Also known as: felony murder rule · felony-murder · felony murder doctrine
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A doctrine under which a killing that occurs during the commission or attempted commission of a felony constitutes murder even without proof of an intent to kill. The intent to commit the underlying felony supplies the implied malice required for murder liability.
Joe directed his workers to bypass a secure gate and pump hazardous waste into a storm channel at night to avoid proper disposal costs. A homeless man sleeping nearby inhaled the fumes and died from toxic exposure. The death occurred while Joe was carrying out the felony of illegal dumping.
Jackie disabled an alarm system and locked a security guard in a server cage while stealing processors from a data center. An electrical fire started during the theft and the guard died from smoke inhalation. The death took place while Jackie was committing the felony of burglary.
Alison disabled a conveyor's emergency stop and jammed open a safety gate to speed up her secret removal of factory goods for resale. Her coworker was pulled into the machinery and killed while clearing a jam created during the loading. The death happened while Alison was committing the felony of embezzlement.
Leah conducted unauthorized off-the-books securities sales sessions that violated state laws. When a colleague confronted her about the illegal activity she shoved him into a glass partition that shattered and caused fatal lacerations. The death occurred amid the ongoing commission of the securities felony.
Walter and Owen entered a restricted hospital storage room after hours to steal diagnostic devices. Walter injected an elderly patient blocking their path with an unauthorized sedative that caused respiratory arrest and death. The death took place while the pair were committing the felony of theft.
On December 27, 1970, Gordon Patterson shot and killed John Northrup in Glens Falls, New York. After a brief and unstable marriage, Patterson had become estranged from his wife Roberta. Roberta had resumed an association with Northrup, a neighbor to whom she had been engaged before her marriage to Patterson. Patterson borrowed a rifle from an acquaintance and went to the residence of his father-in-law. There he observed his wife through a window in a state of semiundress in Northrup's presence. He entered the house and killed Northrup by shooting him twice in the head. Patterson was charged with second-degree murder. At his jury trial in Warren County Court, Patterson raised the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance and presented psychiatric evidence tending to show that he had been extremely emotionally disturbed when he killed Northrup. The jury was instructed that the prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime of murder. The defendant had the burden of proving the affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury convicted Patterson of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. While appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was pending, this Court decided Mullaney v. Wilbur. The New York Court of Appeals nevertheless affirmed, distinguishing the Maine statute at issue in Mullaney and holding that New York's allocation of the burden of proof on the affirmative defense was consistent with due process. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question whether the burden of proof placed on the defendant by New York law is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
View caseUlysses and Clifford confronted a woman in her SUV at an airport parking structure and ordered her out at knifepoint to steal the vehicle. During the struggle the SUV pinned her against a pillar and she died from her injuries. The death occurred while the men were committing the felony of carjacking.
In September 1994, a Wells Fargo armored van pulled up to the drive-up window of a bank in Glendale, Arizona. Inside the van were a driver, a guard, and a messenger carrying a bag with more than $270,000 in cash. As the van waited for the bank to open, a man armed with a rifle approached the driver's side of the van while another man armed with a handgun approached the passenger side. The man with the rifle shot and killed the driver. The man with the handgun shot at the guard but missed. The guard returned fire, shooting and wounding the man with the handgun. The wounded man with the handgun was later identified as Timothy Ring. Ring was indicted for first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, armed robbery, and other crimes. At trial, the prosecutor presented evidence that Ring and two others had planned to rob the armored van. The jury deadlocked on premeditated murder. It convicted Ring of felony murder occurring in the course of armed robbery. At the sentencing stage of the trial, the judge found two aggravating factors. The judge found that the murder was committed in expectation of pecuniary gain and in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner. The judge found one mitigating factor consisting of Ring's minimal criminal record. Finding that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factor, the judge sentenced Ring to death. On appeal, Ring argued that Arizona's capital sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in Apprendi v. New Jersey. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected that claim, relying on Walton v. Arizona, and affirmed Ring's conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether Walton can be reconciled with Apprendi.
View caseNo. The rule treats the defendant's intent to commit the underlying felony as supplying the implied malice needed for murder. A killing during the felony therefore supports a murder conviction even without any separate intent to cause death.
Supporting sources
An intent to commit the predicate felony itself supplies the required implied malice. The rule therefore converts an unintentional killing during the felony into murder without needing proof of express malice or other forms of implied malice such as intent to inflict great bodily injury.
Supporting sources
Yes in jurisdictions that apply the rule to any felony.
The felony-murder rule elevates an unintentional killing during a felony to murder by supplying implied malice. The misdemeanor-manslaughter rule treats an unintentional killing during a misdemeanor or non-covered felony as involuntary manslaughter rather than murder.
Supporting sources
…and him, one wielding a pipe and the other a knife. The trial judge submitted the murder charges to the jury on both felony-murder and nonfelony-murder theories. He also instructed on the issue of self-defense but declined to instruct on manslaughter. He submitted the robbery case to the jury on both an armed-robbery…