Also known as: arising under jurisdiction · federal question jurisdiction
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction authorizing district courts to hear civil actions in which the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint asserts a right to relief created by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Alice Atkins sued a federal agency in district court alleging that agents violated her Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a warrantless search of her home and seizing documents. She sought damages directly under the Constitution without citing any express statutory remedy. The court exercised arising-under jurisdiction because her complaint asserted a right to relief under federal constitutional law.
Anika Anand filed a state-law contract claim in state court against Apex Dynamics. Apex answered by asserting a federal patent law defense and removed the case. The federal court remanded because the well-pleaded complaint contained only state claims and a federal defense cannot support arising-under jurisdiction.
Andre Antoine sued Anchor Bank in state court for breach of a loan agreement under state law. His complaint mentioned that the bank would likely defend by citing federal banking regulations. The bank removed on federal question grounds, but the court remanded because anticipated federal defenses do not create arising-under jurisdiction.
Abigail Alvarez, a state official, sued a neighboring city in federal court alleging that its pollution of an interstate waterway violated federal common law rights. The complaint asserted no statutory cause of action. The court found arising-under jurisdiction because the claim rested on federal common law.
In 1972 the State of Illinois filed a motion for leave to file a bill of complaint in the Supreme Court invoking its original jurisdiction against four Wisconsin cities, the Sewerage Commission of the City of Milwaukee, and the Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of the County of Milwaukee. The complaint alleged that these defendants discharge some 200 million gallons of raw or inadequately treated sewage and other waste materials daily into Lake Michigan, an interstate body of water. Illinois further alleged that it and its subdivisions prohibit and prevent such discharges while the defendants do not, and it asked the Court to abate the resulting public nuisance. No proceedings had taken place in any lower court because Illinois sought to commence the action directly before the Supreme Court. Illinois argued that the named agencies are instrumentalities of Wisconsin and that the suit is therefore effectively against the State of Wisconsin, which could not be brought in any other forum. The defendants are public corporations whose existence and operations are controlled by Wisconsin. Congress has enacted statutes addressing pollution of interstate and navigable waters, including the Rivers and Harbors Act of March 3, 1899, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act declares it federal policy to recognize the primary responsibilities of the States in preventing and controlling water pollution while also providing for federal enforcement actions and water-quality standards.
View caseAlbert Allen sued a drug manufacturer in state court for negligence, alleging that violation of a federal labeling statute created a presumption of negligence under state law. The defendant removed. The court remanded because the federal statute did not create the cause of action and the claim did not necessarily turn on a substantial federal issue.
The Thompson respondents, residents of Canada, and the MacTavishes, residents of Scotland, filed virtually identical complaints against Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., a corporation that manufactures and distributes the drug Bendectin, in the Court of Common Pleas in Hamilton County, Ohio. Each complaint alleged that a child was born with multiple deformities as a result of the mother's ingestion of Bendectin during pregnancy. In five of the six counts, the recovery of substantial damages was requested on common-law theories of negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability, fraud, and gross negligence. In Count IV, respondents alleged that the drug Bendectin was misbranded in violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act because its labeling did not provide adequate warning that its use was potentially dangerous, that the violation of the FDCA in the promotion of Bendectin constituted a rebuttable presumption of negligence, and that the violation of said federal statutes directly and proximately caused the injuries suffered by the two infants. Merrell Dow filed a timely petition for removal from the state court to the Federal District Court alleging that the action was founded, in part, on an alleged claim arising under the laws of the United States. After removal, the two cases were consolidated. Respondents filed a motion to remand to the state forum on the ground that the federal court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The District Court denied the motion to remand and granted Merrell Dow's motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court's denial of remand. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the jurisdictional issue.
View caseAnita Ali asserted a federal copyright claim and a related state unfair-competition claim against Artemis Logistics in the same complaint. The court exercised arising-under jurisdiction over the federal claim and supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim because both arose from the same nucleus of operative facts.
Paul Gibbs was hired in the summer of 1960 by Grundy Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Tennessee Consolidated Coal Company, to serve as mine superintendent for a new mine at Gray's Creek and to haul the coal produced there under a separate contract. This arrangement occurred amid ongoing rivalry between the United Mine Workers of America and the Southern Labor Union for representation of coal miners in the southern Appalachian fields. On August 15 and 16, 1960, armed members of UMW Local 5881 prevented the mine from opening through threats and violence, including beating an organizer for the rival union, after learning that jobs they believed had been promised to them were going to others. George Gilbert, the UMW field representative for the area, was attending an Executive Board meeting in Middlesboro, Kentucky, when the violence occurred and did not return until late on August 16. Upon his return he received instructions from international union superiors to establish a limited picket line, prevent any further violence, and ensure the strike did not spread. No further violence took place at the mine site, a picket line was maintained for nine months, and no further attempts were made to open the mine during that period. Gibbs lost his superintendent position and never performed the haulage contract. He claimed to have lost other trucking contracts and mine leases in nearby areas as a result of a concerted union plan against him. He filed suit against the international UMW only, not against Local 5881 or its members, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. Jurisdiction over the federal claim rested on alleged secondary boycotts under section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Jurisdiction over the state law claim for unlawful conspiracy and boycott was premised on the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. At trial the district court refused to submit claims of pressure on mining firms other than Grundy to cease doing business with Gibbs. The jury returned a verdict finding violations of both section 303 and state law and awarded $60,000 in damages under the employment contract, $14,500 under the haulage contract, and $100,000 in punitive damages. On post-trial motion the court set aside the haulage contract award for lack of proof of damages and sustained a remitted award on the state law claim alone. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseNo. A case arises under federal law when the plaintiff alleges a right to relief directly under the Constitution or federal statutes even if Congress has not created an express remedy. Jurisdiction exists so long as the claim is not wholly insubstantial or frivolous.
No. The well-pleaded complaint rule limits the inquiry to the plaintiff's properly pleaded cause of action. A federal defense or counterclaim cannot supply federal question jurisdiction regardless of how central the federal issue may be.
No. A plaintiff cannot create arising-under jurisdiction by pleading or attacking an anticipated federal defense. Jurisdiction turns solely on whether federal law creates the plaintiff's own cause of action.
When the state claims form part of the same case or controversy as a federal claim that supplies original arising-under jurisdiction. The claims must share a common nucleus of operative fact so that they would ordinarily be tried together.
…scope of the state claim implicates the federal doctrine of pre-emption; while this interrelationship does not create statutory federal question jurisdiction, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mottley , 211 U. S. 149, its existence is relevant to the exercise of discretion. Finally, there may be reasons independent of jurisdictional considerations,…