Also known as: case or controversy · cases and controversies · cases or controversies · case-or-controversy requirement · Article III case or controversy
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
An Article III limitation that confines federal judicial power to actual disputes between adverse parties possessing concrete stakes in the outcome. Federal courts may not issue advisory opinions on hypothetical questions or unenforced statutes lacking any realistic threat of enforcement.
An Article III limitation that confines federal judicial power to actual disputes between adverse parties possessing concrete stakes in the outcome. Federal courts may not issue advisory opinions on hypothetical questions or unenforced statutes lacking any realistic threat of enforcement.
The constitutional standard under which a federal court possessing original jurisdiction over one claim may hear additional claims that share a common nucleus of operative fact with the anchor claim and therefore form part of the same dispute.
The constitutional standard under which a federal court possessing original jurisdiction over one claim may hear additional claims that share a common nucleus of operative fact with the anchor claim and therefore form part of the same dispute.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
The Cleveland Museum of Art sought a declaratory judgment invalidating a 1923 ordinance banning certain explicit displays. The ordinance had never been enforced in a century, city attorneys confirmed it would not be applied, and comparable exhibitions had received grants without incident. The district court lacks jurisdiction because the dispute presents no realistic threat of enforcement.
Taxpayers challenged federal expenditures for religious schools under a statute authorizing the spending. The plaintiffs alleged only that their tax dollars were being used unlawfully and asserted no personal injury distinct from that shared by all taxpayers. The court must determine whether the claimed injury satisfies the case or controversy requirement for standing.
Congress enacted the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. That statute authorized federal grants under Titles I and II to state and local educational agencies. Seven individuals who paid federal income taxes filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They sued the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Commissioner of Education in their official capacities. The complaint alleged that federal funds appropriated under the Act were being disbursed with the consent and approval of the defendants. Those funds were being used to finance instruction in reading, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious schools and to purchase textbooks and instructional materials for use in such schools. The complaint attacked the specific criterion of 20 U.S.C. § 241e(a)(2) that to the extent consistent with the number of educationally deprived children in the school district of the local educational agency who are enrolled in private elementary and secondary schools, such agency has made provision for including special educational services and arrangements in which such children can participate. The plaintiffs alleged that these expenditures constituted compulsory taxation for religious purposes in violation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. They requested a declaratory judgment that the expenditures were unauthorized or alternatively that the Act was unconstitutional to that extent together with an injunction restraining approval of further expenditures for the challenged purposes. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing. A three-judge district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 and the Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseA pregnant woman challenged a state criminal abortion statute that threatened prosecution of physicians who performed the procedure. She alleged that the statute directly constrained her ability to obtain an abortion and created an imminent injury. The court must decide whether her personal stake establishes a live case or controversy.
In March 1970, Jane Roe, a single woman residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted a federal action against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face. She also sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the statutes. Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant. She wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. She was unable to obtain a legal abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by continuation of the pregnancy. She could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction to secure a legal abortion. James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes. Two such prosecutions were pending against him in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions. He claimed that for many cases he was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196 of the Texas Penal Code. John and Mary Doe, a married couple, filed a companion complaint also naming the District Attorney as defendant. The Does alleged that they were a childless couple. Mrs. Doe was suffering from a neural-chemical disorder. Her physician had advised her to avoid pregnancy until her condition materially improved. She had discontinued use of birth control pills pursuant to medical advice. If she should become pregnant she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district court for the Northern District of Texas. Upon the filing of affidavits, motions were made for dismissal and for summary judgment. The court held that Roe and members of her class and Dr. Hallford had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies. The Does had failed to allege facts sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have standing. It concluded that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face. The court dismissed the Does' complaint while denying injunctive relief. The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford appealed to the Supreme Court from that part of the District Court's judgment denying the injunction. The defendant District Attorney cross-appealed from the grant of declaratory relief. Both sides also took protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision by the Supreme Court.
