Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
An individual appointed by a court to manage the assets and liabilities of a decedent who died intestate or whose will failed to name an executor. The administrator collects estate property, pays debts, and distributes remaining assets to heirs according to state law.
A person who manages or heads a business, public office, or agency. The role involves overseeing operations, implementing policies, and exercising discretionary authority within the organization.
An individual appointed by a court to manage the assets and liabilities of a decedent who died intestate or whose will failed to name an executor. The administrator collects estate property, pays debts, and distributes remaining assets to heirs according to state law.
A person who manages or heads a business, public office, or agency. The role involves overseeing operations, implementing policies, and exercising discretionary authority within the organization.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
After her father's death, Anita Ali promised a creditor that she would pay the outstanding balance on a loan her father had taken if the creditor would forbear collection. Because the promise was oral, the creditor could not enforce it against Anita under the statute of frauds executor-administrator provision.
Andrew Avery was appointed administrator of his uncle's intestate estate. Within thirty days he mailed notice of the appointment, including his contact information and the court where filings were located, to all heirs whose addresses he could locate. The notice informed recipients of their right to request further information about the administration.
Alexandra Armstrong, appointed administrator, prepared an inventory of the decedent's property within three months of her appointment. The document listed each asset with reasonable detail, its fair market value at death, and any encumbrances. She mailed copies to interested persons who requested them.
4 common questions
An executor is nominated in the decedent's will and appointed by the probate court. An administrator is appointed by the court when the decedent died intestate or the will failed to name an executor or the named person cannot serve.
Under the Uniform Probate Code, every personal representative except a special administrator must give information of the appointment to heirs and devisees within thirty days, including the representative's name and address and the court where estate papers are filed.
Supporting sources
Within three months after appointment, a personal representative who is not a special administrator must prepare and file or mail an inventory listing the decedent's property with reasonable detail and indicating fair market value at death and any encumbrances.
Supporting sources
No. Under the statute of frauds, a contract by an administrator to answer for a duty of the decedent must be in writing to be enforceable.
Supporting sources
After a divorce, the administrator of a deceased employee's ERISA plan refused to pay benefits to the ex-spouse because state law automatically revoked the designation upon divorce. The plan administrator followed the plan documents rather than the state revocation statute.
Donna Rae Egelhoff was married to David A. Egelhoff. Mr. Egelhoff was employed by the Boeing Company, which provided him with a life insurance policy and a pension plan. Both plans were governed by ERISA, and Mr. Egelhoff designated his wife as the beneficiary under both. In April 1994, the Egelhoffs divorced. Just over two months later, Mr. Egelhoff died intestate following an automobile accident. At that time, Mrs. Egelhoff remained the listed beneficiary under both the life insurance policy and the pension plan. The life insurance proceeds, totaling $46,000, were paid to her. Respondents Samantha and David Egelhoff, Mr. Egelhoff's children by a previous marriage, are his statutory heirs under state law. They sued petitioner in Washington state court to recover the life insurance proceeds. In a separate action, respondents also sued to recover the pension plan benefits. The trial courts, concluding that both the insurance policy and the pension plan "should be administered in accordance" with ERISA, granted summary judgment to petitioner in both cases. The Washington Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and reversed. Applying the statute, it held that respondents were entitled to the proceeds of both the insurance policy and the pension plan. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed. Courts have disagreed about whether statutes like that of Washington are pre-empted by ERISA. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.
View caseA female applicant challenged a state hiring policy that gave absolute preference to veterans for civil service positions. The personnel administrator defended the policy as a legitimate effort to reward military service rather than intentional discrimination against women.
Helen B. Feeney, a Massachusetts resident, entered the workforce in 1948 and held a variety of jobs in the private sector for the next fourteen years. She first entered the state civil service system in 1963 after competing successfully for a Senior Clerk Stenographer position in the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency. She worked there for four years and was promoted in 1967 to Federal Funds and Personnel Coordinator in the same agency. The agency and her job were eliminated in 1975. During her twelve years of public employment, Feeney took and passed multiple open competitive civil service examinations. She received the second-highest score on a 1971 examination for a position with the Board of Dental Examiners and the third-highest score on a 1973 test for an Administrative Assistant position with a mental health center. Despite these strong performances, the veterans' preference placed her behind multiple male veterans on the eligible lists, some with lower scores, and she was never certified for appointment. The Massachusetts veterans' preference statute, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 31, § 23, applies to all positions in the state's classified civil service, which constitute approximately 60 percent of the public jobs in the state. It requires that disabled veterans, veterans, and surviving spouses and surviving parents of veterans who achieve passing scores be ranked above all other candidates on eligible lists. The preference originated in 1884 as a tie-breaking measure for Civil War veterans and blossomed into an absolute preference in 1895 when the state exempted veterans from all merit selection requirements. In 1919 the formula was modified to provide a priority in eligibility rather than an absolute preference in hiring, and it has since been extended to cover veterans of later wars. At the time this litigation began, over 98 percent of the veterans in Massachusetts were male. During the decade between 1963 and 1973, 47,005 new permanent appointments were made in the classified official service. Of the women appointed, 1.8 percent were veterans, while 54 percent of the men had veteran status. Feeney sued the Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts and other state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the absolute preference unconstitutionally denied women equal protection of the laws. A three-judge District Court ruled in her favor in 1976. After this Court vacated the judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of Washington v. Davis, the District Court reaffirmed its conclusion in 1978, and the Attorney General appealed directly to this Court.
A defendant convicted by a six-person jury argued that the state constitution required twelve jurors. The court administrator explained that Florida law permitted smaller juries in noncapital cases, and the Supreme Court upheld the practice as consistent with the Sixth Amendment.
The Florida Constitution, Article I, Section 16, secures the right of trial by jury to all and provides that in all criminal prosecutions the jury shall consist of twelve men, except in prosecutions for crimes punishable by imprisonment for not more than six months, in which case the jury shall consist of six men. Petitioner Williams faced charges of robbery, a felony carrying a potential sentence of life imprisonment. Williams filed a timely motion requesting a jury of twelve persons, which the trial court denied in accordance with state law. The case proceeded to trial before a jury composed of six members. Following the presentation of evidence, the six-person jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. Williams appealed his conviction to the Florida District Court of Appeal. The appellate court rejected his constitutional claim and affirmed the judgment. The United States Supreme Court thereafter granted a writ of certiorari, restricting its inquiry to the issues of jury size and the necessity of a unanimous verdict in state criminal prosecutions for serious offenses.
View case1 common questions
Plan administrators must follow plan documents when distributing benefits even if state law would revoke a beneficiary designation upon divorce, because ERISA preempts conflicting state rules.
Supporting sources
…Connecticut , 310 U. S., at 304-307 (invalidating a licensing system for religious and charitable solicitations under which the administrator had discretion to deny a license to any cause he deemed nonreligious); Murdock v. Pennsylvania , 319 U. S. 105 (1943) (invalidating a flat tax on solicitation as applied to the…