Concept
Opinion and Parody
Constitutional limits: public officials, public figures, and private plaintiffs
Opinion and Parody
Every defamation claim, whichever fault standard governs it, rests on a false and defamatory communication. The Restatement’s rule for public officials and public figures begins there, and so does its rule for private plaintiffs.1 A plaintiff who cannot point to a false assertion has no claim, so this section takes up the question that comes before all the others: does the publication assert anything a factfinder could call true or false? An accusation that an official took a bribe asserts a fact, because records and testimony can confirm or refute it. A judgment that an official is incompetent, an insult, or an obvious joke asserts nothing that a record can confirm or refute, and the falsity element then has nothing to attach to. The preceding section asked what falsity means when a quotation is altered; this one asks whether there is a factual assertion to be false.
The two subsections apply one principle in different settings. The first asks when a statement labeled opinion is protected and when it is a factual assertion in disguise. The second takes up the plaintiff whose libel claim fails because no reasonable reader would take a parody as reporting real events, and who then sues for emotional injury. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell holds that a public figure cannot escape the Sullivan requirements by renaming the claim. Two reasons recur in the cases. A bad idea is corrected by competing speech, not by a verdict, and a jury asked whether speech was outrageous can answer only from its own tastes.
Opinion and Provable Falsity
The Court observed in Gertz that, under the First Amendment, “there is no such thing as a false idea,” that a pernicious opinion is corrected “not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas,” and that “there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.”2 The passage splits the field. Ideas and evaluations stay with the public, which answers them with argument. False statements of fact stay open to liability under the fault and falsity rules of the earlier sections.
The passage invited an argument that anything labeled opinion is immune, and Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. rejected it. The Court said the Gertz language was not “intended to create a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled ‘opinion,’” and it confirmed that only false statements of fact can support defamation liability.3 Milkovich, a high school wrestling coach, had sued over a newspaper column implying that he lied under oath. The judgment below rested in part on the ground that the column was opinion protected by the First Amendment, and the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not prohibit applying Ohio’s libel laws to the column.4
At common law a defamatory statement of opinion, if not privileged, was actionable the same as one of fact. Constitutional decisions have modified that rule, but merely prefacing a defamatory statement with “in my opinion” still does not shield the speaker.5 The Court’s example was “In my opinion Mayor Jones is a liar.” The speaker implies knowledge of facts that lead to the conclusion that Jones told an untruth, and the damage to reputation is the same as from the flat charge.6
What replaces the label is a question about content. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that “a statement on matters of public concern must be provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation law,” and that a statement of opinion on such matters “which does not contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection.”7 The focus is therefore not on whether a statement is opinion but on whether it contains, directly or by clear implication, factual statements.8 Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps had already placed on the plaintiff the burden of proving falsity in speech on a matter of public concern, so a plaintiff must be able to show that the factual connotation is false.9
The Court marked the line with a pair of examples. “In my opinion Mayor Jones is a liar” can support liability. “In my opinion Mayor Jones shows his abysmal ignorance by accepting the teachings of Marx and Lenin” would not be actionable.10 The first accuses Jones of telling an untruth, which a witness, a transcript, or a record can confirm or refute. The second rests on a position anyone can see Jones took, and whether taking it shows “abysmal ignorance” has no answer that a jury could find true or false.
Dropping the opinion label as the test leaves the other safeguards in place. No separate opinion privilege was needed, because the plaintiff must already prove fault, falsity, and a defamatory statement of fact.11 Defense counsel may still argue for a modified opinion privilege by contending that the opinion expressed should not have been read to assert actual facts, since a defamation action cannot prevail unless the statement can reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual.12 That argument concerns the audience. A communication is defamatory only if the recipient understands it in a defamatory sense, and the context of the statement counts in deciding how the recipient understood it.13 Two parts of a defamation claim turn on the audience in this way: the recipient’s understanding of the statement’s defamatory meaning, and the recipient’s understanding of it as intended to apply to the plaintiff.14
The facts behind an opinion decide which side of the line it falls on. If the facts that support the opinion are stated and true, or already known to the reader, the reader has a basis to agree or disagree and the statement is generally not actionable. If the opinion depends on unstated facts, if the stated facts are false or incomplete, or if the speaker’s assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may imply a false assertion of fact.15 A bare conclusion invites the reader to assume that the writer holds grounds never disclosed. A stated basis lets the reader judge for herself. A statement in the form of an opinion also remains defamatory when it expressly relies on another defamatory statement that proves untrue, even if the speaker reasonably thought that statement was true.16 In Beattie v. Fleet National Bank, a bank’s letter calling an appraisal fraudulent was held not actionable because the view rested on disclosed facts that were not themselves defamatory. In Flowers v. Carville, the Ninth Circuit treated calling a tabloid “trash” as invective but found that saying the tapes had been “doctored” implied facts.
