
In Maykut and Prah alike, the zoning laws applied generally to say which uses fit each district, and the legislators who adopted them did not intend to preempt individual nuisance actions against permitted uses with extreme effects.11 The picture could differ where zoning legislation appears to create an exclusive remedy for the matter it regulates, although that is not the usual situation.12
Compliance that fails as a defense still counts as evidence. The character of the area is an important factor in deciding whether a nuisance in fact exists, and an ordinance permitting or precluding uses helps show what that character is. Most courts therefore admit proof of the ordinance as evidence of the district's character bearing on whether a nuisance exists, and some call the classification persuasive while denying it conclusive weight.13 The reason is what reasonableness measures. A steel mill in an otherwise residential area is far more likely to be found an unreasonable interference than a steel mill in the middle of an industrial park, and the zoning of the area helps the court decide which neighborhood it has before it.14
Courts differ on how much the ordinance counts. Some give almost complete deference to a municipality's decision to zone for particular uses.15 Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp. closed on that note, finding it inappropriate for a court to “condemn as a nuisance a business which is being conducted in an approved and expert manner, at the very spot where the council said it might be located.”16 A court that reasons this way treats the legislative placement of the use as the main answer to where the use belongs, so that a finding of nuisance would second-guess the council. Most courts stop short of that position and treat the ordinance as persuasive evidence that the plaintiff can still overcome with proof of the actual interference.
The first scene uses the ordinance for what it does well, which is to prove the character of the district. The second reaches the limit of that proof: where the effect on one parcel is extreme, the legislators who adopted the ordinance are not understood to have meant it to displace the neighbor's action.17
Zoning authorization also disposes of one label. A nuisance per se is an activity said to give rise to liability for any harm it may cause under any and all circumstances,18 and a use that an ordinance authorizes cannot, by definition, be one.19 The authorized use can still be a nuisance in fact, one that is out of place or becomes a nuisance because of the particular way it is carried on.20 Zoning therefore removes the per se shortcut and leaves the ordinary private nuisance claim in place, with its proof of the area's character and of the operation's actual effect.
The ordinance's own terms draw a line that resembles the one between the two kinds of nuisance. Zoning ordinances typically allow uses already in place when the law is adopted to continue as legal nonconforming uses, but some uses, such as junkyards, unsightly billboards, and particularly noxious activities, must end immediately or within a relatively short period.21 The difference between a nuisance per se and a nuisance per accidens is observable in that contrast. The uses condemned outright resemble a nuisance per se, which is unacceptable under any circumstances, while the uses allowed to continue resemble the ordinary nuisance in fact, which turns on the way the use is carried on.
The public nuisance claim stands differently, and the difference is the point on which zoning questions most often turn. Courts hold that a use permitted by zoning cannot be a public nuisance.22 In Green v. Castle Concrete Co. the Colorado court applied that rule to a concrete company whose use the zoning laws permitted. A finding of public nuisance, the court reasoned, would be tantamount to overruling the legislature's clear judgment that the use, as a general matter, serves the public interest and is not inimical to it.23 The interest each claim protects explains why Green does not conflict with Maykut and Prah. A private nuisance claim vindicates one owner's use of one parcel, a matter the district-wide ordinance never addressed. A public nuisance claim asks whether the activity harms the public as a whole, which is the question the legislature answered when it permitted the use.
This weighing parallels the Restatement's treatment of a plaintiff who arrives after the interference began, whose arrival is not in itself a bar but is one factor in deciding whether the nuisance is actionable.24 In each setting, a fact favoring the defendant enters the reasonableness balance as one consideration among several. Statutes and permits that authorize an activity expressly are the next step up, and they are taken up next.
Statutory Authorization and Permits
Legislatures sometimes do more than classify land. They authorize an activity outright by statute, license, or permit, and the defendant then argues that conduct the law allows cannot be a nuisance. Some statutes say so in terms: California provides that “[n]othing which is done or maintained under the express authority of a statute can be deemed a nuisance.”26 Read literally, that sentence would end every nuisance suit against a licensed operator, and courts do not read it that way. They accept legislation authorizing a use, such as a zoning law or a license, as capable of showing that the use is not a nuisance, but they construe the authority narrowly to cover only reasonable conduct.27
The narrow reading follows from what a grant of authority decides. A permit approves an activity in advance, for operators generally, and it does not examine how one operator will run the activity beside one neighbor. The neighbor's claim protects a separate interest, because a private nuisance substantially and unreasonably interferes with a possessor's use and enjoyment of land.28 Reading the permit to cover the authorized use, and leaving the manner of operation open to challenge, lets each instrument do its own work.
Authorization first changes how the claim is classified. A nuisance per se is an activity or condition that is a nuisance in itself and permissible under no circumstances. The category mainly, or perhaps solely, consists of uses prohibited by statute or regulation, although some courts use the term much more broadly.29 A nuisance in fact, or per accidens, is the ordinary private nuisance, an activity or condition that is out of place or is a nuisance because of the particular way it is carried on.30 A lawful business is by definition not a nuisance per se,31 and the per se label asserts that no circumstances could make the activity acceptable, which a legislature denies when it authorizes the activity. Authorization therefore removes the per se shortcut, and the plaintiff still has the nuisance-in-fact claim, which asks whether this operation, as it is run, interferes substantially and unreasonably.
