Also known as:federal states · federal-state · federation · federalism
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A composite state that comprises an aggregate or group of constituent states, each retaining some independent authority while delegating certain powers to the central government.
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How its tested
Common Examples
6
Treaty Cannot Override Fifth Amendment
Forrest Falconer, a U.S. citizen living abroad, signed an executive agreement with a foreign nation that required him to submit to trial without a jury. When prosecuted under the agreement, he challenged the proceeding as violating his Fifth Amendment rights. The court held that the federal state structure prevents treaties or agreements from authorizing action inconsistent with constitutional protections.
Abstention From State Prosecution
Freya Freeman faced ongoing state criminal charges for conduct that she claimed violated federal constitutional standards. She asked a federal district court to enjoin the prosecution. The court declined, citing principles of comity and federalism that require federal courts to abstain from interfering with state proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.
Faith Fitzgerald, representing the state of Massachusetts, sued the EPA in federal court to compel regulation of greenhouse gases. The Supreme Court recognized the state's standing because the federal state structure allows states to protect their sovereign interests in federal litigation when they suffer concrete injury.
Massachusetts, et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.549 U.S. 497, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 167 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2007)
In October 1999, nineteen private organizations filed a rulemaking petition with the EPA requesting regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles under section 202 of the Clean Air Act. The petition asserted that carbon dioxide and other gases were heat-trapping greenhouse gases that had accelerated climate change, with carbon dioxide as the most important contributor according to the IPCC's 1995 report. The EPA received more than fifty thousand comments after requesting public input in 2001. A National Research Council report from 2001, prepared at the White House's request, stated that greenhouse gases from human activities were causing surface air temperatures to rise.
On September 8, 2003, the EPA denied the petition on two grounds: the Clean Air Act did not authorize regulation of greenhouse gases from motor vehicles, and even assuming authority, the agency would not regulate due to scientific uncertainty about causation and concerns that regulation would conflict with the President's comprehensive approach involving voluntary programs and international negotiations. The denial order referenced Congress's decision in 1990 not to enact binding emissions limitations and the political history of climate change issues.
Petitioners including the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and other states and private organizations then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The D.C. Circuit denied the petition for review in 2005. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2006 to address the issues raised by the denial.
Massachusetts submitted affidavits showing that global sea levels rose 10 to 20 centimeters over the 20th century, already causing loss of coastal land owned by the Commonwealth, with projections of further inundation by 2100. The United States transportation sector alone emitted more than 1.7 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide in 1999, accounting for over 6 percent of worldwide emissions.
Fabian Flynn alleged that federal narcotics agents violated his Fourth Amendment rights during a search. He brought a damages action directly under the Constitution. The Court recognized an implied cause of action, reflecting the federal state's allocation of authority between national enforcement powers and individual protections.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971)
On the morning of November 26, 1965, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics entered Webster Bivens's apartment in the Bronx.
The agents broke open the door, handcuffed Bivens in front of his wife and young children, and thoroughly searched the apartment. They then transported Bivens to the federal courthouse in Brooklyn, where he was interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip search.
Several days later Bivens was released on his own recognizance, and he was never indicted or prosecuted for any offense. Bivens filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the six agents in their individual capacities. His complaint sought fifteen thousand dollars in damages from each agent and alleged that the arrest and search were effected without a warrant, that unreasonable force was employed, and that the arrest was made without probable cause. Bivens claimed to have suffered great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering as a result of the agents' conduct.
The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review the judgment.
Faye Fuller was prosecuted under a federal statute for gender-motivated violence occurring entirely within one state. She challenged the law as exceeding Congress's authority. The Court invalidated the provision, holding that the federal state structure reserves traditional areas of state regulation from federal overreach under the Commerce Clause.
