Concept
Primary Equitable Factors
Remedies: damages and injunction
Primary Equitable Factors
Section 936(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts makes the appropriateness of an injunction against a tort depend on a comparative appraisal of all the factors in the case, including a list of primary factors.1 Two words in that sentence govern this unit. All makes the list a starting set, so any other fact bearing on whether an order is the right response also counts. Comparative means the factors are weighed together: a strong showing on one can lose to the others, and a weak showing on one does not defeat the injunction by itself. Earlier sections separated liability from remedy and showed that appropriateness turns on comparing the probable consequences of an injunction with those of the alternative remedies.2 The primary factors supply the inputs for that comparison.
The Restatement lists seven:
- the nature of the interest to be protected;3
- the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of injunction and of other remedies;4
- any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing suit;5
- any related misconduct on the plaintiff’s part;6
- the relative hardship likely to result to the defendant if an injunction is granted and to the plaintiff if it is denied;7
- the interests of third persons and of the public; and8
- the practicability of framing and enforcing the order or judgment.9
Read in order, the factors move from the thing protected, through the other remedies and each party’s conduct, to the burdens on the parties and on outsiders, and end with whether a court can supervise the decree it writes. Section 944 adds a separate set of considerations for measuring whether damages are adequate, and this unit gives them their own subsection.10
One appellate decision, Brown v. Voss, runs through the subsections to show the factors working on real facts. The Browns used an easement across the Vosses’ parcel A to reach parcel C, which the easement did not serve, and they planned a residence straddling the line between parcels B and C. After holding that the Browns had misused the easement and that using it to reach the planned residence would be a further misuse, the court asked whether the trial court erred in refusing the Vosses’ request for an injunction, and it answered by working through the factors one at a time.11 The dispute is a trespass through an overburdened easement, not a nuisance, but § 936 governs injunctions against torts generally, so the case shows how each factor operates.12
Nature of the Interest
The first primary factor asks what the plaintiff stands to lose. Section 937 provides that the nature of the interest to be protected is one of the factors to be considered in determining whether an injunction against a tort is appropriate.13 Interests differ in how well money replaces them, and the comparison of remedies depends on that difference. The factor weighs without deciding: because § 936(1) calls for a comparative appraisal, a strong interest does not compel an injunction and a weak one does not forbid it.
Land sits at the strong end of the range. Courts typically regard every parcel as having a unique use, so a plaintiff whose land is invaded can frequently show that compensatory damages are not an adequate remedy.14 A damages award can approximate a parcel’s market value, but an injunction is the remedy that protects the parcel itself.
In Brown v. Voss, the court began with the interest. The misuse of the easement was a trespass to real property, and the court called protection of such a property interest a traditional and well-accepted reason to grant injunctive relief.15 It added that a continuing condition likely to produce frequent trespasses, such as the planned location of the Browns’ residence, cannot be remedied adequately by damages, so the kind of interest and the choice of remedy pointed the same way.16
Nicholson v. Connecticut Half-Way House, Inc. supplies the contrast. Residents there sought to enjoin the use of the defendant’s property as a temporary residence for selected parolees from state prison, claiming that the parolees might commit crimes in the neighborhood and that the house would lower property values. The court denied relief because unsubstantiated fears could not justify the intervention of equity.17 Both sets of plaintiffs invoked their property, so the difference lies in what stood behind the interest. The Vosses’ rights were under invasion by a use that would keep recurring; the Nicholson residents had suffered nothing, and their harm depended on conjecture about what others might someday do. Equity can clearly enjoin a continuing invasion of an important interest when the legal remedy is inadequate, but a prediction that rests on speculation falls far short of that clear case.18
A fact pattern describing an ongoing invasion of the plaintiff’s own land therefore puts heavy weight on this factor, and one built on feared harm without proof puts little. Even a strong land interest remains one factor among seven, and hardship, the public interest, and practicability can still outweigh it.
Adequacy of Alternative Remedies
The Restatement lists the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of an injunction, compared with other available remedies, among the factors considered in deciding whether an injunction against a tort is appropriate.20 The word relative sets the question. The court asks how well an injunction would protect the plaintiff compared with how well each alternative would, the same side-by-side comparison of probable consequences that governs the whole appraisal.21 Adequacy is therefore a matter of degree, and it feeds the balance instead of standing outside it.
