immovable

Tompkins, a citizen of Pennsylvania, was injured on a dark night by a passing freight train of the Erie Railroad Company while walking along its right of way at Hughestown in that State. He claimed that the accident occurred through negligence in the operation or maintenance of the train. He asserted that he was rightfully on the premises as a licensee because he was on a commonly used beaten footpath which ran for a short distance alongside the tracks. He further alleged that he was struck by something which looked like a door projecting from one of the moving cars. To enforce that claim he brought an action in the federal court for southern New York, which had jurisdiction because the company is a corporation of that State. The Erie insisted that its duty to Tompkins was no greater than that owed to a trespasser. It contended, among other things, that its duty to Tompkins, and hence its liability, should be determined in accordance with the Pennsylvania law; that under the law of Pennsylvania, as declared by its highest court, persons who use pathways along the railroad right of way are to be deemed trespassers; and that the railroad is not liable for injuries to undiscovered trespassers resulting from its negligence, unless it be wanton or wilful. Tompkins denied that any such rule had been established by the decisions of the Pennsylvania courts. He contended that, since there was no statute of the State on the subject, the railroad's duty and liability is to be determined in federal courts as a matter of general law. The trial judge refused to rule that the Pennsylvania law precluded recovery. The jury brought in a verdict of $30,000. The judgment entered thereon was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that it was unnecessary to consider whether the law of Pennsylvania was as contended, because the question was one not of local, but of general, law and that upon questions of general law the federal courts are free, in the absence of a local statute, to exercise their independent judgment as to what the law is. Because of the importance of the question whether the federal court was free to disregard the alleged rule of the Pennsylvania common law, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Harry Tompkins, a citizen of Pennsylvania, was injured on a dark night by a passing freight train of the Erie Railroad Company while walking along its right of way at Hughestown in that State. He claimed that the accident occurred through negligence in the operation or maintenance of the train. He also claimed that he was rightfully on the premises as a licensee because he was on a commonly used beaten footpath which ran for a short distance alongside the tracks. To enforce that claim he brought an action in the federal court for southern New York, which had jurisdiction because the company is a corporation of that State. The Erie Railroad Company denied liability, and the case was tried by a jury. The railroad insisted that its duty to Tompkins was no greater than that owed to a trespasser. It contended that under the law of Pennsylvania, as declared by its highest court, persons who use pathways along the railroad right of way are to be deemed trespassers. The railroad further contended that it is not liable for injuries to undiscovered trespassers resulting from its negligence unless the conduct is wanton or wilful. Tompkins denied that any such rule had been established by the decisions of the Pennsylvania courts. He contended that since there was no statute of the State on the subject, the railroad's duty and liability is to be determined in federal courts as a matter of general law. The trial judge refused to rule that Pennsylvania law precluded recovery. The jury brought in a verdict of $30,000, and the judgment entered thereon was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. The Erie had contended that application of the Pennsylvania rule was required by section 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789. Because of the importance of the question whether the federal court was free to disregard the alleged rule of the Pennsylvania common law, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

An Oregon resident died intestate in 1962, leaving an estate that included both real and personal property. The decedent's sole heirs, who resided in East Germany, sought to inherit under Oregon probate proceedings. Members of the Oregon State Land Board petitioned the probate court for escheat of the net proceeds of the estate under Oregon Revised Statutes § 111.070. The statute conditioned a nonresident alien's right to inherit on proof of three requirements. One requirement was the existence of a reciprocal right of United States citizens to take property on the same terms as citizens or inhabitants of the foreign country. Another was the right of United States citizens to receive payment within the United States of funds originating from estates in the foreign country. A third was the right of the foreign heirs to receive the proceeds without confiscation in whole or in part by the foreign government. The burden rested on the nonresident alien to establish these facts. The provision concerning confiscation had been added to the statute in 1951, expanding upon earlier general reciprocity language. The Oregon Supreme Court held that Article IV of the 1923 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Germany permitted the East German heirs to take the real property but, following Clark v. Allen, did not permit them to take the personal property. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. In applying the statute in this and related cases, Oregon courts examined the credibility of diplomatic statements from communist-controlled countries, the discretion exercised by foreign banking authorities in issuing licenses for fund transfers, and the political structures under which foreign inheritance laws operated. The Department of Justice appeared as amicus curiae and stated that it did not contend the application of the statute in this case unduly interfered with the United States' conduct of foreign relations.