Also known as: abeyances · abeyant · suspension · in abeyance
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
A period of temporary inactivity or suspension. The condition arises when a legal process, obligation, or right is held without effect until a specified event occurs or a decision is rendered.
A lapse in succession during which no person holds vested title to property. Ownership remains in expectation until the contingency resolving the lapse occurs.
A period of temporary inactivity or suspension. The condition arises when a legal process, obligation, or right is held without effect until a specified event occurs or a decision is rendered.
Audrey Ashton invited Aaron Adams onto her property to inspect equipment. When she revoked consent without advance notice, Aaron's presence remained privileged only while departing promptly. The court placed any trespass claim in abeyance pending determination that Aaron had left in a reasonable manner.
A state disciplinary board charged a judge with associating with drug dealers. The reviewing court held the removal action in abeyance while it assessed whether the off-bench conduct brought the office into disrepute under the judicial canons.
A lapse in succession during which no person holds vested title to property. Ownership remains in expectation until the contingency resolving the lapse occurs.
1 common questions
Property is in abeyance when a limitation leaves no person in being who can convey an absolute fee. The Restatement limits such suspension to lives in being plus a minority period.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Anchor Bank consented to Alpine Mining leaving drilling rigs on its land. After consent ended, the bank placed any ejectment action in abeyance to allow Alpine a reasonable time to retrieve the equipment under the governing privilege.
During an epileptic episode, Adrian Aguilar's arm struck Amelia Amari. The court placed any battery claim in abeyance because the movements occurred while volition was in abeyance and therefore did not constitute an act.
After the district court denied injunctive relief in the abortion case, the court of appeals ordered the parties' cross-appeals held in abeyance until the Supreme Court resolved the jurisdictional questions.
In March 1970, Jane Roe, a single woman residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted a federal action against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face. She also sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the statutes. Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant. She wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. She was unable to obtain a legal abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by continuation of the pregnancy. She could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction to secure a legal abortion. James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes. Two such prosecutions were pending against him in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions. He claimed that for many cases he was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196 of the Texas Penal Code. John and Mary Doe, a married couple, filed a companion complaint also naming the District Attorney as defendant. The Does alleged that they were a childless couple. Mrs. Doe was suffering from a neural-chemical disorder. Her physician had advised her to avoid pregnancy until her condition materially improved. She had discontinued use of birth control pills pursuant to medical advice. If she should become pregnant she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district court for the Northern District of Texas. Upon the filing of affidavits, motions were made for dismissal and for summary judgment. The court held that Roe and members of her class and Dr. Hallford had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies. The Does had failed to allege facts sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have standing. It concluded that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face. The court dismissed the Does' complaint while denying injunctive relief. The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford appealed to the Supreme Court from that part of the District Court's judgment denying the injunction. The defendant District Attorney cross-appealed from the grant of declaratory relief. Both sides also took protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision by the Supreme Court.
View caseThe Attorney General suspended Chadha's deportation order. The House passed a resolution vetoing the suspension, placing the alien's continued presence in abeyance until the Supreme Court decided whether the legislative veto was constitutional.
In 1966 Jagdish Rai Chadha, an East Indian born in Kenya who held a British passport, was lawfully admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa that expired on June 30, 1972. In October 1973, the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service informed Chadha that he had remained longer than permitted and was therefore deportable. Chadha conceded deportability but applied for suspension under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. On June 25, 1974, an Immigration Judge acting on behalf of the Attorney General suspended Chadha's deportation and adjusted his status to permanent resident after finding that he satisfied the statutory criteria of seven years' continuous presence, good moral character, and extreme hardship. A report of the suspension was transmitted to Congress as required by the Act. On December 16, 1975, the House of Representatives passed a resolution disapproving the suspension for Chadha and five other aliens on the ground that they did not meet the statutory requirements, particularly as to hardship. Pursuant to the House resolution, the Immigration Judge reopened the deportation proceedings. Chadha moved to terminate them on constitutional grounds, but the Immigration Judge ruled that he lacked authority to declare the resolution unconstitutional and ordered Chadha deported. Chadha appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which likewise held that it had no authority to pass on the constitutionality of the resolution and dismissed the appeal. Chadha then filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Immigration and Naturalization Service appeared and urged the court to hold the House resolution unconstitutional. After inviting briefs from the Senate and House as amici curiae, the Court of Appeals held the resolution unconstitutional because it was a legislative act that failed to satisfy the requirements of Article I, sections 1 and 7, and set aside the deportation order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the consolidated cases to address the constitutional question.
View case3 common questions
Abeyance creates only a temporary pause. The right or process remains available once the suspending condition ends, whereas termination extinguishes the right entirely.
No. Abeyance merely postpones proceedings. The limitations period continues to run unless a separate tolling statute or equitable doctrine applies.
The governing statute requires any challenge to be filed within sixty days. An agency may not unilaterally extend that period by holding the revocation in abeyance.
…have taken protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision here. We postponed decision on jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. 402 U. S. 941 (1971). III It might have been preferable if the defendant, pursuant to our…