Also known as: alienage classification · classifications based on alienage · alienage
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A government distinction drawn on the basis of an individual's status as a noncitizen. Such classifications receive rational basis review when enacted by the federal government under its plenary immigration power and are upheld if not arbitrary or unreasonable.
Antonio Alvarado, a Mexican citizen, sued an Illinois corporation in federal court on a contract claim exceeding $75,000 while domiciled in Illinois as a permanent resident. Months after filing, Alvarado became a U.S. citizen. The court retained jurisdiction because alienage diversity is measured only at the time of filing.
Arthur Abrams, a lawful permanent resident for four years, applied for federal Medicare benefits but was denied under a five-year residency requirement. The denial was upheld because Congress may impose reasonable alienage conditions on federal benefits without triggering strict scrutiny.
Anika Anand, a child of undocumented parents, was barred from public school under a state statute limiting enrollment to citizens and lawful residents. The classification was struck down because the state could not show a substantial interest sufficient to justify denying education to children likely to remain in the country.
Since the late 19th century the United States has restricted immigration into this country. Unsanctioned entry is a crime and those who enter unlawfully are subject to deportation, yet a substantial number of persons have succeeded in unlawfully entering and now live within various States including Texas. In May 1975 the Texas Legislature revised its education laws to withhold state funds from local school districts for the education of children not legally admitted into the United States. The revision also authorized local districts to deny enrollment to such children under Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.031. In September 1977 a class action was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas on behalf of school-age children of Mexican origin residing in Smith County who could not establish legal admission. The suit challenged their exclusion from the Tyler Independent School District schools, and the State of Texas intervened as a defendant. After certifying a class of all undocumented school-age children of Mexican origin in the district, the court held an extensive hearing in December 1977. It found that the statute had neither the purpose nor effect of keeping illegal aliens out of Texas, that enrollment increases stemmed primarily from legal residents, and that barring undocumented children would save money but would not necessarily improve education quality. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the injunction. During 1978 and 1979 additional suits were filed in other Texas districts. The Judicial Panel on Multi-district Litigation consolidated them in the Southern District of Texas. After a hearing the district court held the statute violated equal protection, the Court of Appeals summarily affirmed, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and consolidated the cases.
View caseAlbert Allen, a lawful permanent resident, challenged a state school-financing system that produced lower per-pupil spending in districts with high concentrations of noncitizen families. The system survived review because wealth-based disparities in education do not trigger heightened scrutiny absent a suspect classification.
In the summer of 1968 Mexican-American parents whose children attended elementary and secondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School District in San Antonio Texas brought a class action. They sued on behalf of schoolchildren throughout the state who were members of minority groups or who were poor and resided in school districts having a low property tax base. Named as defendants were the State Board of Education the Commissioner of Education the State Attorney General and the Bexar County Board of Trustees. The complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. A three-judge court was impaneled in January 1969. The Texas system of financing public education originated with the state's first constitution in 1845. It evolved through constitutional amendments permitting local school districts to levy ad valorem taxes for school buildings and maintenance. These local revenues were supplemented by distributions from the state's Permanent School Fund established in 1854 and the Available School Fund. In the late 1940s the legislature enacted the Minimum Foundation School Program. Under the program the state supplies approximately 80 percent of the cost of teacher salaries operating expenses and transportation. Each district contributes the remaining 20 percent through a Local Fund Assignment. The assignment is calculated by an economic index reflecting relative taxpaying ability. Every district also levies additional local property taxes beyond the assignment to supplement its foundation grant. For the 1967-1968 school year the Edgewood Independent School District had an average assessed property value of $5960 per pupil and a median family income of $4686. It raised $26 per pupil through local taxation at a rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed valuation. It received $222 per pupil from the Foundation Program and obtained $108 in federal funds for a total of $356 per pupil. By comparison the Alamo Heights Independent School District had an assessed property value exceeding $49000 per pupil and a median family income of $8001. It raised $333 per pupil locally at a rate of $0.85 per $100 received $225 from the Foundation Program and $36 in federal funds for a total of $594 per pupil. Similar disparities in per-pupil expenditures existed throughout the state. They were largely attributable to differences in the amount of taxable property within each district. In December 1971 the three-judge District Court rendered judgment holding the Texas school finance system unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State appealed. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1972 to consider the constitutional questions presented.
View caseAva Adebayo, a lawful permanent resident, was denied a federal civil-service position under a regulation limiting eligibility to citizens. The ban was invalidated because the agency lacked authority to impose a broad alienage restriction without a showing that the positions implicated core governmental functions.
