Also known as: executive powers · executive authority
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Authority vested in the President of the United States to ensure that federal laws are faithfully executed and enforced. The vesting clause assigns this power exclusively to the President rather than to Congress or the courts.
Elijah Edwards, the President, orders the Department of Housing and Urban Development to reallocate safety auditors from routine projects to emergency infrastructure reviews after a bridge collapse. HUD officials follow the directive and suspend audits on selected sites. The action illustrates the President's authority to supervise execution of existing statutes through subordinate executive officers.
Elliot Edmonds, governor of State A, issues a formal demand to the governor of State B for the return of a fugitive charged with felony theft. State B authorities locate the individual and prepare transfer documents. The demand rests on the executive authority of the demanding state to secure delivery of persons charged with crimes.
Ewan Eckhart, a state election official, challenges a federal court's refusal to recognize the sitting governor as the lawful executive after disputed election results. The court declines to intervene, citing the political question doctrine and the President's prior recognition of the governor. The ruling leaves the executive power of the state to be exercised by the recognized official.
In 1901 the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a statute apportioning the Senate with thirty-three members and the House of Representatives with ninety-nine members among the state's ninety-five counties. The Tennessee Constitution required a decennial enumeration of qualified voters and reapportionment of both houses on that basis. The General Assembly performed reapportionments after the enumerations of 1871, 1881, and 1891. After 1901 every proposal for reapportionment failed to pass. Between 1901 and 1960 the state's population grew from 2,020,616 to 3,567,089. The number of persons eligible to vote rose from 487,380 to 2,092,891. Substantial redistribution occurred from rural to urban counties. Appellants were residents and qualified voters of the urban counties of Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, Montgomery, and Shelby. They brought a civil action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the Secretary of State, Attorney General, Coordinator of Elections, and members of the State Board of Elections. The complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. It alleged that continued application of the 1901 statute debased their votes and denied equal protection of the laws. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional. It also sought an injunction against conducting further elections under the statute. Alternative relief included at-large elections or a court-ordered reapportionment. A three-judge district court convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 dismissed the complaint. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court characterized the controversy as a nonjusticiable political question. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The case was argued in April 1961, set for reargument, reargued in October 1961, and decided on March 26, 1962.
View caseEduardo Enriquez, the President, directs military officers to seize enemy-owned property located within the United States during declared war. The owners sue, claiming the seizure exceeds statutory authority. The Court upholds the action as an exercise of executive power incident to the conduct of war.
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View caseEmma Erickson and other plaintiffs sue the Secretary of the Interior alleging failure to enforce environmental statutes protecting foreign wildlife habitats. The Court dismisses the suit for lack of standing, noting that the executive power to enforce laws belongs to the President and subordinate officers rather than private parties.
In 1973 Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act to protect species of animals against threats to their continuing existence caused by man. In 1978 the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service issued a joint regulation interpreting section 7(a)(2) to require federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior on actions taken in foreign nations. In 1986 the Secretary promulgated a revised regulation that limited the consultation obligation to actions within the United States or on the high seas. Shortly after the 1986 regulation took effect, Defenders of Wildlife and other environmental organizations filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota against the Secretary of the Interior. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the regulation was invalid as to its geographic scope and an injunction requiring the Secretary to promulgate a new regulation mandating consultation for foreign projects. The complaint alleged that the absence of consultation would increase the rate of extinction of endangered and threatened species. The complaint further alleged that some of the organizations' members observed these species both domestically and abroad. Respondents supported their allegations with affidavits from two members. Joyce Kelly stated that she had traveled to Egypt in 1986, observed the habitat of the endangered Nile crocodile, and intended to return. Kelly further stated that she would suffer harm from the United States role in the rehabilitation of the Aswan High Dam. Amy Skilbred stated that she had traveled to Sri Lanka in 1981, observed the habitat of endangered species including the Asian elephant and leopard at the site of the Mahaweli project funded by the Agency for International Development, and intended to return. Skilbred admitted she had no current plans to return because of a civil war. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. On remand the District Court denied the Secretary's motion for summary judgment on standing. The District Court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment on the merits and enjoined the Secretary from applying the regulation to foreign countries. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseEmanuel Escobar, an alien facing deportation, challenges a one-house veto that blocked the Attorney General's suspension of his removal order. The Court holds the legislative veto unconstitutional because it allows Congress to exercise executive power without bicameral passage and presentment.
In 1966 Jagdish Rai Chadha, an East Indian born in Kenya who held a British passport, was lawfully admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa that expired on June 30, 1972. In October 1973, the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service informed Chadha that he had remained longer than permitted and was therefore deportable. Chadha conceded deportability but applied for suspension under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. On June 25, 1974, an Immigration Judge acting on behalf of the Attorney General suspended Chadha's deportation and adjusted his status to permanent resident after finding that he satisfied the statutory criteria of seven years' continuous presence, good moral character, and extreme hardship. A report of the suspension was transmitted to Congress as required by the Act. On December 16, 1975, the House of Representatives passed a resolution disapproving the suspension for Chadha and five other aliens on the ground that they did not meet the statutory requirements, particularly as to hardship. Pursuant to the House resolution, the Immigration Judge reopened the deportation proceedings. Chadha moved to terminate them on constitutional grounds, but the Immigration Judge ruled that he lacked authority to declare the resolution unconstitutional and ordered Chadha deported. Chadha appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which likewise held that it had no authority to pass on the constitutionality of the resolution and dismissed the appeal. Chadha then filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Immigration and Naturalization Service appeared and urged the court to hold the House resolution unconstitutional. After inviting briefs from the Senate and House as amici curiae, the Court of Appeals held the resolution unconstitutional because it was a legislative act that failed to satisfy the requirements of Article I, sections 1 and 7, and set aside the deportation order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the consolidated cases to address the constitutional question.
View caseExecutive power enables the President to supervise and direct the enforcement of statutes already enacted by Congress. Legislative power allows Congress alone to create new legal obligations through bicameral passage and presentment.
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No. Once Congress enacts mandatory appropriations, the President must execute the spending directive and may not unilaterally impound or cancel the funds.
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No. When Congress has assigned specific domestic functions to an agency by statute, a presidential order that displaces that assignment falls to its lowest ebb and is presumptively invalid.
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