equitable remedies

In January 1970 respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost his job as a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force when his position was eliminated during a departmental reorganization and reduction in force. One year earlier, on November 13, 1968, Fitzgerald had testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee that cost overruns on the C-5A transport plane could approximate $2 billion. Concerned that the dismissal might constitute retaliation for the congressional testimony, the subcommittee held public hearings. At a December 8, 1969 news conference President Richard Nixon promised to look into the matter and directed White House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman to arrange for Fitzgerald's reassignment to another administration position. An internal White House memorandum from aide Alexander Butterfield recommended that Fitzgerald "bleed, for a while at least" because of perceived disloyalty, and no further White House efforts to reemploy him occurred. Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission alleging unlawful retaliation. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable civil service regulations based on a finding that the departmental reorganization was motivated by reasons purely personal to respondent. The Examiner recommended Fitzgerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority. The Commission explicitly found that the evidence did not support Fitzgerald's allegation of retaliation for his 1968 testimony. At a January 31, 1973 news conference President Nixon stated that he had approved Fitzgerald's dismissal. A day later the White House press office issued a retraction of the President's statement. In 1978 Fitzgerald filed a second amended complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia naming Nixon as a defendant and alleging violations of the First Amendment and two federal statutes. The District Court denied Nixon's motion for summary judgment on absolute immunity grounds. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed the collateral appeal. Shortly after Nixon petitioned for certiorari the parties agreed that Nixon would pay Fitzgerald $142,000 immediately and an additional $28,000 if the Supreme Court ruled he was not entitled to absolute immunity.

Petitioners, who were stockholders in the Lehman Corporation, a closed-end investment company, brought a derivative action in federal district court against the corporation's directors and its brokers, Lehman Brothers. They alleged that Lehman Brothers had obtained control through an illegally large representation on the board in violation of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and used that control to extract excessive brokerage fees from the corporation. The complaint charged the directors with converting corporate assets and with gross abuse of trust, gross misconduct, willful misfeasance, bad faith, and gross negligence. It also accused both the directors and Lehman Brothers of breaching fiduciary duties, committing waste and spoliation, and violating the brokerage contract. Petitioners requested that the defendants account for and pay to the corporation their profits and gains and its losses. They demanded a jury trial on the corporation’s claims. The district court denied the motion to strike the jury demand in part. It held that only the shareholder’s initial claim to speak for the corporation would be tried to the judge while the corporation’s underlying claims would be tried to a jury if the corporation itself had brought suit. Finding substantial grounds for difference of opinion, the district court certified the question for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that a derivative action is entirely equitable in nature and that no jury is available to try any part of it. Because of the conflict among the circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In May 1930 the Van Sweringen Corporation issued $30,000,000 in notes under an indenture naming Guaranty Trust Co. of New York as trustee with power to enforce noteholders' rights. In October 1930 Guaranty and other banks advanced large sums to companies affiliated with the Corporation and controlled by the Van Sweringens. When the Corporation could not meet its obligations, Guaranty participated in an exchange plan under which noteholders could surrender their notes for cash equal to 50 percent of face value plus twenty shares of Van Sweringen stock per $1,000 note; the offer remained open until December 15, 1931. In 1934 respondent York received $6,000 of the notes as a gift from a donor who had not accepted the exchange offer. In April 1940 three accepting noteholders filed the Hackner suit in federal court charging Guaranty with fraud and misrepresentation in connection with the exchange. York's motion to intervene was denied, and summary judgment for Guaranty was affirmed on appeal. On January 22, 1942, after her exclusion from the Hackner litigation, York filed the present class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of non-accepting noteholders. The complaint, resting exclusively on diversity of citizenship, alleged that Guaranty had breached its trust by failing to protect noteholders' interests when it assented to the exchange offer and by failing to disclose its own self-interest. The district court granted Guaranty's motion for summary judgment on the authority of the Hackner decision. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a federal court sitting in equity is not required to apply the New York statute of limitations that would govern an identical suit in the New York state courts. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power administered retirement, disability, and death-benefit programs for its employees, with monthly retirement benefits computed as a fraction of salary multiplied by years of service. The Department required its 2,000 female employees to make monthly contributions to the pension fund that were 14.84% higher than those required of its 10,000 male employees, based on a study of mortality tables and its own experience showing that women on average live longer than men. This resulted in female employees taking home less pay than male employees earning the same salary, even though monthly benefits for men and women of the same age, seniority, and salary were equal and the plan was funded entirely by contributions from employees and the Department. In 1973, respondents brought this suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California on behalf of a class of women employed or formerly employed by the Department. They prayed for an injunction and restitution of excess contributions. While the action was pending, the California Legislature enacted a law prohibiting municipal agencies from requiring female employees to make higher pension fund contributions than males, and the Department amended its plan effective January 1, 1975, to draw no distinction in contributions or benefits on the basis of sex. On a motion for summary judgment, the District Court held that the contribution differential violated federal law and ordered a refund of all excess contributions made before the amendment of the plan. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that judgment. We granted certiorari to decide whether this practice discriminated against individual female employees because of their sex in violation of § 703 (a) (1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. The case was argued on January 18, 1978.