Courts once framed this question as an absolute rule, the irreparable-injury rule or adequacy test: equitable relief is available only when no adequate legal remedy, such as damages, exists.22 Courts still cite the rule, but they do not usually follow it literally.23 Even the phrase “irreparable harm” is sometimes only a short, and misleading, way of saying that the threat of harm must be real.24 The Restatement’s factor treats adequacy as a matter of degree inside a balance. A showing that damages are imperfect helps the plaintiff without ending the inquiry, and a showing that damages are good enough weighs against an injunction without barring it.
The alternatives to an injunction are not limited to a damage judgment. Courts give provisional relief at law before trial by attachment, garnishment, or replevin, and a plaintiff can sometimes obtain security without any judicial process by filing a lis pendens notice or a notice of mechanics’ lien.25 Another proceeding can also supply the protection: courts usually refuse to enjoin a criminal prosecution already instituted, because the person seeking the injunction can present a good defense in the prosecution itself, even though an injunction might be preferable for many reasons.26
Whether the harm is finished or still coming sorts most cases. Equity will not enjoin a completed act, but it may grant injunctions to halt clearly continuous invasions of an important interest where a remedy at law is inadequate.27 Suppose a factory malfunction releases gases onto an orchard once, and the equipment is then repaired. An injunction would forbid a repetition that is not reasonably imminent, so it adds nothing that damages for the orchard do not already supply.
A continuing invasion of land reverses the result. In Brown v. Voss, the Browns planned to build a house straddling the line between two parcels and to use an easement across the Vosses’ land to serve a parcel the easement did not reach. The court reasoned that a continuing condition of that kind would produce frequent trespasses, that damages were not a sufficient remedy, and that an injunction was far superior, citing §§ 938 and 944.28 It acknowledged that the damage might be hard to measure in dollars, but the fact of damage to the Vosses’ property rights entitled them to some remedy, and the injunction was the better one.29 Two reasons support the result. Land is treated as unique, so an owner can often show that money is no replacement for protection of the land itself.30 And when a tort repeats, each new invasion invites a new lawsuit: successive actions must be brought for actual, not prospective, losses,31 and § 944(1) counts the cost of a multiplicity of suits against the adequacy of damages in repeated or continuing torts.32 The orchard and the Vosses’ land differ because damages can fully answer a finished wrong, while a wrong that keeps recurring outruns any single award.
Continuing pollution fits the same pattern.
A strong showing on adequacy clears one item on the list and leaves the rest of the appraisal open. In Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., the defendant, a cement plant, constantly produced high levels of cement dust that clogged neighboring homes. The operation was a nuisance, but the plant employed 300 people and had invested $45 million, while the neighbors’ total damage was $185,000. The court concluded that the injunction should be denied if the defendant paid the damages.33 Hardship and the public interest can therefore outweigh relative inadequacy, which is why adequacy is weighed with the other factors and never treated as a gate. The next subsection turns to the considerations a court uses to decide whether damages are in fact adequate.
Assessing Damages Adequacy
Section 944(1) lists the questions a court asks when it decides whether damages would protect the plaintiff as well as an injunction would. As to the compensatory function, the relative adequacy of the damage remedy depends on (a) the nature of the interests harmed, (b) the effects of the rules governing the measure of damages, (c) the availability and persuasiveness of evidence bearing on the assessment of damages, (d) the effects of resort to measures of self-help, (e) the cost of assessing damages and, for repeated or continuing torts, the cost of a multiplicity of suits, (f) the collectibility of the judgment, and (g) other pertinent factors.35 The list fills in the adequacy factor of the § 936 appraisal, and each item names a place where a money award can fail to do what an injunction would do.
A money award can stand in for an injunction only if a court can price the loss, prove it with evidence, and collect what it awards. The interest may resist a market price, the measure of damages may leave part of the loss out, the proof may be too thin to support a figure, the plaintiff may be pushed toward self-help, the cost of litigating may eat into the recovery, and the defendant may be unable to pay. Because the question is relative, a defect in damages counts toward an injunction only to the degree that an injunction would cure it.
The considerations tend to arrive in clusters, so one fact pattern often trips several at once. In Brown v. Voss, the court held that a continuing condition producing frequent trespasses makes damages an insufficient remedy and an injunction far superior, and it noted that the damage to the Vosses’ property rights might be difficult to measure in dollars.43 Run through the checklist, those facts engage the first question (the interest was land), the third (the loss resisted a clean dollar figure), and the fifth (each trespass would invite another suit).
The other end of the range looks different.