United States v. Morrison529 U.S. 598 (2000)
In September 1994 Christy Brzonkala enrolled as a student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. Within thirty minutes of meeting fellow students Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, both members of the varsity football team, Brzonkala alleges that the two men assaulted and repeatedly raped her. Morrison allegedly told Brzonkala after the attack that she had better not have any diseases. He later announced in a dormitory dining room that he liked to get girls drunk and made other vulgar remarks about women.
Brzonkala became severely emotionally disturbed and depressed after the incident. She sought assistance from a university psychiatrist who prescribed antidepressant medication. She stopped attending classes and withdrew from the university. In early 1995 she filed a complaint against Morrison and Crawford under the university's Sexual Assault Policy. Virginia Tech conducted a hearing under its Sexual Assault Policy and a second hearing under its Abusive Conduct Policy. The first found Morrison guilty of sexual assault and suspended him for two semesters. The second hearing again found him guilty but changed the offense description to using abusive language. University officials later set aside the punishment.
In December 1995 Brzonkala sued Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. Her complaint alleged that the attack violated 42 U.S.C. §13981, the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, which creates a federal cause of action for compensatory and punitive damages against persons who commit crimes of violence motivated by gender. She also asserted Title IX claims against the university.
The district court dismissed the Title IX claims for failure to state a claim. It also dismissed the §13981 claim on the ground that Congress lacked authority to enact the provision under either the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed in part, but the en banc Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact §13981.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the constitutionality of the civil remedy provision.
Fiona Foster and other members of an environmental group sued federal agencies over funding decisions affecting overseas habitats. The Court dismissed the suit for lack of standing, emphasizing that the federal state structure requires plaintiffs to show concrete, particularized injury traceable to the challenged action.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife504 U.S. 555 (1992)
In 1973 Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act to protect species of animals against threats to their continuing existence caused by man. In 1978 the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service issued a joint regulation interpreting section 7(a)(2) to require federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior on actions taken in foreign nations. In 1986 the Secretary promulgated a revised regulation that limited the consultation obligation to actions within the United States or on the high seas.
Shortly after the 1986 regulation took effect, Defenders of Wildlife and other environmental organizations filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota against the Secretary of the Interior. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the regulation was invalid as to its geographic scope and an injunction requiring the Secretary to promulgate a new regulation mandating consultation for foreign projects. The complaint alleged that the absence of consultation would increase the rate of extinction of endangered and threatened species. The complaint further alleged that some of the organizations' members observed these species both domestically and abroad.
Respondents supported their allegations with affidavits from two members. Joyce Kelly stated that she had traveled to Egypt in 1986, observed the habitat of the endangered Nile crocodile, and intended to return. Kelly further stated that she would suffer harm from the United States role in the rehabilitation of the Aswan High Dam. Amy Skilbred stated that she had traveled to Sri Lanka in 1981, observed the habitat of endangered species including the Asian elephant and leopard at the site of the Mahaweli project funded by the Agency for International Development, and intended to return. Skilbred admitted she had no current plans to return because of a civil war.
The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. On remand the District Court denied the Secretary's motion for summary judgment on standing. The District Court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment on the merits and enjoined the Secretary from applying the regulation to foreign countries. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
How does the structure of a federal state limit the treaty power?
Treaties and executive agreements cannot authorize action that violates specific constitutional protections or alter basic structural principles such as federalism.
When must federal courts abstain from enjoining state criminal proceedings?
Federal courts must generally abstain out of principles of comity and federalism absent extraordinary circumstances such as bad-faith prosecution or a flagrantly unconstitutional statute.
Can an individual defendant raise a Tenth Amendment challenge to federal action?
Yes, an individual criminal defendant can have standing to raise a Tenth Amendment or federalism-based challenge provided the defendant demonstrates injury in fact and redressability.
326 U.S. 310 (1945)
…of due process, which here would amount to deciding a constitutional question “in advance of the necessity for its decision.” Federation of Labor v. McAdory , 325 U. S. 450, 461. Certainly appellant cannot in the light of our past decisions meritoriously claim that notice by registered mail and by personal service on its…