Also known as:grievances · grieve · grieves · grieved · grieving · labor complaint · union complaint
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional guarantee protecting citizens' ability to seek redress from the government for perceived wrongs. The guarantee forms part of the First Amendment and bars laws that abridge the right to petition. Courts apply the guarantee when evaluating claims that government action retaliates against or burdens such petitions.
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How its tested
Common Examples
6
Citizen Petition to Congress
Georgia Gibbs circulates a petition urging Congress to investigate federal land-use policies that she believes harm her community. When federal agents threaten to prosecute her for the petition drive, she sues. The court holds that the First Amendment protects her right to petition and bars the threatened prosecution.
Generalized Standing Challenge
Gabriel Gonzalez sues the Environmental Protection Agency claiming that lax enforcement of pollution rules violates federal law. He alleges only that the agency fails to follow the statute and that all citizens suffer equally from the violation. The court dismisses the suit because the asserted injury constitutes a generalized grievance insufficient for Article III standing.
Gloria Green, an assistant district attorney, circulates a petition among colleagues protesting a proposed transfer policy. Her supervisor fires her for the petition. The court upholds the termination because the petition addressed only internal personnel matters rather than a public concern and therefore receives minimal First Amendment protection.
Zoning Petition and Standing
Glenn Gross, a prospective resident, joins a challenge to a village zoning decision that blocks construction of affordable housing near his workplace. The court finds that his injury is particularized because success in the suit would create a substantial probability that the housing project will proceed, satisfying standing requirements.
Arlington Heights, Village of v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977), on remand 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir.1977)
In 1971 Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation applied to the Village of Arlington Heights, Illinois, for rezoning of a 15-acre parcel from single-family to multiple-family classification. Using federal financial assistance under section 236 of the National Housing Act, MHDC planned to build 190 clustered townhouse units for low- and moderate-income tenants. The Village denied the rezoning request. MHDC, joined by other plaintiffs, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging that the denial was racially discriminatory and violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.
Arlington Heights is a suburb of Chicago located about 26 miles northwest of the downtown Loop. Most land in the Village is zoned for detached single-family homes. The Clerics of St. Viator own an 80-acre parcel just east of the center of Arlington Heights that includes a high school, a novitiate building, and vacant land. Since 1959 all land surrounding the Viatorian property has been zoned R-3 for single-family use with relatively small minimum lot-size requirements.
In 1970 MHDC entered into a 99-year lease and accompanying agreement of sale covering a 15-acre site in the southeast corner of the Viatorian property. The agreement set a bargain purchase price of $300,000 with the sale contingent upon securing zoning clearances and section 236 housing assistance. MHDC's plans for the Lincoln Green project called for 20 two-story buildings containing 190 units with a mix of one-, two-, three-, and four-bedroom configurations and a large portion of the site left open. The development did not conform to the Village zoning ordinance and required rezoning to the R-5 multiple-family classification. MHDC filed a petition for rezoning with the Village Plan Commission accompanied by supporting materials that included an affirmative marketing plan designed to assure racial integration. MHDC consulted with Village staff and incorporated every recommended change into the plans.
During the spring of 1971 the Plan Commission considered the proposal at three public meetings that drew large crowds. Opponents focused on the zoning aspects. They argued that the area had always been single-family. They also argued that the buffer policy adopted in 1962 called for R-5 zoning primarily to serve as a buffer between single-family development and commercial or manufacturing districts. At the close of the third meeting the Plan Commission recommended denial. On September 28, 1971, the Village Board denied the rezoning by a 6-1 vote.
In June 1972 MHDC and three Black individuals filed suit against the Village. A second nonprofit corporation and an individual of Mexican-American descent intervened. After a bench trial the District Court entered judgment for the Village in 1974. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed in 1975. The Supreme Court granted the Village's petition for certiorari in 1975.
Giselle Guerrero submits a petition to a government agency containing statements about a public official that later prove false. The official sues for defamation. The court applies the actual-malice standard because the statements were made in a petition to the government and therefore receive First Amendment protection unless actual malice is shown.
New York Times v. Sullivan376 U.S. 254 (1964)
L. B. Sullivan is one of three elected Commissioners of the City of Montgomery, Alabama. He has duties including supervision of the Police Department. He brought this civil libel action against the New York Times Company and four individual petitioners who were Alabama clergymen. The suit sought $500,000 in damages based on a full-page advertisement entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices" that appeared in the New York Times on March 29, 1960. A jury in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County awarded Sullivan the full amount claimed against all petitioners. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the judgment.
