Also known as: Commerce Clause · Necessary and Proper Clause · Art. I, § 8
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An enumerated power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several states. The clause is paired with authority to enact all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution that power and other enumerated powers.
Crestview Holdings ships live baitfish from out of state into a state that bars all such imports to protect local fisheries from parasites. State officials seize the shipment at the border. The company sues, claiming the ban discriminates against interstate commerce. The court upholds the prohibition after finding it serves a legitimate ecological interest with no adequate nondiscriminatory alternative.
Canyon Construction hauls hazardous waste generated in another state to a landfill inside the forum state. The state charges a higher per-ton fee for out-of-state waste than for locally generated waste. Canyon sues, alleging a violation of the dormant commerce principle. The court strikes down the surcharge as presumptively invalid discrimination based on origin.
Central Dynamics operates a private waste-transfer station. A county ordinance requires all solid waste collected within its borders to be delivered to a county-owned facility. Central Dynamics challenges the rule as economic protectionism. The court applies lenient review and upholds the ordinance because it directs waste to a public provider performing a traditional government function.
Camila Cervantes works for a state-operated hospital. Congress extends minimum-wage and overtime rules to state and local governments under its commerce authority. The state claims the law intrudes on traditional governmental functions. The court rejects that limit and holds that states must rely on the political process rather than judicially enforced boundaries.
Cobalt Energy ships nuclear waste across state lines. A federal statute expressly permits states to impose graduated surcharges on out-of-state nuclear waste. The company argues the surcharges still violate the dormant commerce principle. The court upholds the fees because Congress has authorized the discrimination.
Craig Caldwell carries a handgun near a local high school. A federal statute criminalizes possession of firearms in school zones. Caldwell moves to dismiss the indictment, arguing the law exceeds congressional power. The court holds that the noneconomic, intrastate activity lacks a sufficient connection to interstate commerce.
In March 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a twelfth-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, arrived at school carrying a concealed .38-caliber handgun and five bullets. Acting on an anonymous tip, school authorities confronted Lopez, who admitted possessing the weapon. Local police arrested him and charged him under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The following day, state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. A federal grand jury indicted him on one count of knowing possession of a firearm at a school zone. Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress's power to legislate control over public schools. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the statute was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate activities affecting commerce because the business of schools affects interstate commerce. After a bench trial, the court found Lopez guilty and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and two years of supervised release. Lopez appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the conviction, holding that the statute was beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
View caseCongress may regulate noneconomic intrastate activity only when the statute is part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme that would be undercut if the activity were left unregulated. Isolated noneconomic conduct without a substantial effect on interstate commerce falls outside the power.
Yes, when the law serves a legitimate and important non-economic local interest such as protecting wildlife or natural resources and no reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives exist.
Congress may expressly authorize states to impose surcharges or other discriminatory measures on certain out-of-state waste, and such authorized discrimination does not violate the dormant commerce principle.
The Necessary and Proper Clause permits Congress to charter a corporation when doing so is plainly adapted to executing enumerated powers such as regulating interstate commerce or providing for national defense.
…that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone,” 18 U. S. C. § 922(q)(1)(A), exceeds Congress’ Commerce Clause powers. Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with “commerce” or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms. It…