Also known as: heat of passion voluntary manslaughter · heat of passion · sudden heat of passion
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A mitigation of murder to voluntary manslaughter at common law when the defendant kills in the heat of passion upon adequate provocation before a reasonable cooling-off period has elapsed. Adequate provocation must be of a type that would arouse sudden intense passion in an ordinary person, the defendant must have been actually provoked, and the killing must occur before cooling occurs in fact or by objective measure.
Hakim Hall learned at a party that a colleague had removed his name from patent filings and then watched the colleague punch his brother in the face. Minutes later, when the colleague reached into a bag during continued insults, Hakim struck her with a laptop stand, killing her. The sequence of battery on a close relative and immediate response supports reduction to voluntary manslaughter because the provocation remained unextinguished.
Harper Hill discovered his spouse with another person after closing at the store and immediately attempted to seize a weapon. After several hours of intervening duties and text messages, Harper located and stabbed the other person in a parking lot. The cooling period and deliberate search show that the heat of passion had subsided, preventing reduction to voluntary manslaughter.
Henry Hoffman invited a coworker to an isolated elevated platform after dark, knowing its dangers. When the coworker repeated earlier criticisms during the repair, Henry shoved him to his death. Advance choice of the hazardous location demonstrates malice formed before the verbal exchange, so the killing remains murder rather than heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter.
Appellants Harris and Hart were jointly tried and convicted by a jury of first-degree murder. The government's evidence rested principally on the testimony of an eyewitness to the homicide who stated that he was inside the Federal City Liquor Store at 943 Ninth Street, N.W., at approximately 2:30 on the afternoon of January 21, 1975, when appellants and two other men, one of whom became the murder victim, entered the store. They appeared to the witness to be somewhat intoxicated. An argument ensued between Hart and the victim regarding a gun, and Hart pulled an ice pick out of his coat pocket and held it in his hands towards the victim's face. Hart then told the victim you are going to get my gun or else I am gonna kill you. According to the eyewitness, Harris then stated let's kill the victim. When the manager of the liquor store insisted they take the argument outside, Hart, the victim, and an unidentified third man left the premises, crossed the street and turned into a nearby alley. Harris followed shortly thereafter but he did not enter the alley until after the unidentified third man exited the alley and proceeded down Ninth Street. The witness then left the liquor store and walked down the street to get a direct view of the alley. A scuffle had started between the three men. Harris grabbed the victim from the back. The man was wrestled to the ground by both defendants and Harris struck him on top of the head. Hart then proceeded to stab the victim repeatedly with the ice pick. A second government witness was outside the liquor store during the time in which the homicide was committed. He testified that as Hart crossed the street he was holding the victim behind his neck. He also recalled that as Harris walked past him he said he stole his pistol and he is going to kill him. On January 22, 1975, the day after the homicide, the witness was shown an array of 10 photographs and he positively identified appellant Hart as the man who had been holding the victim behind the neck. Before his grand jury testimony on February 21, 1975, the witness was shown the exact same array of photographs with the exception that appellant Hart's photograph had been removed and replaced by a picture of Harris, and on that occasion the witness made a positive identification of Harris. Harris challenged his conviction on the ground that the court at a pretrial suppression hearing erroneously denied his motion to suppress identification evidence, and both appellants challenged the denial of their motions for judgment of acquittal.
View caseHannah Hale was charged with murder after striking her manager during an argument. The prosecution required her to prove heat of passion to reduce the charge. Because the state may not shift the burden of disproving malice to the defendant, the allocation violates due process and affects whether voluntary manslaughter mitigation applies.
