Also known as: fact issues · issue of fact · question of fact
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A disputed factual matter whose resolution is entrusted to the trier of fact.
Francois Fortier mailed an offer to sell equipment to Frontier Capital on Monday. Frontier Capital mailed its acceptance the following Friday. Whether that interval constituted a reasonable time for acceptance turned on the surrounding business circumstances and was therefore a fact issue for the jury.
Francisco Frost struck Felix Franco during an altercation. Whether the blow created a substantial risk of fatal consequences or permanent loss of function depended on the amount of force, the weapon used, and Franco's known physical condition, presenting a fact issue for the jury.
Faith Fitzgerald sued Freeman Engineering after her car's power brakes failed. Whether the dealer had negligently installed or inspected the unit could be shown by circumstantial evidence of the failure itself, creating a fact issue that survived summary judgment.
In May 1955, Claus H. Henningsen purchased a new 1955 Plymouth Plaza Club Sedan from Bloomfield Motors, Inc., an authorized De Soto and Plymouth dealer for Chrysler Corporation. Mr. Henningsen intended the car as a Mother's Day gift for his wife, Helen Henningsen, and communicated that intention to the dealer. He alone signed a one-page printed purchase-order form. The reverse side contained, in fine six-point script type, a warranty clause limiting the manufacturer's obligation to replacement of defective parts within ninety days or four thousand miles and disclaiming all other warranties, express or implied. The front of the form contained two even smaller paragraphs directing attention to the back-side conditions. The form was a standardized document prepared by the manufacturer and used by all its dealers. No one called the fine-print provisions to Mr. Henningsen's attention, and he did not read them. The car was delivered on May 9, 1955, after the dealer performed the items listed in Chrysler's New Car Preparation Service Guide. On May 19, 1955, while Mrs. Henningsen was driving north on Route 36 in Highlands, New Jersey, at twenty to twenty-two miles per hour on a smooth, paved highway, she heard a loud noise from the front of the car. The steering wheel spun in her hands and the vehicle veered sharply into a highway sign and brick wall. The car had been driven only 468 miles, had required no servicing, and had exhibited no unusual behavior before the accident. An insurance appraiser with eleven years of experience examined the wrecked vehicle and concluded that something in the steering mechanism from the wheel down to the front wheels had broken or dropped off. Plaintiffs also presented expert testimony that the steering failure resulted from a latent manufacturing defect that could not have been discovered by reasonable inspection. The negligence counts against both defendants were dismissed at trial. The case was submitted to the jury solely on the implied-warranty claims. The jury returned verdicts for both plaintiffs against Chrysler Corporation and Bloomfield Motors, Inc. Defendants appealed and plaintiffs cross-appealed from the dismissal of the negligence claim. The Supreme Court of New Jersey certified the matter directly before consideration by the Appellate Division.
View caseThe City of Chicago took land from Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. The railroad received an opportunity in state court to present evidence on the amount of just compensation due, making the valuation of the property a fact issue resolved by the trier of fact.
The City of Chicago, acting under an 1872 Illinois statute that became part of its charter in 1875, passed an ordinance on October 9, 1880, to open and widen Rockwell Street from West 18th Street to West 19th Street by condemning parcels of land owned by individuals and parts of the right of way of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company within the city limits. On November 12, 1890, the city filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking condemnation of the property and asking that just compensation be ascertained by a jury, with the railroad company admitted as a defendant along with other interested parties. The jury awarded one dollar as just compensation to the railroad company for the parts of its right of way to be used for the street, while awarding compensation to individual owners for their parcels. The railroad moved for a new trial, which was overruled, and final judgment was entered in execution of the award. The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Illinois in 149 Illinois 457. After affirmance the railroad company sued out a writ of error to the United States Supreme Court. The railroad had raised claims under the Fourteenth Amendment in its motion for new trial and in its assignment of errors filed in the state supreme court. The Illinois statute provided no provision for an answer by defendants in condemnation proceedings, but the railroad asserted its federal claims in the written motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial.
View caseA worker sued Blue Ridge Rural Electrical Cooperative, Inc. after an injury. Whether the cooperative qualified as a statutory employer under state law depended on the facts of the employment relationship and was therefore a fact issue that the plaintiff was entitled to try before a jury.
