Also known as: establishment clauses · Est. Clause · Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The constitutional command in the First Amendment that prohibits the federal and state governments from establishing an official religion or favoring one religion over another.
President issues an order limiting visas from several majority-Muslim nations after an interagency security review. The order recites only national-security concerns about vetting. Elena Estrada, a U.S. citizen whose relative is affected, sues claiming religious animus. The court applies rational-basis review in the immigration setting and upholds the order because the stated purpose is legitimate and rationally related to the restrictions.
Edward Everett, an Amish parent, withdraws his children after eighth grade for religious reasons and provides vocational training at home. State officials prosecute under compulsory-attendance laws. Everett defends by arguing that the mandate substantially burdens his religious practices.
In Green County, Wisconsin, respondents Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller are members of the Old Order Amish religion, and respondent Adin Yutzy is a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church. They and their families reside in Green County. Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law required them to cause their children to attend public or private school until reaching age 16. The respondents declined to send their children, ages 14 and 15, to public school after they completed the eighth grade. The children involved were Frieda Yoder, aged 15, Barbara Miller, aged 15, and Vernon Yutzy, aged 14. All had graduated from the eighth grade of public school. On complaint of the school district administrator for the public schools, respondents were charged, tried, and convicted in Green County Court of violating the compulsory-attendance law. They were each fined the sum of five dollars. At trial, respondents defended on the ground that application of the compulsory-attendance law violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial testimony showed that respondents believed, in accordance with the tenets of Old Order Amish communities generally, that their children's attendance at high school, public or private, was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life. The State stipulated that respondents' religious beliefs were sincere. Expert witnesses, including scholars on religion and education such as Dr. John Hostetler and Dr. Donald A. Erickson, testified regarding the relationship of Amish beliefs to school attendance and the impact of compulsory high school attendance on Amish communities. The Wisconsin Circuit Court affirmed the convictions. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding that the compulsory school-attendance law violated respondents' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. On petition of the State of Wisconsin, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The record showed that the Amish have a history dating back to the 16th century Swiss Anabaptists and maintain a way of life emphasizing separation from the world, harmony with nature, and informal learning through doing on the family farm. Respondents presented evidence that an additional one or two years of formal high school education would do little to serve the state's interests in preparing citizens for political participation and self-sufficiency. The Amish have functioned effectively as a self-sufficient community for more than 200 years. There was no evidence in the record that any of the children in this case expressed a desire to attend high school against their parents' wishes.
View caseEmanuel Escobar, a federal taxpayer, sues to enjoin congressional appropriations that fund textbooks for religious schools. He alleges the spending endorses religion. The court recognizes his standing solely because the claim targets an exercise of the taxing and spending power under the Establishment Clause.
Congress enacted the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. That statute authorized federal grants under Titles I and II to state and local educational agencies. Seven individuals who paid federal income taxes filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They sued the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Commissioner of Education in their official capacities. The complaint alleged that federal funds appropriated under the Act were being disbursed with the consent and approval of the defendants. Those funds were being used to finance instruction in reading, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious schools and to purchase textbooks and instructional materials for use in such schools. The complaint attacked the specific criterion of 20 U.S.C. § 241e(a)(2) that to the extent consistent with the number of educationally deprived children in the school district of the local educational agency who are enrolled in private elementary and secondary schools, such agency has made provision for including special educational services and arrangements in which such children can participate. The plaintiffs alleged that these expenditures constituted compulsory taxation for religious purposes in violation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. They requested a declaratory judgment that the expenditures were unauthorized or alternatively that the Act was unconstitutional to that extent together with an injunction restraining approval of further expenditures for the challenged purposes. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing. A three-judge district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 and the Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseEsther Eisenberg challenges a state law that withholds public funds from clinics providing certain reproductive services while allowing religiously affiliated hospitals to receive grants. She claims the funding scheme endorses religious views on abortion. The court evaluates the statute under substantive due process standards.
The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989, established several requirements governing the performance of abortions within the Commonwealth. The Act required a woman seeking an abortion to provide informed consent after receiving specific information from a physician or counselor at least twenty-four hours before the procedure. It mandated that a minor obtain the informed consent of one parent, subject to a judicial bypass option. It further required a married woman to sign a statement confirming that she had notified her husband of her planned abortion, unless certain exceptions applied. The Act also imposed reporting obligations on facilities providing abortion services and defined a medical emergency exception to the various requirements. Before any of these provisions took effect, the petitioners brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The petitioners were five abortion clinics and one physician representing himself as well as a class of physicians who provide abortion services. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and challenged each provision as unconstitutional on its face. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction. After conducting a three-day bench trial, the District Court held all the provisions unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against their enforcement by Pennsylvania. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It adopted the District Court's factual findings and legal analysis except with respect to the spousal notification requirement. The Court of Appeals upheld the spousal notification requirement as constitutional and applied the undue burden standard in evaluating the provisions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.
View caseEnzo Eastwood's congregation seeks a permit to enlarge its building in a historic district. The city denies the permit under a neutral preservation law. Eastwood claims the denial burdens religious exercise and that RFRA requires an exemption. The court holds that Congress lacked power to impose RFRA on the states because doing so would exceed Section Five authority.
