A high-ranking official who holds an office of trust, authority, or command under a national, state, or local government and is authorized to exercise a specific function.
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Direction Blocked Without Confinement
Genevieve Gardner, a general officer directing traffic after an accident, stopped Gregory Gates from proceeding down one blocked lane. Gregory had a right to travel that route but could turn around or take an alternate path. Gregory sued for false imprisonment, but the claim failed because the officer's action did not create complete confinement.
Mandamus Issued to Commission
Grace Gupta, a general officer in the executive branch, refused to deliver a signed commission to George Garcia. George petitioned the court for a writ ordering delivery. The court determined it possessed authority to review the refusal and compel the act as a ministerial duty.
In December 1801, William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsend Hooe, and William Harper petitioned the Supreme Court for a rule requiring Secretary of State James Madison to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue commanding delivery of their commissions as justices of the peace in the District of Columbia. The applicants had been nominated by outgoing President John Adams. The Senate had advised and consented to the appointments. Commissions in due form were signed by the President with the seal of the United States affixed by the Secretary of State.
During the proceedings the Court heard testimony from Department of State clerks Jacob Wagner and Daniel Brent, who described the preparation and handling of the commissions. Wagner recalled that two commissions had been signed but could not confirm whether those of the applicants were recorded. Brent believed Marbury's and Hooe's commissions were made out. Ramsay's was omitted by mistake. None of the Adams-signed commissions for District justices were recorded. Attorney General Levi Lincoln, who had acted as Secretary of State, testified that he had seen signed and sealed commissions but did not know whether any for the applicants were ever sent out.
James Marshall's affidavit stated that on March 4, 1801, he received and later returned several commissions from the Secretary of State's office, including those for Hooe and Harper. The applicants also submitted the affidavit of Hazen Kimball confirming that commissions for Marbury and Hooe were in the office on March 3, 1801. Madison did not appear or show cause after the rule was served. The motion for the writ itself was heard in the February 1803 term.
Gwen Gallagher, a general officer supervising federal agents, authorized a warrantless search of Galaxy Technologies' offices. The company sued the agents directly for constitutional violations. The court recognized an implied cause of action for damages arising from the Fourth Amendment breach.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971)
On the morning of November 26, 1965, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics entered Webster Bivens's apartment in the Bronx.
The agents broke open the door, handcuffed Bivens in front of his wife and young children, and thoroughly searched the apartment. They then transported Bivens to the federal courthouse in Brooklyn, where he was interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip search.
Several days later Bivens was released on his own recognizance, and he was never indicted or prosecuted for any offense. Bivens filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the six agents in their individual capacities. His complaint sought fifteen thousand dollars in damages from each agent and alleged that the arrest and search were effected without a warrant, that unreasonable force was employed, and that the arrest was made without probable cause. Bivens claimed to have suffered great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering as a result of the agents' conduct.
The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review the judgment.
Georgia Gibbs, a general officer on the landmarks commission, designated Golden Gate Logistics' terminal as historic. The company claimed the restriction amounted to a taking without compensation. The court weighed the economic impact and investment-backed expectations against the regulation's character.
Penn Central Transportation Co. et al. v. New York City438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978)
In 1965 New York City enacted the Landmarks Preservation Law, which created an eleven-member Landmarks Preservation Commission and authorized it to designate buildings at least thirty years old that possess special historical or aesthetic interest.
The law required owners of designated landmarks to obtain Commission approval before altering exterior architectural features and imposed an affirmative duty to keep those features in good repair. In August 1967 the Commission designated Grand Central Terminal a landmark and the city tax block it occupies a landmark site; the Board of Estimate confirmed the designation the following month.
Penn Central Transportation Co. and its affiliates owned the Terminal, an eight-story Beaux-Arts structure completed in 1913 that served as the main station for the New York Central and Harlem lines. On January 22, 1968, Penn Central entered a fifty-year renewable lease with UGP Properties, Inc., under which UGP agreed to construct a multistory office building cantilevered above the Terminal and to pay Penn Central at least three million dollars annually after construction.
Penn Central and UGP submitted two plans prepared by architect Marcel Breuer: Breuer I, a fifty-five-story tower resting on the Terminal roof, and Breuer II Revised, a fifty-three-story building that would have removed part of the 42d Street facade. After four days of hearings at which over 80 witnesses testified, the Commission denied this application as to both proposals.