A political party challenged provisions of a federal campaign finance statute limiting certain expenditures. The party alleged that the restrictions chilled its planned speech and fundraising activities. The court must assess whether the claimed injury is sufficiently concrete and imminent to satisfy the case or controversy requirement.
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the Communications Act of 1934, and other statutes to address the role of soft money and issue advocacy in federal elections. Plaintiffs included a diverse group of entities and individuals such as the National Rifle Association and the American Civil Liberties Union who alleged that BCRA was unconstitutional. Defendants included the Federal Election Commission and the Attorney General of the United States. The case was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and heard by a three-judge panel pursuant to special procedures in BCRA Section 403. The District Court received a voluminous record from the parties and issued a judgment on May 1, 2003, that upheld some provisions of BCRA and invalidated others. All losing parties filed direct appeals to the Supreme Court within ten days, and the Court noted probable jurisdiction on June 5, 2003, ordering expedited briefing and argument on September 8, 2003. More than a century of federal legislation preceded BCRA, beginning with the Tillman Act of 1907 that banned corporate contributions in connection with federal elections. Congress later extended prohibitions to unions, required disclosure of contributions and expenditures, and enacted FECA in 1971 with further amendments in 1974 that imposed contribution limits, expenditure ceilings, and created the FEC. The Supreme Court addressed constitutional challenges to the 1974 amendments in Buckley v. Valeo. After Buckley, the FEC permitted political parties to fund mixed-purpose activities such as voter registration and generic advertising in part with soft money not subject to FECA's source and amount limits. Soft-money fundraising by the national parties grew from $21.6 million in 1984 to $498 million in 2000, with large corporate and union donations often motivated by a desire for access to federal candidates. National parties transferred substantial soft money to state parties, which could use higher percentages for mixed activities under FEC allocation rules. The use of soft money also supported so-called issue ads that avoided express advocacy of a candidate's election or defeat and therefore fell outside FECA's disclosure and source restrictions. These ads frequently aired in the 60 days before federal elections, referred to clearly identified candidates, and were funded by corporations, unions, and tax-exempt organizations using misleading names. A Senate investigation into 1996 federal election practices documented both parties' use of soft money to obtain special access for large donors and the coordination of issue ads with candidates. The District Court compiled extensive evidence from declarations, expert reports, and internal party documents showing that federal officeholders solicited soft-money donations, that parties maintained tallies crediting donors to particular candidates, and that large soft-money contributions were often made to secure influence rather than for ideological reasons.
2 common questions
A challenge fails when the statute has never been enforced, no realistic threat of enforcement exists, and the dispute remains hypothetical. Federal courts refuse to issue advisory opinions on dormant laws under these circumstances.
Supporting sources
No. A plaintiff must show an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized. A procedural violation alone, unaccompanied by actual or threatened harm, does not meet the case or controversy requirement.
Supporting sources
ByteGlow LLC sued Apex Systems Corp in federal court alleging federal copyright infringement from unauthorized copying of source code. In the same complaint ByteGlow added a state misappropriation claim arising from the identical episode of code theft and engineer poaching. The court may hear the state claim because both rest on the same factual nucleus.
SwiftHaul Logistics sued the Midstate Transportation Authority in federal court under a federal statute governing tollway freight access. SwiftHaul also asserted state claims for interference with contracts and unfair competition based on the authority steering customers to a rival. The federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims because they share the same course of conduct.
1 common questions
The state claim must share a common nucleus of operative fact with the federal anchor claim so that both form part of the same constitutional case or controversy. Claims arising from the same alleged conduct satisfy this standard.
Supporting sources
…failure, possible future pregnancy, and possible future unpreparedness for parenthood is too speculative to present an actual case or controversy. Pp. 127-129. (c) The physician-appellant Hallford, who is under two pending prosecutions for violating the Texas abortion laws, has standing to challenge the facial validity of those…