St. Peter Catholic Church was built in 1923 in Boerne, Texas. Its structure replicates the mission style of the region's earlier history. The church seats about 230 worshippers, a number too small for its growing parish. Some 40 to 60 parishioners cannot be accommodated at some Sunday masses. To meet the needs of the congregation, the Archbishop of San Antonio gave permission to the parish to plan alterations to enlarge the building. A few months later, the Boerne City Council passed an ordinance authorizing the city's Historic Landmark Commission to prepare a preservation plan with proposed historic landmarks and districts. Under the ordinance, the commission must preapprove construction affecting historic landmarks or buildings in a historic district. Soon afterwards, the Archbishop applied for a building permit so construction to enlarge the church could proceed. City authorities, relying on the ordinance and the designation of a historic district which they argued included the church, denied the application. The Archbishop brought this suit challenging the permit denial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The complaint contained multiple claims, but to this point the litigation has centered on RFRA and the question of its constitutionality. The District Court concluded that by enacting RFRA Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court certified its order for interlocutory appeal and the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding RFRA to be constitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and now reverses. Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith. RFRA prohibits government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. Unless the government can demonstrate that the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, it must also show that the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The Act applies to all federal and state law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the enactment of RFRA.
View caseElla Emerson's nonprofit religious university maintains racially discriminatory admissions policies justified by religious doctrine. The IRS revokes its tax-exempt status. Emerson sues, arguing the revocation violates religious liberty. The court upholds the revocation because the government's interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education outweighs the burden on the school's religious practices.
Until 1970 the Internal Revenue Service granted tax-exempt status to private schools without regard to their racial admissions policies under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. On January 12, 1970, a three-judge district court issued a preliminary injunction in Green v. Kennedy prohibiting the IRS from according tax-exempt status to private schools in Mississippi that discriminated on the basis of race. In July 1970 the IRS concluded it could no longer legally justify allowing tax-exempt status to private schools practicing racial discrimination and announced it would not treat gifts to such schools as charitable deductions. The IRS formalized its revised policy in Revenue Ruling 71-447, stating that a school not having a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students is not charitable within the common-law concepts reflected in sections 170 and 501(c)(3). Bob Jones University is a nonprofit corporation located in Greenville, South Carolina, whose purpose is to conduct an institution of learning giving special emphasis to the Christian religion and the ethics revealed in the Holy Scriptures. The university operates a school with an enrollment of approximately 5,000 students from kindergarten through college and graduate school and requires its teachers to be devout Christians while teaching all courses according to the Bible. Until 1971 the university completely excluded Negroes. From 1971 to May 1975 it accepted no applications from unmarried Negroes but did accept applications from Negroes married within their race. Following the Fourth Circuit decision in McCrary v. Runyon, the university revised its policy. Since May 1975 the university has permitted unmarried Negroes to enroll while maintaining a disciplinary rule that prohibits interracial dating and marriage and expels students who violate it. The university continues to deny admission to applicants engaged in an interracial marriage or known to advocate interracial marriage or dating. Until 1970 the IRS extended tax-exempt status to Bob Jones University under section 501(c)(3). On January 19, 1976, the IRS officially revoked the university's tax-exempt status effective December 1, 1970. The university paid a $21 federal unemployment tax for 1975, had its refund request denied, and filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina seeking recovery of that amount while the government counterclaimed for $489,675.59 in unpaid taxes for 1971 through 1975. The district court ordered the IRS to pay the refund and rejected the counterclaim, but the Fourth Circuit reversed. Goldsboro Christian Schools is a nonprofit corporation located in Goldsboro, North Carolina, established to conduct an institution of learning giving special emphasis to the Christian religion and the ethics revealed in the Holy Scriptures. Since its incorporation in 1963 the school has maintained a racially discriminatory admissions policy based upon its interpretation of the Bible. Goldsboro has for the most part accepted only Caucasians. On occasion, however, the school has accepted children from racially mixed marriages in which one of the parents is Caucasian. Upon audit the IRS determined that Goldsboro was not an organization described in section 501(c)(3) and required it to pay taxes under the Federal Insurance Contribution Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act. Goldsboro paid the IRS $3,459.93 in taxes for one employee for the years 1969 through 1972 and filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina seeking a refund while the government counterclaimed for $160,073.96 in unpaid taxes. The district court granted summary judgment to the IRS on its counterclaim, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed per curiam. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases. The cases were argued on October 12, 1982. The Court decided the cases on May 24, 1983.
View caseCourts apply at most rational-basis review and defer to the political branches when the order states a legitimate national-security purpose that is rationally related to the restrictions.
Supporting sources
Yes, but only when the challenge targets an exercise of the taxing and spending power that allegedly violates the Establishment Clause.
A state does not violate the Free Exercise Clause by excluding the pursuit of a devotional theology degree from an otherwise generally available scholarship program, though it could fund such training without violating the Establishment Clause.
Supporting sources
The clause prevents government from endorsing or supporting religion, composing official prayers, or favoring one religious view over another.
…says, between allowing a patchwork of exemptions that would hinder its law enforcement efforts, and risking a violation of the Establishment Clause by arbitrarily limiting its religious exemptions. This argument, however, could be made in almost any free exercise case. See Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free…