The seven considerations all concern the compensatory function of damages, their capacity to put the plaintiff where the plaintiff would have been without the tort. Section 944(2) qualifies them: where that function is defective, the damage remedy may still be regarded as relatively adequate on the basis of its declaratory, emotional, and punitive functions.44 A judgment declares that the plaintiff’s right was invaded, it can give the plaintiff the satisfaction of seeing the wrong acknowledged and answered, and where the defendant acted with malice a court may allow punitive damages.45 The subsection is permissive. It gives a court a reason it can weigh when comparing damages with an injunction and does not create a separate test that damages must pass.
The qualification does most of its work where the loss is real but hard to price and the wrong is finished or unlikely to recur. A harm that is still arriving gives these functions less to do, since a declaration or a penalty for past conduct does not by itself stop the invasion. A stem that stresses repeated harm, thin proof, or a defendant who may not be able to pay is therefore describing inadequate damages, while a stem that gives a single provable loss and a solvent defendant describes adequate ones.
Plaintiff’s Unreasonable Delay
Section 939 provides that any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing suit is one of the factors to be considered in determining whether an injunction against a tort is appropriate, and the third primary factor in § 936(1) carries the same item.47 The wording limits what the factor can do. Delay is one entry in the comparative appraisal, so a court weighs it against the nature of the interest, the adequacy of damages, and the hardship each side faces, and any of those can outweigh it. The adjective also matters: a plaintiff needs a fair interval to discover an intrusion, investigate it, and try to resolve it, and only delay beyond that interval counts against the order.
The factor protects a defendant who has changed position. When a plaintiff watches a project go forward in silence, the defendant may reasonably keep spending, so each month of silence enlarges the hardship an injunction would later impose. Courts expressly consider hardships, changed position, and various forms of prejudice to the parties in the balance.48 Delay also matters when the defendant acted in good faith, because a court then asks whether the complaining plaintiff engaged in delay or misleading conduct.49
Delay can appear in a harsher form. Viewed as a defense, a plaintiff’s delay may simply bar the claim altogether.50 Weighing delay as a factor is a different exercise: if the delay is not enough to bar the plaintiff, it may still be counted in the total balance of all the factors affecting the equities, along with the equities for and against each party.51 As a defense, delay is all or nothing; as a factor, it is a matter of degree. Its weight also depends on the surrounding equities. When they strongly favor the plaintiff, a relatively minor inequity may not bar the claim entirely, even though the same inequity might do so if the equities favored the defendant.52
Brown v. Voss supplies the opposite result. The record showed that in 1978 the Vosses engaged in various forms of self-help to protect their property rights from the Browns’ trespasses, and the court held that, under those circumstances, the Vosses did not unreasonably delay in bringing suit.53 The earlier self-help is the key fact. A plaintiff who has been acting to protect a right has not slept on it, and a defendant cannot read that plaintiff’s conduct as acquiescence. The same opinion treated the Browns’ position separately, observing that they knew or should have known from the public records that the easement did not reach parcel C.54
The usual exam error is to treat any gap between the wrong and the suit as fatal. A stem that says the plaintiff waited should prompt three questions: how long the plaintiff waited, measured from when the invasion became concrete; whether the plaintiff had an explanation or acted in the meantime, as the Vosses did with self-help; and what the defendant did while the plaintiff waited. Delay carries the most weight when it is unreasonable and the defendant changed position because of it, and even then it is weighed with the interest to be protected, the adequacy of damages, and the hardships.
Plaintiff’s Related Misconduct
The Restatement lists any related misconduct on the part of the plaintiff as one of the factors to be considered in determining whether an injunction against a tort is appropriate.56 Because misconduct is a factor, it goes into the comparative appraisal and is weighed with the nature of the interest, the adequacy of damages, and the hardships, so proof of it adds weight to one side of the scale without ending the inquiry. The word related limits the factor to misconduct connected to the matter in suit. A lapse in some unrelated dealing says nothing about whether this defendant’s dust should be stopped or how the hardships compare, and counting it would turn an injunction hearing into an audit of the plaintiff’s character.
Brown v. Voss shows a charge of related misconduct that failed. The Browns alleged that the Vosses had engaged in related misconduct by seeking injunctive relief through a counterclaim. Mr. Voss testified that the Vosses raised the claim as leverage to help settle the Browns’ lawsuit and to protect the Vosses’ property rights from the Browns’ trespasses, and the court found in those facts no misconduct related to the Vosses’ suit.57 The testimony admitted a strategic motive, yet the claim was one the Vosses actually held, since a continuing condition producing frequent trespasses is a harm an injunction answers far better than damages.58 Pressing a genuine claim at a tactically useful moment is ordinary litigation conduct, and it gives the court no reason to doubt that the order would protect a right that is really being invaded.
