Also known as:deferential standards of review · deference · deferential review
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A judicial posture of restraint that upholds official action if rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. The posture requires courts to accept the determinations of the political branches or administrative decision makers unless the challenger shows a clear constitutional violation or arbitrary conduct.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Visa Restriction Upheld
Alpha Framing challenged an executive order barring entry of construction workers from several majority-Muslim nations. The order recited national-security risks to infrastructure projects in State A. The district court applied rational-basis review and upheld the order because the stated purpose was legitimate and the restriction was rationally connected to it.
Employee Petition Firing Sustained
An assistant district attorney circulated a petition protesting internal transfer policies. The district attorney fired the employee after concluding the petition would disrupt office operations. The court deferred to the employer's assessment and upheld the termination because the speech concerned only workplace grievances.
The state commission banned promotional advertising by electric utilities to conserve energy. Central Hudson challenged the ban as violating commercial-speech protections. The court applied intermediate scrutiny but gave weight to the commission's factual findings on energy conservation and upheld the restriction.
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York447 U.S. 557, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 65 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1980)
In December 1973, the Public Service Commission ordered electric utilities in New York State to cease all advertising that promoted the use of electricity because the interconnected utility system lacked sufficient fuel stocks for the 1973-1974 winter. The order rested on the Commission's finding that the system did not have sufficient fuel stocks or sources of supply to meet customer demands.
Three years later, when the fuel shortage had eased, the Commission requested comments from the public on its proposal to continue the ban on promotional advertising. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. opposed the ban on First Amendment grounds. After reviewing the public comments, the Commission extended the prohibition in a Policy Statement issued on February 25, 1977.
The Policy Statement divided advertising expenses into promotional and institutional categories. It permitted informational advertising designed to encourage shifts of consumption from peak demand times to periods of low electricity demand. The Commission banned promotional advertising because additional electricity would be more expensive to produce and promotional advertising would give misleading signals to the public. Central Hudson challenged the order in state court. The order was upheld through the New York Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and reversed.
The coastal commission required the Nollans to grant a public-access easement as a condition of rebuilding their beachfront home. The Nollans argued the condition lacked a sufficient nexus to their project. The court deferred to the commission's findings on increased beach demand and upheld the easement requirement.
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987)
The Nollans own a beachfront lot in Ventura County, California.
A concrete seawall approximately eight feet high separates the beach portion of their property from the rest of the lot. The historic mean high tide line determines the lot's oceanside boundary. The Nollans originally leased their property with an option to buy, and the building on the lot was a small bungalow totaling 504 square feet.
The Nollans' option to purchase was conditioned on their promise to demolish the bungalow and replace it. On February 25, 1982, they submitted a permit application to the California Coastal Commission proposing to demolish the existing structure and replace it with a three-bedroom house.
The Commission informed them that the permit would be granted subject to the condition that they allow the public an easement to pass across a portion of their property bounded by the mean high tide line and their seawall. On June 3, 1982, the Nollans filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in the Ventura County Superior Court to invalidate the access condition. The court remanded the case to the Commission for a full evidentiary hearing.
After the hearing, the Commission reaffirmed the condition. The Superior Court ruled in favor of the Nollans on statutory grounds and directed that the permit condition be struck. While the Commission's appeal to the California Court of Appeal was pending, the Nollans tore down the bungalow, built the new house, and bought the property. The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court. The Nollans appealed to this Court, raising only the constitutional question.
Connecticut prosecuted a married couple and their physician for using contraceptives in violation of a state statute. The couple argued the law invaded a fundamental liberty interest. The court declined to defer to the legislature and invalidated the statute because it lacked any rational connection to a legitimate state purpose.
Griswold v. Connecticut381 U.S. 479 (1965)
Estelle Griswold served as Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Dr. C. Lee Buxton served as the League's Medical Director and was a professor at Yale Medical School. Together they opened and operated a center in New Haven that was open from November 1 to November 10, 1961.
At the center they gave information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the means of preventing conception. They examined the wife and prescribed the best contraceptive device or material for her use. Fees were usually charged, although some couples were serviced free.
The statutes involved were sections 53-32 and 54-196 of the General Statutes of Connecticut (1958 rev.). Section 53-32 made it a crime to use any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception. Section 54-196 punished accessories as principals. The appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each.
The Appellate Division of the Circuit Court affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut affirmed that judgment in State v. Griswold, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A. 2d 479. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
The appellants asserted standing to raise the constitutional rights of the married persons with whom they had a professional relationship. A criminal conviction for serving married couples removes doubts about case or controversy. The rights of husband and wife would be diluted unless considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission adopted a rule on spent-fuel storage without additional environmental-impact hearings. Environmental groups challenged the rule as arbitrary. The court deferred to the agency's technical expertise and upheld the rule because the record showed a rational basis for the commission's conclusions.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2781, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984)
In 1967 the Atomic Energy Commission granted Vermont Yankee a construction permit for a nuclear power plant in Vernon, Vermont, after the required adjudicatory hearing and reviews. Vermont Yankee later applied for an operating license; NRDC intervened and objected to exclusion of fuel-reprocessing and waste-disposal impacts from the hearing. In November 1972 the Commission opened a separate rulemaking proceeding on those fuel-cycle issues, noticed two alternative approaches based on its Environmental Survey, and conducted a February 1973 hearing at which more than forty participants submitted comments but no discovery or cross-examination occurred. In April 1974 the Commission adopted a rule assigning numerical values to fuel-cycle impacts and applied it prospectively.
In January 1969 Consumers Power applied for permits to build two nuclear reactors in Midland, Michigan. After staff and ACRS review, Saginaw and Mapleton intervened and raised 119 environmental contentions, including seventeen on energy conservation. The Licensing Board held hearings on radiological issues, the staff issued a final environmental impact statement in March 1972, and further hearings occurred in May and June 1972; Saginaw declined to participate in the later hearings or submit proposed findings. The Licensing Board granted the construction permit, the Appeal Board affirmed, and the Commission declined further review. In November 1973 the Commission ruled in another case that energy-conservation evidence meeting threshold tests could be considered, but it later refused Saginaw's motion to reopen the Consumers Power record.
NRDC appealed the Vermont Yankee license and rule to the D.C. Circuit; Saginaw and others appealed the Consumers Power permit. In 1976 the Court of Appeals remanded both matters, holding the fuel-cycle rulemaking procedures inadequate, the Consumers Power environmental impact statement defective for omitting energy conservation, and the ACRS report insufficiently explained. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1977.
The Commission is the successor agency to the Atomic Energy Commission under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. All licensing proceedings followed the two-stage process of construction permit followed by operating license under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, with NEPA environmental reviews added after 1969.
When does a court apply a deferential standard of review rather than strict scrutiny?
A court applies a deferential standard when the challenged action involves immigration, foreign affairs, or routine administrative or employment decisions that do not implicate fundamental rights. The court then asks only whether the action is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.
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Does deference apply to factual findings or also to legal conclusions?
Deference applies primarily to factual findings and discretionary policy judgments. Legal conclusions about the meaning of constitutional provisions receive no deference and are reviewed de novo.
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Can presidential statements suggesting improper motive overcome a deferential standard?
No. When the order or action states a legitimate purpose on its face and is rationally related to that purpose, courts applying a deferential standard uphold the action even if extrinsic statements suggest an improper motive.
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381 U.S. 479 (1965)
…must be changed from time to time and that this Court is charged with a duty to make those changes. For myself, I must with all deference reject that philosophy. The Constitution makers knew the need for change and provided for it. Amendments suggested by the people's elected representatives can be submitted to the people or…