The second protected category covers statements that no reasonable recipient would read as stating actual facts. Satire, parody, and hyperbole do not support a libel claim because they are not defamatory statements of fact.17 Milkovich left that category in place without saying where its boundary lies. It holds only that labeling a statement opinion does not by itself preclude liability, and the question when “rhetorical hyperbole” is protected and when a statement is factual enough to ground liability remains open.18 A widely used formulation, associated with Ollman v. Evans, supplies four factors. A statement points toward fact when it has a “core meaning” its audience understands, when it can be verified by objective tests, when the immediate context invites an inference of factual content, and when the broader context stresses fact or narrative instead of editorials and reviews, where readers expect greater latitude from the author.19
Context cuts both ways. Reviews are a recognized home of opinion, yet in Mr. Chow of New York v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A. the court held that a restaurant review’s statement about the Peking Duck was “not metaphorical or hyperbolic” and was “laden with factual content.” The plaintiff’s victory on the point was bittersweet, because the restaurant was a public figure and the false statement was protected by the actual malice rule.20 At the other extreme, a heated internet debate about whether Mary Feld was responsible for the disappearance of her horse produced a post calling her, in an expletive-laden phrase, “crazy.” The court read the words in that setting and held that they could not reasonably be understood to state actual facts about her mental state; the post was “obviously intended as criticism—that is, as opinion—not as a statement of fact.”21 A humorous or hyperbolic frame does not always help the defendant. In Unelko v. Rooney, a television commentator’s remark that a windshield product did not work was treated as an assertion of fact, while the Sixth Circuit in Seaton v. TripAdvisor LLC found that context and hyperbole cut against reading a Dirtiest Hotels list as an assertion of fact.
The reach of the provable-falsity requirement is also unsettled. Hepps itself was framed for media defendants, and some members of the Court have indicated that they would draw no distinction between media and other defendants.22 Where falsity is required, the effect is to protect opinion statements that cannot be said to be either true or false, and even where the constitutional limits may not apply, some states have adopted them as part of their common law.23 A private plaintiff suing over speech on a matter of public concern must prove falsity, some fault (usually negligence), and actual injury.24
Parody and Emotional Distress
A plaintiff whose libel claim fails because no reasonable reader would take the words as fact has an obvious next move: sue for the emotional harm the publication caused. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell closed that route for public figures. The Court held that public figures and public officials may not recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one at issue “without showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with ‘actual malice,’” meaning with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether it was true.32 The preceding subsection explained that opinion and hyperbole escape defamation liability because they contain nothing a jury can find false. This one asks what happens when the plaintiff stops calling the injury reputational, and the answer is that the First Amendment requirement follows the publication into the new count.
Jerry Falwell was a nationally known minister and a commentator on politics and public affairs. The November 1983 issue of Hustler carried, on its inside front cover, a parody of a Campari Liqueur advertisement under the title “Jerry Falwell talks about his first time.” The genuine Campari ads interviewed celebrities about their “first times,” playing on a sexual double entendre. Hustler copied the layout and wrote an “interview” in which Falwell describes a drunken, incestuous encounter with his mother. Small print at the bottom of the page read “ad parody—not to be taken seriously,” and the table of contents listed the piece as “Fiction; Ad and Personality Parody.”33
Falwell sued for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court directed a verdict against him on the privacy claim and sent the other two to the jury. The jury rejected the libel claim after finding that the parody could not “reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about [respondent] or actual events in which [he] participated.”34 It nonetheless ruled for Falwell on the distress claim and awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages from each petitioner.35
The distress claim could succeed where the libel claim failed because of what the tort requires. In Virginia, the plaintiff had to show conduct that was intentional or reckless, that offended generally accepted standards of decency or morality, that was causally connected to the plaintiff’s distress, and that caused severe distress.36 Truth and falsity appear nowhere on that list.
