Also known as: tenancy by the entirety
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
The complete and undivided whole of a thing, as opposed to any part or moiety. The law sometimes treats judgments, contracts, or statutes as incapable of division into separate components.
A concurrent estate in land held by a husband and wife that can be created only when the jurisdiction permits such ownership and the conveyance names the spouses and their issue or a designated class of issue.
The complete and undivided whole of a thing, as opposed to any part or moiety. The law sometimes treats judgments, contracts, or statutes as incapable of division into separate components.
After Congress passed a statute containing tax credits, transparency rules, and penalty provisions, the President issued a signing statement declaring only the tax credits void and directing agencies to ignore the rest. Sun Mall sued the agency that refused to process its credit claims. The court held that the statute had to be treated as an indivisible whole, rendering the selective nullification ineffective.
A concurrent estate in land held by a husband and wife that can be created only when the jurisdiction permits such ownership and the conveyance names the spouses and their issue or a designated class of issue.
A grantor executed a deed transferring Blackacre to Edward Everett and Eileen Epstein, husband and wife, and to the issue of their marriage. In a jurisdiction satisfying the Restatement conditions, the deed created a tenancy by the entirety rather than separate fee interests. Title therefore could not be partitioned during the marriage without both spouses' consent.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Ambler Realty attacked a municipal zoning ordinance that restricted its land to residential uses, claiming the entire ordinance diminished the property's value. The Court treated the ordinance as a single regulatory scheme rather than isolated provisions and evaluated its overall impact on the owner's rights.
The Village of Euclid is an Ohio municipal corporation that adjoins and is practically a suburb of the City of Cleveland. Its estimated population is between 5,000 and 10,000, and its area spans from twelve to fourteen square miles, with the greater part consisting of farm lands or unimproved acreage. It lies roughly in the form of a parallelogram measuring approximately three and one-half miles each way and is traversed east and west by three principal highways and two railroads. Ambler Realty Co. owns a tract of land containing 68 acres situated in the westerly end of the village. This tract abuts on Euclid Avenue to the south and the Nickel Plate railroad to the north. Adjoining this tract on both the east and the west, restricted residential plats have been laid out upon which residences have been erected. On November 13, 1922, the Village Council adopted an ordinance establishing a comprehensive zoning plan. The ordinance divides the village into six use districts denominated U-1 to U-6, three height districts denominated H-1 to H-3, and four area districts denominated A-1 to A-4. Appellee's tract is classified as U-2 for the first 620 feet north of Euclid Avenue, U-3 for the next 130 feet, and U-6 for the remainder. Enforcement of the ordinance is entrusted to the inspector of buildings under rules and regulations of the board of zoning appeals. The board holds public meetings, keeps minutes of its proceedings, and possesses authority to interpret the ordinance in cases of practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship, while penalties are prescribed for violations. Ambler Realty Co. filed suit alleging that the tract has been held for years for sale and development for industrial uses for which it is especially adapted. The bill further alleged that unrestricted market value is about $10,000 per acre but limited to residential purposes the value does not exceed $2,500 per acre, that the first 200 feet back from Euclid Avenue has a value of $150 per front foot if unrestricted but not in excess of $50 per front foot if limited to residential uses, and that the ordinance confiscates and destroys a great part of its value while deterring prospective buyers. The bill sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the ordinance. The district court overruled a motion to dismiss on the ground that the suit was premature. The district court held the ordinance unconstitutional and void and enjoined its enforcement.
View caseAfter a one-house veto clause was declared unconstitutional, Congress argued that the entire immigration statute must fall with it. The Court examined whether the veto provision could be severed while leaving the remainder of the statute intact and enforceable.
In 1966 Jagdish Rai Chadha, an East Indian born in Kenya who held a British passport, was lawfully admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa that expired on June 30, 1972. In October 1973, the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service informed Chadha that he had remained longer than permitted and was therefore deportable. Chadha conceded deportability but applied for suspension under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. On June 25, 1974, an Immigration Judge acting on behalf of the Attorney General suspended Chadha's deportation and adjusted his status to permanent resident after finding that he satisfied the statutory criteria of seven years' continuous presence, good moral character, and extreme hardship. A report of the suspension was transmitted to Congress as required by the Act. On December 16, 1975, the House of Representatives passed a resolution disapproving the suspension for Chadha and five other aliens on the ground that they did not meet the statutory requirements, particularly as to hardship. Pursuant to the House resolution, the Immigration Judge reopened the deportation proceedings. Chadha moved to terminate them on constitutional grounds, but the Immigration Judge ruled that he lacked authority to declare the resolution unconstitutional and ordered Chadha deported. Chadha appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which likewise held that it had no authority to pass on the constitutionality of the resolution and dismissed the appeal. Chadha then filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Immigration and Naturalization Service appeared and urged the court to hold the House resolution unconstitutional. After inviting briefs from the Senate and House as amici curiae, the Court of Appeals held the resolution unconstitutional because it was a legislative act that failed to satisfy the requirements of Article I, sections 1 and 7, and set aside the deportation order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the consolidated cases to address the constitutional question.
View case1 common questions
No. The President's veto power permits only approval or rejection of an entire bill. Any attempt to nullify or amend discrete portions after presentment violates the requirement that statutes be enacted or rejected as a whole.
While divorce proceedings were pending, Ethan Evans executed a will leaving the marital home to a third party. He died before the divorce was final and while the tenancy by the entirety remained intact. Title passed automatically to his surviving spouse by operation of law, and the will provision had no effect on the property.
A deed conveyed land to Esther Eisenberg and her husband and their designated issue. Because the jurisdiction recognized tenancy by the entirety as a permitted form of concurrent ownership, the conveyance satisfied the statutory prerequisites and created that estate rather than a joint tenancy or tenancy in common.
2 common questions
No. Property held in tenancy by the entirety passes by operation of law to the surviving spouse upon death. A will attempting to devise that property to a third party has no effect while the tenancy remains intact.
A conveyance creates a tenancy by the entirety only when the jurisdiction permits that form of ownership and the deed names the grantees as husband and wife together with their issue or a designated class of issue.
…Therefore, it is not a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause. The Pennsylvania statute should be upheld in its entirety because it is rationally related to legitimate state interests. Dissenting — Justice Scalia I join the opinion of the Chief Justice. Roe v. Wade was an unjustified exercise of raw…