Misconduct that does count makes the claim itself less deserving of the court’s help. Courts ask whether an injunction would encourage a plaintiff who is merely trying to force the defendant to buy the plaintiff out, whether the buy-out price might nonetheless reflect the plaintiff’s damages, and whether the plaintiff is seriously damaged at all.59
The same homeowner’s unpaid bill to a roofer on another property would carry no weight in that appraisal, because it has no connection to the bakery. The difference from Brown v. Voss lies in where the leverage comes from. The Vosses’ leverage rested on a trespass the Browns were actually committing, while the homeowner’s rested on a harm the homeowner manufactured.
The factor weighs; it does not automatically bar. A court balancing equities looks at the conduct of both parties and at the hardships that either result would cause.60 Serious misconduct may operate as a defense that bars the claim entirely, but short of that it counts against the injunction in proportion to its seriousness and to the strength of the other equities. When the equities strongly favor the plaintiff, a relatively minor inequity does not bar the claim, although the same inequity might do so if the equities favored the defendant.61 A stem that attributes bad conduct to the plaintiff therefore calls for two questions in order: whether the conduct connects to the matter in suit, and, if it does, how much it weighs against everything else in the appraisal.
A plaintiff’s conduct of a different kind, moving near an existing nuisance, belongs to a later section. Older cases sometimes treated “coming to the nuisance” as an absolute defense, but the modern tendency treats it as one factor in evaluating the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct.62
Relative Hardship
The Restatement lists “the relative hardship likely to result to defendant if an injunction is granted and to plaintiff if it is denied” among the primary factors, and § 941 repeats it as a provision of its own.65 The two factors just before this one looked at what the plaintiff did; this one turns from conduct to consequences. It puts two burdens on the scale at once: the weight an order would place on the defendant and the weight its absence would leave with the plaintiff. A court needs both. Courts do not follow an inflexible rule requiring an immediate injunction in every case, although they are typically cautious in denying one.66 And because an injunction must be justified against the utility of the defendant’s conduct, a plaintiff seeking one must show that the harm actually outweighs that utility, a showing the plaintiff probably need not make to recover damages so long as the defendant’s conduct is unreasonable.67
Of the considerations that feed the comparison, relative economic impact is by far the most important. All other things being equal, a court issues an injunction only if the resulting benefit to the plaintiff exceeds the resulting damage to the defendant, and the public interest in continuing or preventing the conduct is usually weighed as well.68 Leverage also matters. Courts ask whether an injunction would encourage a plaintiff who is merely trying to force the defendant to buy the plaintiff out, and whether the buy-out price would reflect the plaintiff’s actual damages.69
The dance-studio comparison shows the arithmetic. A court finds that a studio’s noise is a nuisance, but soundproofing would cost the studio $100,000 while the noise lowers the value of the plaintiff’s land by only $1,000. The studio’s social value is relatively low and no other neighbor is disturbed, so the public interest is neutral. An injunction would impose $100,000 in costs to confer $1,000 in benefits, so the court denies it and awards $1,000 in damages.70
The ratio of burden to benefit separates the studio from the print shop; the defendants’ size and the bare existence of a nuisance do not. A stem that stresses a defendant’s large payroll or heavy investment raises only half of the comparison. The other half is what the plaintiff would continue to bear without an order, together with the public-interest factor taken up in the next subsection.
A defendant’s hardship earns weight according to how the defendant came to face it. In Brown v. Voss, the Browns complained of the hardship they would suffer if enjoined from using the easement road to benefit parcel C. The court answered that they knew or should have known from the public records that the easement did not provide access to parcel C, yet bought the property and prepared to build without acquiring adequate access, so the hardship they complained of deserved significantly less weight.71 It relied on a Washington rule that the benefit of balancing the equities is reserved for “the innocent defendant who proceeds without knowledge or warning that his structure encroaches upon another’s property or property rights.”72 The burden was also smaller than the Browns portrayed. The injunction required only that the house and its construction stay on parcel B unless the Browns obtained access to parcel C by other means, such as an action under RCW 8.24.010 for a private way of necessity.73
The rule shields a defendant from a loss out of proportion to the plaintiff’s interest that the defendant had no fair chance to avoid. A defendant who had notice of the plaintiff’s rights and built anyway chose to run the risk, and counting the cost at full weight would let any defendant turn a known invasion into a forced sale by investing first and pleading hardship afterward. Good faith therefore matters. Where a defendant acted negligently or intentionally, as in erecting a garage on the plaintiff’s land, the equities weigh heavily against the defendant, and only a defendant who acted in good faith earns a full hearing on the other equities and hardships.74 At the far end of the spectrum, an injunction is definitely granted when the defendant harms the plaintiff willfully or could reasonably avoid doing so.75
Both the Browns and the homeowner would lose a building, and the difference lies in notice. The Browns had the public records and prepared to build without securing access, while the homeowner relied on a professional’s plat and had no warning. That is why the homeowner’s hardship is weighed in full and the Browns’ was discounted.
