Brady

In October 1981, The Investigator magazine published two articles entitled "The Private World of Willis Carto" and "Yockey: Profile of an American Hitler," along with a shorter introductory article. These articles portrayed respondent Liberty Lobby, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation and self-described citizens' lobby, and its founder Willis A. Carto as neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist, and Fascist. Respondents filed a diversity libel action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against petitioners Jack Anderson, the publisher, Bill Adkins, and the Investigator Publishing Co., alleging that 28 statements and 2 illustrations in the articles were false and derogatory. Following discovery, petitioners moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. In support, they submitted an affidavit from Charles Bermant, the author of the articles, stating that he had spent substantial time researching from a wide variety of sources and believed the facts to be truthful, along with an appendix detailing sources for each allegedly libelous statement. Respondents opposed the motion, asserting inaccuracies and that Bermant had relied on patently unreliable sources, and presented evidence that editor William McGaw had told Adkins before publication that the articles were terrible and ridiculous. The District Court held that respondents were limited-purpose public figures to whom the New York Times standards applied. After reviewing the evidence, the District Court granted summary judgment to petitioners. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed as to 21 statements and reversed as to 9. It held that the requirement that actual malice be proved by clear and convincing evidence need not be considered at the summary judgment stage. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the holding conflicted with decisions of several other Courts of Appeals.

In August 1971, appellee Cohn's 17-year-old daughter was raped and murdered in Georgia. Six youths were indicted for murder and rape. Although there was substantial press coverage of the crime and of subsequent developments, the identity of the victim was not disclosed pending trial, perhaps because of Ga. Code Ann. § 26-9901 (1972). In April 1972, during court proceedings in which five defendants entered guilty pleas, reporter Wassell for petitioner Cox Broadcasting Corporation examined the indictments made available in the courtroom. Wassell obtained the victim's name from those public records and broadcast it on WSB-TV that day and again the following day. In May 1972, Cohn filed suit in the Superior Court of Fulton County against Cox Broadcasting and Wassell. The complaint alleged invasion of privacy arising from the television broadcasts that named his deceased daughter and sought money damages. The trial court granted summary judgment to Cohn on the issue of liability. The Georgia Supreme Court initially held that the complaint stated a common-law claim for public disclosure. On rehearing the court sustained the constitutionality of the state statute prohibiting publication of a rape victim's name. The United States Supreme Court postponed decision on jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits and reviewed the case after the Georgia Supreme Court rejected the constitutional challenge to liability.

International Shoe Co. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. The company manufactured and sold shoes and other footwear. During the years 1937 to 1940 the company employed eleven to thirteen salesmen who resided in Washington and whose principal activities were confined to that state. These salesmen were compensated by commissions totaling more than $31,000 each year. The salesmen displayed samples to prospective purchasers. On occasion they rented permanent sample rooms in business buildings or rented rooms in hotels or business buildings temporarily for that purpose. The cost of such rentals was reimbursed by the company. The authority of the salesmen is limited to exhibiting their samples and soliciting orders from prospective buyers, at prices and on terms fixed by appellant. The salesmen transmit the orders to appellant's office in St. Louis for acceptance or rejection. When accepted the merchandise for filling the orders is shipped f. o. b. from points outside Washington to the purchasers within the state. Washington state maintained a comprehensive unemployment compensation scheme. The costs of the scheme are defrayed by contributions required to be made by employers to a state unemployment compensation fund. The contributions are a specified percentage of the wages payable annually by each employer for his employees' services in the state. The assessment and collection of the contributions and the fund are administered by appellees. For the years in question notice of assessment for delinquent contributions was personally served upon a sales solicitor employed by appellant in the State of Washington. A copy of the notice was mailed by registered mail to appellant at its address in St. Louis, Missouri. Appellant appeared specially before the office of unemployment and moved to set aside the order and notice of assessment on the ground that the service upon appellant's salesman was not proper service upon appellant. Appellant also asserted that it was not doing business within the state and that it is not an employer and does not furnish employment within the meaning of the statute. The motion was heard on evidence and a stipulation of facts by the appeal tribunal which denied the motion and ruled that appellee Commissioner was entitled to recover the unpaid contributions. That action was affirmed by the Commissioner. Both the Superior Court and the Supreme Court affirmed. The company appealed to the United States Supreme Court under section 237(a) of the Judicial Code. The facts found by the appeal tribunal and accepted by the state courts showed that the company had no office in Washington and makes no contracts either for sale or purchase of merchandise there. It maintains no stock of merchandise in that state and makes there no deliveries of goods in intrastate commerce. All the merchandise shipped into Washington is invoiced at the place of shipment from which collections are made. No salesman has authority to enter into contracts or to make collections.

Petitioner Clarence Earl Gideon was charged in a Florida state court with having broken and entered a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor. This offense is a felony under Florida law. Appearing in court without funds and without a lawyer, Gideon asked the court to appoint counsel for him. The court denied the request, stating that under the laws of the State of Florida the only time the Court can appoint Counsel to represent a Defendant is when that person is charged with a capital offense. Put to trial before a jury, Gideon conducted his defense about as well as could be expected from a layman. He made an opening statement to the jury, cross-examined the State’s witnesses, presented witnesses in his own defense, declined to testify himself, and made a short argument emphasizing his innocence to the charge contained in the Information filed in this case. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and petitioner was sentenced to serve five years in the state prison. Later, petitioner filed in the Florida Supreme Court this habeas corpus petition. The petition attacked his conviction and sentence on the ground that the trial court’s refusal to appoint counsel for him denied him rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights by the United States Government. Treating the petition for habeas corpus as properly before it, the State Supreme Court, upon consideration thereof but without an opinion, denied all relief. Since 1942, when Betts v. Brady was decided by a divided Court, the problem of a defendant’s federal constitutional right to counsel in a state court has been a continuing source of controversy and litigation in both state and federal courts. To give this problem another review here, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Since Gideon was proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court appointed counsel to represent him and requested both sides to discuss in their briefs and oral arguments whether this Court’s holding in Betts v. Brady should be reconsidered.