amended pleading

In 1959 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania enacted a statute requiring that at least ten verses from the Holy Bible be read without comment at the opening of each public school on each school day. The statute included a provision allowing any child to be excused upon the written request of a parent or guardian. The Schempp family, Unitarian parents residing in Abington Township whose children attended Abington Senior High School, filed suit in federal district court seeking to enjoin enforcement of the statute. The exercises at the school involved selected students reading ten verses over the intercom system between 8:15 and 8:30 a.m., followed by recitation of the Lord's Prayer in unison by students in classrooms. The exercises were conducted daily under teacher supervision with no prefatory statements or comments. A three-judge district court held the statute unconstitutional after hearing testimony from the Schempps and expert witnesses regarding the religious character of the exercises and potential psychological effects on children. In 1905 the Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore City adopted a rule pursuant to Art. 77, § 202 of the Annotated Code of Maryland requiring opening exercises consisting of reading a chapter from the Holy Bible and/or recitation of the Lord's Prayer. Madalyn Murray and her son William, professed atheists living in Baltimore, filed suit in state court to compel rescission of the rule after unsuccessful attempts to have it rescinded. The Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the rule. The two cases were consolidated for argument before the Supreme Court because of the similarity of the issues presented. In both cases the Bible readings were conducted without comment using versions such as the King James, Douay, or Revised Standard. Students could select passages or be excused upon parental request, though the Schempps chose not to seek excusal for their children due to concerns about social stigma. Expert testimony was introduced concerning differences between Jewish and Christian scriptures and the potential for harm or divisiveness from reading certain passages without explanation. The district court in Schempp made findings that the exercises possessed a devotional and religious character and that the statute preferred the Christian religion. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in both cases following appeals from the respective lower court decisions.

Interactive Data Corporation hired John Foley in June 1976 as an assistant product manager at a starting salary of $18,500. As a condition of employment Foley signed a confidential and proprietary information agreement. The company's president told Foley that if he performed his job well he would have a long and rewarding employment with the firm. Over the next six years and nine months Foley received steady salary increases, promotions, bonuses, awards, and superior performance evaluations, rising to branch manager of the Los Angeles office with an annual salary of $56,164 plus a merit bonus. In January 1983 Foley learned that his new supervisor, Robert Kuhne, was under investigation by the FBI for embezzlement from his former employer, Bank of America. Foley reported the information to Vice President Richard Earnest because he was worried about working for Kuhne in a supervisory position. Earnest told Foley not to discuss rumors and to forget what he had heard. In early March 1983 Kuhne informed Foley that the company had decided to replace him for performance reasons and offered a transfer to another division. Foley was later told he could continue as branch manager if he agreed to a performance plan, but when Kuhne met with him the next day Kuhne instead gave Foley the choice of resigning or being fired. Foley was discharged on March 13, 1983. Foley filed suit against Interactive Data Corporation alleging three causes of action: tortious discharge in violation of public policy, breach of an implied-in-fact contract to terminate only for good cause, and tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The superior court sustained the company's demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the action. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted review.

In August 1972 appellee Diaz filed a class action complaint. He is a Cuban refugee over age 65 who had been lawfully admitted to the United States less than five years earlier. The complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. It challenged the denial of his application for enrollment in the Medicare Part B supplemental medical insurance program. The complaint alleged that the denial rested on his failure to satisfy the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1395o(2) as a noncitizen. It sought relief on behalf of a class of persons denied enrollment for the same reasons. On September 28, 1972, the District Court granted leave to add appellees Clara and Espinosa as plaintiffs and to file an amended complaint. Clara is another Cuban refugee in similar circumstances who remained in the country at the discretion of the Attorney General. Espinosa is an alien admitted for permanent residence since 1971 who had not applied because he could not meet the five-year residence requirement. The amended complaint sought relief on behalf of a class represented by Diaz and Clara and a subclass represented by Espinosa. On October 24, 1972, the Secretary moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that none of the plaintiffs had exhausted administrative remedies under the Social Security Act. Two days later Espinosa filed his application for enrollment. Although none of the appellees completely exhausted available administrative review, the Secretary acknowledged that the applications of Diaz and Clara raised no disputed issues of fact and treated the interlocutory denials as final, satisfying the jurisdictional requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Secretary also stipulated that Espinosa’s application could not be allowed under the statute. The District Court overruled the motion to dismiss and, on cross-motions for summary judgment, held that the five-year residence requirement violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and could not be severed from the permanent residence requirement, enjoining the Secretary from refusing to enroll members of the represented classes. The Secretary appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.

The legislature of the State of Minnesota, in the year 1905, passed an act fixing the rates of passenger fares to be charged by railroads within the State, and also fixing the rates for the transportation of freight. The act was to take effect on the 1st day of July, 1905, and it provided for the appointment of a railroad commission, with power to fix rates, and also provided for the enforcement of the act by penalties and by mandamus. Before the act took effect, the railroad companies affected by it filed bills in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota, alleging that the act was unconstitutional, in that it was confiscatory, and deprived the companies of their property without due process of law, and also that it was in violation of the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States, and they asked for an injunction to restrain the enforcement of the act. These suits were brought against the railroad commission and the Attorney General of the State. While those cases were pending on appeal, the legislature in 1907 amended the law to create a railroad and warehouse commission with authority to set rates and to impose a penalty of one thousand dollars for each violation of charging higher rates, with the Attorney General charged with enforcement. After the Supreme Court decided the Minnesota Rate Cases in 208 U.S. 1, stockholders Perkins and Shepard of the Northern Pacific Railway Company filed a new bill in the Circuit Court against the commission members, Attorney General Edward T. Young, and others, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the 1907 act on constitutional grounds. The Circuit Court granted a preliminary injunction restraining Young from instituting suits to enforce the penalties. Young appeared specially, moved to dismiss the bill as a suit against the State barred by the Eleventh Amendment, but the motion was overruled; he declined to plead further, resulting in a default decree granting the injunction. Subsequently, Young, as Attorney General, commenced a mandamus proceeding in Minnesota state court against the Northern Pacific Railway Company to compel compliance with the 1907 rates. Upon learning of the state court action, the Circuit Court issued a rule to show cause why Young should not be held in contempt; after hearing, it found him in contempt, fined him one hundred dollars, and ordered him to dismiss the mandamus suit or remain in custody. Young then petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that the federal court's orders exceeded its jurisdiction.