Hardship need not take the form of a dollar loss. In Yome v. Gorman, a dispute over moving the remains of loved ones between cemeteries, the court had to balance sentiments it could not quantify objectively. In Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., the Supreme Court tested an injunction restricting speech around an abortion clinic by asking whether its provisions burdened more speech than necessary, upholding some and striking others. Where one side’s interest cannot be priced, the court still weighs the burdens, using the best measure the facts allow.
Hardship does its work at two points: whether to enjoin and how broadly. A court may find a middle ground by ordering the defendant to minimize or eliminate the nuisance without closing down operations, as by reducing the amount of dynamite in a quarry explosion or reducing nighttime activities, and it can order the defendant to experiment with alternative processes that might reduce the harm.76 A showing of hardship therefore often produces a narrower decree instead of a denial, a possibility the later section on tailoring the decree develops.
Third Persons and the Public
Section 942 provides that the interests of third persons and of the public are factors to be considered in determining the appropriateness of an injunction against a tort, and the sixth primary factor in § 936(1) carries the same item.79 The factors covered so far are measured almost entirely by what happens to the two parties. This one widens the view to people who are not in the case, such as the employees and neighboring owners whose circumstances an order would change whichever way the court rules. Because § 936(1) requires a comparative appraisal, the interests of outsiders add weight to one side of the scale and do not decide the case alone.
A nuisance suit is private in form and often public in effect. An order closing a plant takes jobs and products away from people who never sued, and a refusal to order anything can leave other people who never sued breathing the same fumes as the plaintiff. Counting third persons and the public lets the court consider all the costs and benefits of the defendant’s conduct and likewise all the costs and benefits of issuing the injunction, and benefits an order confers on others besides the plaintiff may be weighed in its favor.80 The need to protect innocent third parties from nontrivial losses is also one reason courts are typically cautious in denying injunctive relief.81 The factor therefore cuts in two directions. Public harm from an injunction, such as lost jobs or lost services, weighs against it, while benefits to other affected owners weigh for it. Public-interest values may also show in who the litigants are and what rights they assert: in Kansas v. Nebraska, Kansas sought disgorgement and injunctive relief against Nebraska for alleged violations of an interstate water compact, and a special master recommended partial disgorgement of Nebraska’s excess gains for knowingly exceeding its allowable water consumption.82
Estancias Dallas Corp. v. Schultz shows what the factor protects. The plaintiffs testified that their land was worth $25,000 before the noise began and $10,000 after; a neighbor who was a real estate broker put the figures at $25,000 and $12,500; and an expert gave decibel readings taken before and after the defendant made changes to reduce the noise.83 The court found little or no testimony of benefit to the public generally and no evidence of a shortage of apartments in Houston, so no evidence that the public would suffer by having no place to live.84 It nevertheless awarded an injunction, finding that the critical comparison was between the harm to the plaintiff and the harm to the public, not the harm to the defendants, of the activity stopping.85
That reading follows from the reason courts balance at all. Balancing the equities seeks to protect the public from the effect of injunctive relief; it is not about protecting activities that are more costly to stop than the costs they impose.86 The defendant’s own burden still enters through the relative-hardship factor, so this factor demands evidence about people other than the defendant. A defendant who shows that others would lose something real has turned a private cost into a public one, and a defendant who cannot has shown only its own expense. Without that requirement, every defendant could describe its operation as important to the community, and the factor would collapse into the hardship comparison already made.
Benefits to other owners appear on the opposite side of the scale in Brown v. Voss. The Browns reached their parcel across easements over the land of several owners, including the Vosses. The trial court found that the other owners, who were not parties, had not objected to the Browns’ misuse of the easement road, but the appellate court reasoned that those owners’ legal rights likely would be protected by the injunction the Vosses requested, and it counted that as a factor weighing in favor of granting it.87 The weight attaches to the rights the order would protect, so it does not depend on the absent owners appearing to claim it.