Five Chinese aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence brought this litigation after each was denied federal employment solely because of alienage. Mow Sun Wong, admitted in 1969 after working as an electrical engineer in China, participated in the California Supplemental Training and Education Program and was assigned to the General Services Administration but could not obtain a janitor position. Siu Hung Mok, admitted in 1968 with eighteen years of business experience in China, likewise participated in the STEP program and was assigned to the Federal Records Center of GSA but could not retain a file clerk position. Kae Cheong Lui performed satisfactory work for the Post Office Department for ten days before termination when his personnel record showed he was not a citizen. Francene Lum, admitted in 1946 with fifteen years of teaching experience and a master's degree in education, was not permitted to take an examination for an evaluator position in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Anna Yu, admitted in 1965, was barred from taking a typing test for a clerk-typist position. Two of the plaintiffs had filed declarations of intent to become citizens while the other three had not. On December 22, 1970, the five plaintiffs commenced a class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California naming the Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission and the heads of the three agencies that had denied them employment. The complaint alleged that approximately four million aliens reside in the United States, that about three hundred thousand federal jobs become available each year, and that noncitizens are generally barred from competing for those positions. The District Court rejected a jurisdictional challenge but ruled for the defendants on the merits after defendants moved to dismiss and plaintiffs moved for summary judgment supported by affidavits. Four plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. While the appeal was pending for over two years, the Supreme Court decided Sugarman v. Dougall and In re Griffiths on June 25, 1973. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court judgment. Only the Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission petitioned for certiorari. In 1971 Congress established the United States Postal Service and removed its officers and employees from the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. In 1974 the Postal Service amended its regulation to make noncitizens who have permanent resident alien status eligible for most positions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Civil Service Commission regulation barring resident aliens from federal competitive civil service employment is constitutional. The regulation at issue, 5 CFR § 338.101, provided that a person may be admitted to competitive examination or given appointment only if a citizen of or owing permanent allegiance to the United States, with limited exceptions for executive assignments when no qualified citizens are available. The Commission construed the permanent allegiance category to cover only natives of American Samoa.
View caseAlexandra Armstrong, a noncitizen, was denied access to state divorce courts because she could not pay filing fees required of nonresidents. The fee requirement was struck down because it imposed an unconstitutional barrier on the fundamental right to dissolve a marriage without a sufficient state justification.
Appellants, welfare recipients residing in the State of Connecticut, brought this action in the Federal District Court for the District of Connecticut on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated. The action concerned state procedures for the commencement of litigation, including requirements for payment of court fees and costs for service of process, in connection with efforts to bring divorce actions. The average cost to a litigant for bringing an action for divorce is sixty dollars. Section 52-259 of the Connecticut General Statutes provides that there shall be paid to the clerks of the supreme court or the superior court, for entering each civil cause, forty-five dollars. An additional fifteen dollars is usually required for the service of process by the sheriff. There is no dispute as to the inability of the named appellants to pay either the court fees required by statute or the cost incurred for the service of process. The affidavits in the record establish that appellants' welfare income in each instance barely suffices to meet the costs of the daily essentials of life. It includes no allotment that could be budgeted for the expense to gain access to the courts. The clerk of the Superior Court returned their papers on the ground that he could not accept them until an entry fee had been paid. Subsequent efforts to obtain a judicial waiver of the fee requirement and to have the court effect service of process were to no avail. Appellants sought a judgment declaring that the fee requirements were unconstitutional as applied to them and an injunction ordering the appropriate officials to permit them to proceed with their divorce actions without payment of fees and costs. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to twenty-eight United States Code section 2281. On July sixteen, nineteen sixty-eight, that court issued its decision. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in nineteen sixty-nine. The case was heard at the nineteen sixty-nine term and thereafter was set for reargument at the present term.
View caseFederal alienage classifications receive rational basis review because Congress holds plenary power over immigration and naturalization. A five-year residency requirement for federal benefits is upheld if rationally related to cost control or integration goals.
Alienage jurisdiction covers suits between a state citizen and a foreign citizen or subject when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. A permanent resident alien domiciled in the same state as the opposing party is treated as a citizen of that state, destroying jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is determined at the time the complaint is filed. Later changes in a party's citizenship or domicile do not divest a court of jurisdiction that properly attached at filing.
…Virginia , 8 Wall. 168, 180 (1869) ("[W]ithout some provision . . . removing from the citizens of each State the disabilities of alienage in the other States, and giving them equality of privilege with citizens of those States, the Republic would have constituted little more than a league of States; it would not have…