The manner of operation decides how far authorization protects. A town that held a sewage discharge permit from the state department of environmental protection was not insulated from private nuisance liability.32 The permit authorized the discharge, and it did not make the way the town ran its system immune from challenge. California shows the other side of the line. It precludes injunctive relief by private persons against a use conducted in an appropriate zone that does not employ harmful methods of operation, though the statute does not preclude the recovery of damages.33 In both settings the operator's methods control: authorization failed to shield an operation that harmed a neighbor, and it protected a harmlessly run use against an injunction while leaving damages available. A problem that says the defendant “holds all required permits” therefore asks one question, whether the complaint targets what the permit allows or how the defendant runs the operation.
Strict liability follows a parallel pattern. Statutory sanction has frequently been held to preclude strict liability, on the ground that a defendant cannot be held strictly liable for doing properly what the law has authorized, though the defendant remains liable for negligence.34 Courts have applied the idea to the custodian of a public zoo in Guzzi v. New York Zoological Society and to a contractor blasting for the state in Pumphrey v. J. A. Jones Construction Co., while Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co. applied strict liability to rocket testing done under a federal contract.35 The Restatement Third likewise withholds strict liability from a defendant who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity pursuant to an obligation imposed by law, a narrower ground than bare permission.36 Where the shelter applies, it covers the authorized activity done properly, and negligent operation remains actionable. For the abnormally dangerous conditions covered earlier in this chapter, authorization may therefore defeat strict liability while leaving a claim for careless operation.
The legislature's power to authorize has constitutional limits. The common law of nuisance is subject to legislative change, but the change is subject to the same constitutional limits that apply to any exercise of the police power.37 It has been said that, within limits not exactly determined, the legislature “may move the line either way, so as to make things nuisances which were not so, or to make things lawful which were nuisances.” The Supreme Court has added that “while the legislature may legalize what otherwise would be a public nuisance, it may not confer immunity from action for a private nuisance of such a character as to amount in effect to a taking of private property for public use.”38 The split tracks the interests the two claims protect. A public nuisance claim concerns harm to the public as a whole, and deciding what serves the public is the legislature's own business, so legalizing the activity answers that claim. A private nuisance claim concerns one owner's use and enjoyment of one parcel, and a statute that immunized the neighboring operation would let it burden that land without paying for it, which is what the takings limit forbids.
The limits also bind a legislature that declares something a nuisance. In Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), the Court invalidated a state statute that provided for abatement, as a public nuisance, of any “malicious, scandalous and defamatory” newspaper article concerning political and public figures. The Court acknowledged that freedom of the press is not an absolute right and that the state can punish abuses, yet it struck the statute down.39
The third step does most of the work. The defendant's authorization is real, and it can defeat a nuisance per se theory, shape the remedy, and supply evidence of reasonableness. It does not license the way the defendant chooses to run the operation next door.
Federal Preemption
A federal statute can do to a nuisance claim what zoning and permits ordinarily cannot, which is end it. Zoning and permits enter the reasonableness balance as evidence. When a federal law is held to preempt state law, the state-law claim is barred completely, and compliance with the preemptive federal law becomes a complete defense.41 The plaintiff then has nothing left to weigh, because the court no longer asks whether the conduct is unreasonable under state nuisance law.
Preemption takes an express form and an implied form. Express preemption occurs when Congress states in the statute, usually in a preemption clause, that state law is displaced. Implied preemption occurs when a court infers Congress's intent from the statute's broader purpose. The implied form has two branches: field preemption, when federal regulation of a subject is so pervasive that Congress is reasonably understood to have left no room for state supplementation or when the federal interest in the field is dominant, and conflict preemption, when federal and state law directly or indirectly conflict.42 Each variety asks one question in a different way: did Congress mean the federal law to control this conduct? A nuisance defendant therefore cannot win merely by showing that some federal rule touches its activity.
Railroad noise is the standard illustration. In Rushing v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. the Fifth Circuit held that a railroad faced no nuisance liability for noise at levels that did not violate federal standards, a decision later superseded by statute on other grounds.43 The holding covers noise that stays within the federal standards and says nothing about a carrier that exceeds them.
The interference in the two scenes is the same kind, and the only difference is whether a federal regime occupies the subject. A federal regime can also remove a nuisance remedy that federal courts themselves created. Interstate pollution was once governed by federal common law, and in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. the State of Georgia obtained an injunction against a company whose sulfur oxide emissions were destroying forests, orchards, and crops across the border.44 In Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), the Supreme Court held that the comprehensive regulatory system of the federal Clean Water Act completely displaced federal common law. In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut the Court applied the same reasoning to federal nuisance suits against major greenhouse gas emitters, because the Clean Air Act gave EPA authority to regulate those emissions. The federal common law was displaced even if EPA ultimately decided not to regulate them.45
Displacement does not wait for the agency to act. Once Congress gives an agency authority over the subject, the judge-made remedy gives way, whether or not the agency has yet regulated or ever does.46 A more recent wave of climate cases, brought by state and local governments against fossil fuel producers, rests on state rather than federal nuisance law alongside other legal theories, and a common element is the claim that the producers knew about the dangers of climate change and concealed that knowledge through active disinformation campaigns.47 Because those claims arise under state law, whether federal law bars them is a question of preemption, and it turns on Congress's intent.
Zoning ordinances and state permits make no comparable claim to be the only rule on the subject, so they remain evidence. A preemptive federal standard does make that claim, because Congress intended it to control, and once a court finds that intent the state claim has nothing left to weigh.
The fifth step guards against the most common overreach. A federal permit or standard is only a fact about the defendant unless Congress intended the federal law to control, so an answer that treats any federal regulation as a complete defense skips the intent question that decides the issue. The opposite error treats preemption as one more factor in the reasonableness balance, and a preempted claim never reaches that balance.