Also known as:entrapment doctrine · entrapment · entrapment defense
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A criminal defense that bars conviction when a law enforcement official or person cooperating with such an official induces another to commit an offense by making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that the conduct is not prohibited or by employing methods of persuasion that create a substantial risk the offense will be committed by persons other than those ready to commit it. The defendant must prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The defense is unavailable when the charged offense involves causing or threatening bodily injury to a person other than the one perpetrating the entrapment.
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Cases
Model Codes
How its tested
Common Examples
6
False Assurances Induce Structuring
Deanna Davenport, a bank compliance officer with no prior violations, was approached by an undercover investigator who formed a shell company and repeatedly urged her to structure deposits. The investigator assured her that staying under reporting thresholds was perfectly legal. After initial refusals, Deanna agreed and faced charges. The court found entrapment because the investigator's false representations and pressure induced the offense.
Extended Inducement Creates Predisposition Issue
Denise Donovan received repeated government mailings over two years suggesting she order child pornography. With no prior interest or orders, she eventually complied after sustained pressure. Charged with receipt of illegal material, Denise raised entrapment. The facts showed the government created the disposition rather than merely providing an opportunity to a predisposed person.
Jacobson v. United States503 U.S. 540, 553 (1992)
Keith Jacobson, a 56-year-old farmer living in Nebraska, ordered two magazines entitled Bare Boys I and Bare Boys II from a California adult bookstore in February 1984. The magazines contained photographs of nude preteen and teenage boys, which surprised Jacobson as he had expected images of young men 18 years or older.
Within three months, Congress enacted the Child Protection Act of 1984, which made the receipt through the mails of sexually explicit depictions of children illegal. Postal inspectors located Jacobson's name on the mailing list of the bookstore that had sent him the magazines and began a series of mailings using fictitious organizations.
From January 1985 through May 1987, the Postal Service and Customs Service contacted Jacobson using five fictitious organizations and a bogus pen pal named Carl Long. Jacobson responded to questionnaires from the American Hedonist Society and Heartland Institute for a New Tomorrow, indicating interest in preteen sex materials and teenage sexuality, and corresponded with the pen pal about his preferences for male-male items involving young men in their late teens and early twenties.
In March 1987, Jacobson placed an order with a fictitious Canadian company for photographs of young boys engaging in sex, though the order was never filled. In May 1987, he ordered the magazine Boys Who Love Boys from the Far Eastern Trading Company, which depicted young boys in sexual activities, and was arrested following a controlled delivery.
Jacobson was indicted on September 24, 1987, for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A). Following a jury trial, he was convicted, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
Diego Duarte, a prohibition-era prohibition violator with no recent activity, was repeatedly visited by an undercover prohibition agent posing as a war veteran seeking liquor for personal use. After initial refusals citing the law, Diego sold a small amount. Arrested and charged, Diego asserted entrapment on the ground that the agent originated and induced the transaction through persistent persuasion.
Sorrells v. United States287 U.S. 335 (1932)
Defendant Sorrells was indicted on two counts for possessing and selling one-half gallon of whiskey on July 13, 1930, in violation of the National Prohibition Act. He pleaded not guilty and at trial relied on the defense of entrapment.
Prohibition agent Martin visited Sorrells' home near Canton, North Carolina, on Sunday, July 13, 1930, accompanied by three local residents who knew Sorrells. Posing as an ex-service man and furniture dealer from Charlotte, Martin asked Sorrells multiple times to obtain liquor, eventually succeeding after invoking their shared World War experiences in the 30th Division; Sorrells returned with a half gallon for which Martin paid five dollars.
Sorrells presented testimony from the three companions corroborating the repeated requests and his initial refusals, along with evidence of his steady employment since March 1924 and good character from multiple neighbors. The government offered rebuttal testimony that Sorrells had a reputation as a rum-runner, but introduced no evidence of any prior liquor transactions by him.
The trial court denied a motion for directed verdict, refused to submit the entrapment issue to the jury, and ruled as a matter of law that there was no entrapment. Following a guilty verdict, the court sentenced Sorrells to eighteen months' imprisonment, and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question whether the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury upon the issue of entrapment.
Burden on Entrapment Claim
Danielle Dixon was prosecuted after an undercover agent supplied a controlled substance and urged its distribution. She denied participation yet sought to raise entrapment. The court addressed whether the defense could proceed without an admission of the underlying conduct and how the burden of proof applied to the inducement claim.
Dixon v. United States381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965)
In January 2003, petitioner Keshia Dixon purchased multiple firearms at two gun shows. During the purchases, she provided an incorrect address and falsely stated that she was not under indictment for a felony.
Dixon was indicted and convicted on one count of receiving a firearm while under indictment in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(n). She was also convicted on eight counts of making false statements in connection with the acquisition of a firearm in violation of § 922(a)(6). At trial she admitted that she knew she was under indictment when she made the purchases and that she knew doing so was a crime. Her defense was that she acted under duress because her boyfriend threatened to kill her or hurt her daughters if she did not buy the guns for him.