In June 1966, a jury convicted Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr. of murder in a Maine state court. The prosecution introduced Wilbur's pretrial statement describing how he fatally assaulted Claude Hebert in Hebert's hotel room after a homosexual advance, together with circumstantial evidence of the killing. Although the defense presented no evidence at trial, it argued that Wilbur lacked criminal intent or that the homicide amounted at most to manslaughter because it occurred in the heat of passion provoked by the advance. The trial court instructed the jury that an intentional and unlawful homicide would support a finding of malice aforethought unless the defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. After the jury twice returned for additional instructions on implied malice and the definition of heat of passion, it convicted Wilbur of murder. Wilbur appealed his conviction to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, which upheld the trial court's instructions and affirmed the judgment. Wilbur then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court granted the petition, and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed that decision. After the Maine Supreme Judicial Court issued its opinion in State v. Lafferty reaffirming its view of state law, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case and remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration. On remand, that court again applied Winship, this time to the Maine law as construed by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari a second time to consider the constitutional question presented by the Maine homicide law as applied to Wilbur's case.
View caseHector Huerta retrieved a scalpel during a workplace dispute and deliberately drove it into a nurse's chest. The use of a deadly weapon on a vital area permits an inference of intent to kill that satisfies malice aforethought. The inference supports a murder conviction unless the defendant establishes heat-of-passion mitigation.
David Sandstrom, an 18-year-old, confessed on November 22, 1976, to the slaying of Annie Jessen. Based on the confession and corroborating evidence, he was charged on December 2 with deliberate homicide under Montana law for purposely or knowingly causing her death. At trial, Sandstrom's attorney told the jury that although his client admitted killing Jessen, he did not do so purposely or knowingly and was therefore guilty only of a lesser crime. The defense relied on testimony from two court-appointed mental health experts describing Sandstrom's mental state, attributing the killing to a personality disorder aggravated by alcohol consumption. The prosecution requested, and over defense objection the trial judge delivered, the instruction that the law presumes a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts. The jury found Sandstrom guilty of deliberate homicide, and he was sentenced to 100 years in prison. Sandstrom appealed to the Supreme Court of Montana, which upheld the conviction. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the constitutionality of the instruction.
View caseHenry Harrison was convicted of murder after arming himself in advance of a confrontation and striking the victim during an argument. The court treated the presence of a deadly weapon as a sentencing factor rather than an element. This treatment leaves the heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter analysis to be resolved at trial rather than at sentencing.
The Pennsylvania legislature adopted the Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act in 1982. The statute applies to persons convicted of enumerated felonies including third-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, robbery, aggravated assault, and kidnapping. Under the Act a sentencing judge must impose a minimum term of five years' imprisonment upon finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant visibly possessed a firearm during commission of the offense. The judge considers trial evidence plus any additional evidence offered by the parties at the sentencing hearing. The Act does not increase the statutory maximum penalty for the underlying felony. Petitioner McMillan was convicted by jury of aggravated assault after shooting his victim in the right buttock during an argument over a debt. Petitioner Peterson was convicted after a bench trial of voluntary manslaughter after shooting and killing her husband. Petitioner Dennison was convicted after a bench trial of aggravated assault after shooting and seriously wounding an acquaintance. Petitioner Smalls was convicted after a bench trial of robbery after holding up a seafood store at gunpoint. In each case the Commonwealth provided notice before sentencing that it would seek application of the Act. The four sentencing judges each held the Act unconstitutional and imposed sentences below the five-year minimum. The Commonwealth appealed all four cases to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which consolidated them and upheld the statute. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the constitutional challenges.
View caseThe provocation must be adequate to arouse sudden intense passion in an ordinary person. The defendant must have been actually provoked. A reasonable person would not have had time to cool off. The defendant in fact did not cool off before the killing.
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Yes. Catching a spouse in the act of adultery is a classic category of adequate provocation at common law. The discovery must still satisfy the requirements that the defendant was actually provoked and that no reasonable cooling-off period had elapsed.
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No. Mere words, trivial battery, and wrongs that occurred long in the past are legally inadequate. Only serious battery on the defendant or a close relative, or catching a spouse in adultery, among other recognized categories, qualify as adequate provocation.
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The prosecution must prove malice aforethought beyond a reasonable doubt. A state may not shift to the defendant the burden of proving heat of passion to reduce murder to manslaughter.
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