Also known as: directives · EU directive
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An authoritative instruction or command issued by a court, legislature, principal, or other authority to guide or require specific conduct. The instruction carries binding force within its domain and determines the obligations of the recipient.
Diane Dawson sued in federal court under diversity jurisdiction after a car accident. State procedure required a different filing deadline than Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3. The court applied the federal rule because it was valid and on point, allowing the case to proceed despite the state conflict.
Dustin Donovan's will contained a general directive to pay all debts. He specifically devised a house that carried an existing mortgage at his death. The devise passed subject to the mortgage with no right of exoneration for the beneficiary.
Deborah Dunn, a state sheriff, received a federal directive under the Brady Act requiring her office to perform background checks on handgun buyers. She refused, arguing the command violated the Tenth Amendment by forcing state officers to administer a federal program.
Doris Duffy's state legislature considered authorizing sports betting. A federal statute directed states not to authorize or license such schemes. The Court held the directive violated anti-commandeering rules because it ordered state legislative action rather than regulating private conduct.
Dylan Duffy invoked the privilege against self-incrimination in state court. The directive from the Fifth Amendment, applied through the Fourteenth, required the state to honor the federal standard rather than a narrower state version.
In November 1959, Harold Malloy was arrested during a gambling raid in Hartford, Connecticut, on charges related to pool selling. He pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor, receiving a sentence of one year in jail and a five-hundred-dollar fine, with the jail term suspended after ninety days followed by two years of probation. Approximately sixteen months later, Malloy was subpoenaed to appear before a referee appointed by the Superior Court of Hartford County to investigate alleged gambling and other criminal activities in the county. During the inquiry, he was questioned about the circumstances of his 1959 arrest and conviction, including the identity of his employer, who paid his fine and bondsman, the tenant of the apartment where he was arrested, and whether he knew a man named John Bergoti. Malloy refused to answer any of these questions, asserting that his responses might tend to incriminate him. The Superior Court adjudged Malloy in contempt and ordered him committed to prison until he answered the questions. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors affirmed the contempt adjudication, holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege was unavailable in state proceedings and that Malloy had not properly invoked the state constitutional privilege. Malloy then sought federal habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, which was denied, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutional questions presented.
View caseDamian Decker's family sought to discontinue life support. The court required clear and convincing evidence of his wishes, noting that a formal advance directive would satisfy the standard while informal statements might not.
On the night of January 11, 1983, Nancy Beth Cruzan lost control of her car as she traveled down Elm Road in Jasper County, Missouri. The vehicle overturned, and Cruzan was discovered lying face down in a ditch without detectable respiratory or cardiac function. Paramedics were able to restore her breathing and heartbeat at the accident site, and she was transported to a hospital in an unconscious state. An attending neurosurgeon diagnosed her as having sustained probable cerebral contusions compounded by significant anoxia. The Missouri trial court found that permanent brain damage generally results after six minutes in an anoxic state, and it was estimated that Cruzan was deprived of oxygen from twelve to fourteen minutes. She remained in a coma for approximately three weeks and then progressed to an unconscious state in which she was able to orally ingest some nutrition. Surgeons implanted a gastrostomy feeding and hydration tube in Cruzan with the consent of her then husband. Subsequent rehabilitative efforts proved unavailing. She now lies in a Missouri state hospital in what is commonly referred to as a persistent vegetative state in which a person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function. The State of Missouri is bearing the cost of her care. After it had become apparent that Nancy Cruzan had virtually no chance of regaining her mental faculties, her parents Lester and Joyce Cruzan, who serve as coguardians, asked hospital employees to terminate the artificial nutrition and hydration procedures. All agree that such a removal would cause her death. The employees refused to honor the request without court approval. The parents then sought and received authorization from the state trial court for termination. The trial court found that a person in Nancy's condition had a fundamental right under the State and Federal Constitutions to refuse or direct the withdrawal of death prolonging procedures. The court also found that Nancy's expressed thoughts at age twenty-five in conversation with a housemate friend suggested that given her present condition she would not wish to continue on with her nutrition and hydration. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed by a divided vote. The court recognized a right to refuse treatment embodied in the common-law doctrine of informed consent but expressed skepticism about the application of that doctrine in the circumstances of this case. The court found that Cruzan's statements to her roommate regarding her desire to live or die under those conditions were unreliable for determining her intent and thus insufficient to support the coguardians' claim to exercise substituted judgment on Nancy's behalf. It rejected the argument that Cruzan's parents were entitled to order the termination of her medical treatment, concluding that no person can assume that choice for an incompetent in the absence of the formalities required under Missouri's Living Will statutes or the clear and convincing inherently reliable evidence absent here. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the question whether Cruzan has a right under the United States Constitution which would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from her under these circumstances.
View caseA valid Federal Rule of Civil Procedure applies in diversity even if it conflicts with state law provided the federal rule is arguably procedural and within the Rules Enabling Act. Where no federal directive governs, state law controls to avoid forum shopping.
Supporting sources
No. A specific devise passes subject to any mortgage existing at death without right of exoneration regardless of a general directive to pay debts.
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The federal government may not issue directives requiring states to address particular problems or command state officers to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.
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A sanction may include nonmonetary directives limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct.
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Yes. A presently exercisable power allows the donee to issue a directive effective immediately during life even if the instrument also permits testamentary exercise.
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…cease; a request for counsel brings about the same result until a lawyer is procured. Finally, there are a miscellany of minor directives, for example, the burden of proof of waiver is on the State, admissions and exculpatory statements are treated just like confessions, withdrawal of a waiver is always permitted, and so…