In her request for jury instructions on the duress defense, Dixon asked that she have the burden of production and that the Government then be required to disprove duress beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court, finding itself bound by Fifth Circuit precedent, denied the request. Instead, the court instructed the jury that Dixon had the burden of proof to establish the defense of duress by a preponderance of the evidence.
After her conviction, the Court of Appeals rejected Dixon's contention that the instructions were erroneous. Given contrary treatment by other federal courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Voluntary Intoxication and Entrapment Overlap
Damian Decker, after consuming alcohol, was approached by officers who supplied materials and encouraged him to commit theft. He claimed the combination of intoxication and government inducement negated predisposition. The court examined whether evidence of voluntary intoxication could be considered in assessing the entrapment defense under due-process constraints.
Montana v. Egelhoff518 U.S. 37, 116 S.Ct. 2013, 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996)
On July 12, 1992, respondent James Egelhoff was camping in the Yaak region of northwestern Montana with Roberta Pavola and John Christenson to pick mushrooms. The three sold the mushrooms they had collected and spent the rest of the day and evening drinking in bars and at a private party in Troy, Montana. After leaving the party after 9 p.m. in Christenson's 1974 Ford Galaxy station wagon, the drinking continued, as Egelhoff was seen buying beer at 9:20 p.m. and recalled passing a bottle of Black Velvet with Christenson.
Around midnight, officers of the Lincoln County sheriff's department discovered the station wagon stuck in a ditch along U.S. Highway 2. Pavola and Christenson were in the front seat, each dead from a single gunshot to the head. Egelhoff lay in the rear of the car, alive and yelling obscenities, with a blood-alcohol content of .36 percent measured over an hour later. His .38-caliber handgun lay on the floor near the brake pedal with four loaded rounds and two empty casings, and he had gunshot residue on his hands.
Egelhoff was charged with two counts of deliberate homicide under Montana law requiring that he purposely or knowingly caused the deaths of another human being. At trial he claimed an unidentified fourth person must have committed the murders, that his extreme intoxication rendered him physically incapable of committing them, and that it accounted for his inability to recall the events. The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. § 45-2-203 that it could not consider respondent's intoxicated condition in determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense. The jury found Egelhoff guilty on both counts and the court sentenced him to 84 years' imprisonment.
The Supreme Court of Montana reversed the convictions. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Religious Belief and Government Inducement
Demetrius Douglas, a parent relying on faith healing, was repeatedly contacted by an undercover officer who misrepresented the legality of withholding medical treatment. After sustained pressure and false assurances, Demetrius agreed to a course of conduct leading to charges. The court evaluated whether the officer's methods created the criminal intent in a person not otherwise ready to offend.
Commonwealth v. Twitchell416 Mass. 114, 617 N.E.2d 609 (1993)
David and Ginger Twitchell were the parents of Robyn Twitchell, who died on April 8, 1986, at the age of two and one-half years. Robyn's death resulted from peritonitis caused by the perforation of his bowel, which had been obstructed as a result of an anomaly known as Meckel's diverticulum. Evidence presented at trial indicated that this condition could be corrected by surgery with a high success rate.
The Twitchells are practicing Christian Scientists who grew up in Christian Science families and believe in healing by spiritual treatment. During Robyn's five-day illness from Friday, April 4, through Tuesday, April 8, they retained a Christian Science practitioner, a Christian Science nurse, and at one time consulted with Nathan Talbot, who held a position in the church known as the Committee on Publication. As a result of that consultation, David Twitchell read a church publication concerning the legal rights and obligations of Christian Scientists in Massachusetts.
That publication quoted a portion of G.L. c. 273, § 1, as then amended, which accepted remedial treatment by spiritual means alone as satisfying any parental obligation not to neglect a child or to provide a child with physical care. The Twitchells appealed their convictions of involuntary manslaughter, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted their request for direct appellate review.
4 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
What must a defendant prove to establish entrapment under the Model Penal Code?
The defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that a law enforcement official or cooperating person induced the offense through knowingly false representations about legality or through persuasive methods creating a substantial risk that a non-predisposed person would commit the crime. The court decides the issue outside the jury's presence.
Does supplying contraband alone establish entrapment under federal law?
No. The mere provision of essential materials or contraband by a government agent does not amount to entrapment. The key inquiry remains the defendant's predisposition to commit the offense before the government's initial contact.
Supporting sources
When is the entrapment defense unavailable even if inducement occurred?
The defense is unavailable when causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the charged offense and the prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person other than the one perpetrating the entrapment.
Supporting sources
Can a defendant assert entrapment while denying participation in the offense?
Yes. Federal law permits a defendant to raise entrapment even while denying the elements of the charged offense. Courts reject rules that force an admission of guilt as a precondition to asserting the defense.
Supporting sources
entrapment
. The law independently forbids convictions that rest upon
entrapment
. See Jacobson v.…
Criminal Law & ProcedureGeneral principles · Justification and excuseUBEFoundational