The court of appeals affirmed. It held that the New York Times standard was satisfied by the state-law requirement, and by the jury’s finding, that the defendants acted intentionally or recklessly. It also called the jury’s finding that the parody described no actual facts “irrelevant,” because the issue was “whether [the ad’s] publication was sufficiently outrageous to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress.”37 Falwell’s position was the same. Once an utterance is intended to inflict emotional distress, is outrageous, and does inflict serious distress, “it is of no constitutional import whether the statement was a fact or an opinion, or whether it was true or false.” Intent to injure was the gravamen of the tort, and the State’s interest in preventing emotional harm outweighed whatever interest a speaker has in speech of this type.38
The Court rejected the motive-based rule. A bad motive may control tort liability in other areas of law, but the First Amendment prohibits that result in public debate about public figures.39 The political cartoon shows why. Webster’s defines a caricature as “the deliberately distorted picturing or imitating of a person . . . by exaggerating features or mannerisms for satirical effect,” and a rule that made hostile purpose enough would expose political cartoonists and satirists to damages without any showing that their work falsely defamed its subject.40
Falwell answered that the Hustler piece was too outrageous to be compared with a traditional cartoon. The Court replied that “outrageousness” in political and social discourse “has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression.”41 Such a standard “runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience.”42 Jurors asked whether speech is outrageous can answer only by consulting their own reactions, and a speaker cannot know in advance how a jury will react to a sharp piece.
Having rejected motive and outrageousness as the measure of liability, the Court required, for a public figure’s distress claim, a false statement of fact made with actual malice.43 Actual malice, as Sullivan defined it, means knowledge that a statement was false or reckless disregard of whether it was false.44 The Court said that the requirement is not merely a “blind application” of the New York Times standard.45 Applying it was straightforward. Falwell was a public figure, and the Court accepted the finding that the parody was not reasonably believable. That left Falwell with a claim for damages for “outrageous” conduct, and that claim cannot, consistently with the First Amendment, support damages for publishing a caricature like this one.46 The same finding ended both counts. The libel count failed because libel needs a defamatory assertion of fact. The distress count failed because the element a public figure must add to any such count, a false statement of fact, was missing, so actual malice never came into play.
Intent to injure also differs from actual malice. Actual malice is a state of mind about truth: whether the publisher knew a statement was false or recklessly disregarded whether it was. The finding that the defendants acted intentionally or recklessly said nothing on that question. A publisher who sets out to wound a public figure with a piece that everyone understands to be fiction has the purpose the tort punishes and no awareness of falsity, because the piece makes no factual claim that could be false.
The rule protects Sullivan itself. A plaintiff who could swap a distress count for a libel count would sidestep the falsity and fault requirements built up in the earlier sections, because the distress tort asks about outrageousness and intent and never about truth. The Sullivan standard applies instead, and recovery depends on the plaintiff’s proof of falsity and actual malice.47
Both publications targeted a prominent person, and both were hostile. What separates the senator’s claim from Falwell’s is what a reasonable reader would understand the publication to assert. The Hustler piece carried a disclaimer and a table-of-contents label, and the jury found that readers would not take it as describing actual events. The fabricated interview carries no such signals. Two errors are easy to make here: treating the distress count as a way around Sullivan, and treating the word parody on the page as conclusive when the question is what a reasonable reader would take from the piece.
The holding is stated for public figures and public officials, and the status line matters here as it did earlier in the chapter. A private plaintiff in a defamation case must show fault, and damages are limited to compensation for actual injury unless knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity is proved; that limit does not apply when the statement does not involve a matter of public concern.52 How far Hustler’s reasoning reaches beyond public figures is open. One commentator observes that the decision is limited to public figures but that its rationale is not obviously so limited, since the same worry about juries punishing disliked speech arises when a private figure’s outrageous speech concerns public affairs. The same commentator asks why the First Amendment should protect outrageous speech intended to do harm.53 Where the attack is aimed at a private person on a subject of no public interest, a New York trial court let a distress claim go forward, although no defamation claim would lie because the publication asserted no facts, when a radio station employee was named in a rival station’s “Ugliest Bride Contest” in Esposito-Hilder v. SFX Broadcasting.54
Snyder v. Phelps carries the rejection of outrageousness into a case with a private plaintiff. Members of the Westboro Baptist Church picketed near a soldier’s funeral, and a jury held Westboro liable for $2.9 million in compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive damages on claims that included intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy.55 The Court repeated the point from Falwell: outrageousness in political and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness that would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or their dislike of a particular expression.56 Falwell involved a public figure and a parody that asserted no facts. Snyder involved a private plaintiff and speech on public issues, so the protection could not rest on public-figure status. What the two cases share is the refusal to let a jury’s reaction to an offensive message stand in for the limits the First Amendment sets on liability.