The petitioner, a resident of North Carolina, sued respondent, a South Carolina corporation, for damages for injuries allegedly caused by the respondent's negligence. He was employed as a lineman in the construction crew of a construction contractor. Respondent Blue Ridge Rural Electrical Cooperative, Inc., a South Carolina corporation in the business of selling electric power, had contracted with R. H. Bouligny, Inc. for $334,300 to build approximately 24 miles of new power lines, reconvert about 88 miles of existing lines to higher capacities, and construct two new substations and a breaker station. The petitioner was injured while connecting power lines to one of the new substations. Byrd first recovered full benefits under the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Law from his direct employer Bouligny. He then filed a negligence action against Blue Ridge in the United States District Court for the Western District of South Carolina under diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. At trial Blue Ridge asserted an affirmative defense that Byrd qualified as its statutory employee because the contracted work was part of its trade, business, or occupation. Blue Ridge's manager testified on direct examination that three of its substations had been built by its own construction and maintenance crews. His answers on cross-examination created uncertainty that prompted the trial judge to note he appeared to have changed his testimony. Blue Ridge also introduced evidence that it financed the project with a federal loan, purchased the materials, and maintained an engineering service contract with an independent firm for design and supervision. Its charter under the South Carolina Rural Electric Cooperative Act authorized it to construct generating plants, buildings, and equipment necessary for its operations. After all evidence was presented the district judge struck the affirmative defense, ruling that Blue Ridge could not be a statutory employer because its crews performed work only for its own use rather than for others. The judge then denied Blue Ridge's motion for a directed verdict and submitted the negligence claim to the jury, which returned a verdict for Byrd in the amount of $126,786.80. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, resolved uncertainties in the manager's testimony in Blue Ridge's favor, and directed entry of judgment for Blue Ridge without remanding for further proceedings. Byrd petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. The case had previously been dismissed on the ground that Blue Ridge enjoyed tort immunity as a nonprofit corporation, but the Court of Appeals had reversed that dismissal and remanded for trial. On the present appeal the Court of Appeals did not reach other grounds raised by Blue Ridge because its resolution of the statutory employer issue disposed of the case.
View caseShareholders of TSC Industries, Inc. challenged a proxy statement that omitted certain facts. Whether those omissions were material turned on whether a reasonable shareholder would have viewed the facts as significantly altering the total mix of information, presenting a fact issue for the trier of fact.
In February 1969 National Industries, Inc. acquired 34% of TSC Industries, Inc.'s voting securities from Charles E. Schmidt and his family. Schmidt, TSC's founder and principal shareholder, resigned from the board along with his son. Five National nominees then joined TSC's board. Stanley R. Yarmuth, National's president and chief executive officer, became chairman of the TSC board. Charles F. Simonelli, National's executive vice president, became chairman of the TSC executive committee. On October 16, 1969, the TSC board, with the National nominees abstaining, approved a proposal to liquidate and sell all of TSC's assets to National in exchange for National Series B preferred stock and warrants. On November 12, 1969, TSC and National issued a joint proxy statement to their shareholders recommending approval of the proposal. The proxy solicitation succeeded. TSC entered liquidation and dissolution, and the share exchange was completed. Northway, Inc., a TSC shareholder, filed suit on December 4, 1969, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against TSC and National. The complaint alleged that the joint proxy statement violated section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules 14a-3 and 14a-9. It claimed the statement failed to disclose that the Schmidt interests transfer had given National control of TSC. It also claimed the statement omitted material facts concerning the degree of National's control over TSC and the favorability of the transaction terms to TSC shareholders. The District Court denied Northway's motion for summary judgment on liability. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that a genuine issue of fact existed regarding whether National had acquired control through the Schmidt purchase. This precluded summary judgment on the Rule 14a-3 claim. But the court reversed on the Rule 14a-9 claims and ordered partial summary judgment for Northway. It held that certain omissions were material as a matter of law. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the standard of materiality applied by the Court of Appeals.
View caseThe court weighs the federal interest in preserving the jury's role against the state's interest in its chosen factfinder. When the dispute concerns who decides facts inside the federal courthouse, the federal interest predominates and the matter remains a fact issue for the jury.
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The judge must submit both the general verdict form and the written factual questions, provide instructions explaining the governing law, and direct the jury to answer the questions and return a verdict. This procedure preserves the jury's role on the fact issues while creating a record for later review.
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A single common fact issue shared by multiple claims satisfies the threshold for joinder under Rule 20 or permissive intervention under Rule 24(b), even if other elements require separate proof. The court retains discretion to manage any resulting prejudice through case-management orders rather than denying joinder outright.
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