The factor can also supply the main reason for an order. In Spur Industries, a feedlot was required to move “not because of any wrongdoing on the part of Spur, but because of a proper and legitimate regard of the courts for the rights and interests of the public.”88 Public stakes can thus support an injunction even against a defendant who did nothing wrong, and they can support withholding one where the people at risk are a community that depends on the activity. Later sections return to both directions, in the cases where a court substitutes damages for an injunction and in the compensated injunction.
On an exam, the defendant’s own cost of compliance and the effect on non-parties belong in separate columns. A stem that stresses that abatement would cost the defendant many times the plaintiff’s loss supplies the relative-hardship factor, and it supplies this factor only when it also says what stopping would do to employees, customers, or the community, or what continuing would do to other owners. Where the facts give a large compliance cost and no evidence about anyone else, Estancias supports the injunction.
Practicability of the Order
Section 943 provides that the practicability of drafting and enforcing an order or judgment for an injunction is one of the factors to be considered in determining whether an injunction against a tort is appropriate, and § 936(1) places the same item last among the primary factors.91 The six factors before it ask what an injunction would accomplish for the plaintiff, cost the defendant, and mean for outsiders. This one asks whether the court can write and police the order those factors support. An injunction that looks right on every other factor but cannot be framed in terms a defendant can follow, or cannot be monitored once entered, protects the plaintiff only on paper. Like the rest of § 936(1), the factor goes onto the scale with the others and does not decide the case alone.
The factor has two parts. The first is drafting. Courts enforce injunctions through contempt, and a vague command is difficult to enforce that way: a “no harassment” decree, for example, is nebulous.92 The party enjoined must also be able to understand with appropriate clarity what is expected of it. The same concern appears in specific performance, where the contract terms must be clear, definite, and certain, a demand that aids the court in framing the decree and ensures that the party enjoined understands the nature of the obligations.93 The second part is enforcement, which asks something different. Even a clear command protects little if violations cannot be detected or the court has no workable way to respond to them.
The range of decrees available for a single nuisance shows how drafting choices change the problem. The chancellor might consider an injunction forbidding (1) creating or continuing a nuisance, (2) operating certain specified engines, (3) operating any engines producing a noise level at the property line above a stated number of decibels, (4) operating after 5:00 p.m., or (5) any operation, and the list can be extended to reflect all the potential options.94 The first is the kind of nebulous command that the “no harassment” example shows is hard to enforce by contempt. The third and fourth give the defendant a line it can observe for itself and give the court a fact it can check at a contempt hearing. A decree can even reach slightly beyond the plaintiff’s strict entitlement for the sake of clarity. Where a photographer has harassed a celebrity, a court might forbid approaching within twenty-five feet, although the celebrity has no right to keep others off a public sidewalk, and the decree might be justified as reparation for rights already lost or as protection of rights she indisputably has.95
Brown v. Voss shows the factor at work on a real dispute and separates its two parts. The court addressed enforcement directly: although detecting violations might be difficult if the Browns built a residence straddling the property line between parcels B and C, enforcement under those circumstances could be accomplished by suspending the easement, and the trial court’s equitable powers were sufficient to enforce an injunction in this case.96 Concluding that the denial of the injunction rested on untenable grounds, it reversed and remanded for an order enjoining use of the easement across parcel A to gain access to a residence any part of which is located on parcel C, or to further the construction of any residence on parcels B or C if the construction would require entry onto parcel C.97
The remand order shows what good drafting looks like. Each term refers to something the Browns and the Vosses can identify without argument: a particular easement, particular parcels, and a purpose defined by where the house sits or where construction would require entry. The enforcement remedy follows similar logic. If a house straddles the line, no observer of the road can tell whether a given trip serves the portion on parcel B or the portion on parcel C, so a decree policed trip by trip would generate constant disputes. Suspending the easement attaches the consequence to the property right itself, which removes the need to sort the trips.
The numerical cap is a limited abatement of the kind courts use as a middle ground, such as reducing nighttime activities, and it solves the drafting and enforcement problems while still protecting the plaintiff.98 Practicability therefore pushes a court toward specific, checkable terms. The usual exam error is to treat any difficulty in policing an order as a reason to deny relief outright. The sounder analysis asks whether specific terms can be drafted and whether some enforcement mechanism exists, as one did in Brown v. Voss. Where the answer is only partly yes, the court’s response is the narrowing taken up in the later section on tailoring the decree.