Penn Central filed suit in New York Supreme Court, Trial Term, seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages for a temporary taking. The trial court granted the injunctive and declaratory relief. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Penn Central had failed to prove deprivation of all reasonable beneficial use. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Terminal could still earn a reasonable return and that transferable development rights provided significant compensation. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
Gregory Gates, a general officer enforcing immigration rules, faced a one-house veto blocking a deportation suspension. The affected individual challenged the veto mechanism. The court held that the legislative veto violated separation of powers by allowing Congress to alter executive action without bicameral passage and presentment.
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Jagdish Rai Chadha462 U.S. 919, 954 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2785 n. 16, 77 L.Ed.2d 317
In 1966 Jagdish Rai Chadha, an East Indian born in Kenya who held a British passport, was lawfully admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa that expired on June 30, 1972. In October 1973, the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service informed Chadha that he had remained longer than permitted and was therefore deportable. Chadha conceded deportability but applied for suspension under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.
On June 25, 1974, an Immigration Judge acting on behalf of the Attorney General suspended Chadha's deportation and adjusted his status to permanent resident after finding that he satisfied the statutory criteria of seven years' continuous presence, good moral character, and extreme hardship. A report of the suspension was transmitted to Congress as required by the Act.
On December 16, 1975, the House of Representatives passed a resolution disapproving the suspension for Chadha and five other aliens on the ground that they did not meet the statutory requirements, particularly as to hardship.
Pursuant to the House resolution, the Immigration Judge reopened the deportation proceedings. Chadha moved to terminate them on constitutional grounds, but the Immigration Judge ruled that he lacked authority to declare the resolution unconstitutional and ordered Chadha deported. Chadha appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which likewise held that it had no authority to pass on the constitutionality of the resolution and dismissed the appeal.
Chadha then filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Immigration and Naturalization Service appeared and urged the court to hold the House resolution unconstitutional. After inviting briefs from the Senate and House as amici curiae, the Court of Appeals held the resolution unconstitutional because it was a legislative act that failed to satisfy the requirements of Article I, sections 1 and 7, and set aside the deportation order.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the consolidated cases to address the constitutional question.
Gwen Gallagher, a general officer in the village planning department, enforced a zoning code restricting industrial uses on Grove Manufacturing's land. The company argued the restrictions were arbitrary and deprived it of property value. The court sustained the ordinance as a valid exercise of police power advancing public welfare through comprehensive planning.
Village of Euclid Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co.272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed 303 (1926)
The Village of Euclid is an Ohio municipal corporation that adjoins and is practically a suburb of the City of Cleveland. Its estimated population is between 5,000 and 10,000, and its area spans from twelve to fourteen square miles, with the greater part consisting of farm lands or unimproved acreage. It lies roughly in the form of a parallelogram measuring approximately three and one-half miles each way and is traversed east and west by three principal highways and two railroads.
Ambler Realty Co. owns a tract of land containing 68 acres situated in the westerly end of the village. This tract abuts on Euclid Avenue to the south and the Nickel Plate railroad to the north. Adjoining this tract on both the east and the west, restricted residential plats have been laid out upon which residences have been erected.
On November 13, 1922, the Village Council adopted an ordinance establishing a comprehensive zoning plan. The ordinance divides the village into six use districts denominated U-1 to U-6, three height districts denominated H-1 to H-3, and four area districts denominated A-1 to A-4. Appellee's tract is classified as U-2 for the first 620 feet north of Euclid Avenue, U-3 for the next 130 feet, and U-6 for the remainder.
Enforcement of the ordinance is entrusted to the inspector of buildings under rules and regulations of the board of zoning appeals. The board holds public meetings, keeps minutes of its proceedings, and possesses authority to interpret the ordinance in cases of practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship, while penalties are prescribed for violations. Ambler Realty Co. filed suit alleging that the tract has been held for years for sale and development for industrial uses for which it is especially adapted. The bill further alleged that unrestricted market value is about $10,000 per acre but limited to residential purposes the value does not exceed $2,500 per acre, that the first 200 feet back from Euclid Avenue has a value of $150 per front foot if unrestricted but not in excess of $50 per front foot if limited to residential uses, and that the ordinance confiscates and destroys a great part of its value while deterring prospective buyers. The bill sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the ordinance.
The district court overruled a motion to dismiss on the ground that the suit was premature. The district court held the ordinance unconstitutional and void and enjoined its enforcement.
What distinguishes a general officer from other public officials?
A general officer holds a position of significant command or authority within a governmental hierarchy, typically exercising discretionary functions rather than routine administrative tasks.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)
…1801, William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsend Hooe, and William Harper, by their counsel Charles Lee, late Attorney General of the United States, severally moved the court for a rule to James Madison, Secretary of State of the United States, to show cause why a mandamus should not issue commanding him to cause…