The advertisement was signed by the Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South. It described widespread non-violent demonstrations by Southern Negro students and an unprecedented wave of terror against them. Two paragraphs formed the basis of the claim. One alleged that after students sang on the State Capitol steps their leaders were expelled, truckloads of police ringed the Alabama State College Campus, and the dining hall was padlocked to starve students into submission. The other stated that Southern violators had bombed Dr. King's home, assaulted him, arrested him seven times, and charged him with perjury. The text appeared over the names of 64 persons. It was endorsed by the individual petitioners among others.
Sullivan contended that the references to police referred to him in his supervisory capacity. Six Montgomery residents testified that they read the statements as referring to him. However, several statements were inaccurate. The students sang the National Anthem rather than "My Country, 'Tis of Thee." The expulsions were for a different incident. The dining hall was not padlocked. Dr. King had been arrested only four times. The bombings occurred before Sullivan's tenure with police efforts to apprehend the perpetrators.
The Times published the advertisement for approximately $4800. It acted upon an order from a New York advertising agency. The agency provided a letter from A. Philip Randolph certifying authorization. The Times made no efforts to confirm its accuracy against its own news files.
Sullivan served written demands for retraction on the petitioners pursuant to Alabama law. None of the individual petitioners responded as they had not authorized use of their names. The Times did not retract. It published a retraction only upon demand by Governor John Patterson after learning more facts. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the separate petitions of the individual petitioners and the Times due to the importance of the constitutional issues involved.
Gordon Gray, a shareholder, sues a corporation alleging securities violations. The corporation moves to strike his jury demand. The court notes that the historical right to jury trial traces in part to colonial grievances over denial of jury trials and therefore preserves the right in the present action.
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore439 U.S. 322, 334 (1979)
Parklane Hosiery Company, Inc., and eleven of its officers and directors issued a proxy statement in connection with a merger between Parklane and another corporation. Leo Shore, a stockholder of Parklane, filed a class action on behalf of stockholders in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against Parklane and the individual defendants. The complaint alleged that the proxy statement was false and misleading in violation of sections 14(a), 10(b), and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and related SEC rules. The complaint sought damages for the class, rescission of the merger, and recovery of costs.
Before Shore’s action came to trial, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed a separate suit against the same defendants in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The SEC complaint alleged that the proxy statement that had been issued by Parklane was materially false and misleading in essentially the same respects as those that had been alleged in the respondent's complaint. After a four-day trial, the District Court found that the proxy statement was materially false and misleading in the respects alleged, and entered a declaratory judgment to that effect. The court permanently enjoined the defendants from further violations of the securities laws and ordered them to offer rescission to shareholders who had tendered shares. The defendants did not appeal this judgment.
Shore then moved for partial summary judgment in the Eastern District of New York action, asserting that the defendants were collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues resolved against them in the SEC action. The District Court denied the motion on the ground that application of collateral estoppel would deny the defendants their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that a party who has had issues of fact determined against him after a full and fair opportunity to litigate in a nonjury trial is collaterally estopped from obtaining a subsequent jury trial of these same issues of fact. Because of an intercircuit conflict with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Rachal v. Hill, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Does the First Amendment protect petitions that address only internal employment disputes?
No. A public employee's petition that concerns only internal office matters such as personnel disputes receives minimal First Amendment protection. Courts give substantial deference to an employer's assessment of workplace disruption when the petition does not address a matter of public concern.
Supporting sources
Can Congress create standing for plaintiffs who assert only generalized grievances?
No. Generalized grievances shared equally by all citizens do not satisfy Article III standing even when Congress authorizes citizen suits. Plaintiffs must still show a concrete and particularized injury.
Supporting sources
What standard applies when a petition to the government contains allegedly defamatory statements about a public official?
The actual-malice standard from New York Times v. Sullivan applies. A person who makes defamatory statements in a petition may be held liable only if the statements were made with actual malice.
Supporting sources
376 U.S. 254 (1964)
…advertisement in the sense in which the word was used in Chrestensen. It communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern. See N. A. A. C. P. v.…