individualized exemptions

Alfred Smith and Galen Black were members of the Native American Church employed at a private drug rehabilitation organization in Oregon. They ingested peyote for sacramental purposes during a church ceremony. Their employer fired them for this conduct, treating it as work-related misconduct. Smith and Black applied to the Employment Division of the Oregon Department of Human Resources for unemployment compensation benefits, but the Division denied the claims on the ground that the firings constituted misconduct. The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the denials, holding that they violated the respondents' free exercise rights under the First Amendment. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that respondents were entitled to payment of unemployment benefits. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded for a determination whether Oregon law prohibited the sacramental use of peyote. On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the statute made no exception for sacramental use and reaffirmed its conclusion that denying benefits violated the respondents' constitutional rights. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari a second time. Oregon law prohibits knowing or intentional possession of peyote, a Schedule I controlled substance, making it a Class B felony. The respondents' peyote use occurred at a Native American Church ceremony and formed the sole basis for their terminations and benefit denials.

In April 1987 the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation organized under Florida law in 1973 whose president is Ernesto Pichardo, leased land in Hialeah, Florida, and announced plans to build a house of worship, school, cultural center, and museum at which members would practice Santeria. Santeria originated in nineteenth-century Cuba as a fusion of Yoruba traditions and Roman Catholicism. It centers on animal sacrifice performed by cutting the carotid arteries, after which the animals are usually cooked and eaten except in healing and death rituals. The announcement prompted the Hialeah City Council to convene an emergency public session on June 9, 1987. At that session residents and council members voiced strong opposition to Santeria practices. The council then adopted Resolution 87-66 declaring opposition to religious acts inconsistent with public morals, peace, or safety and passed Ordinance 87-40 incorporating Florida's animal-cruelty statute that criminalizes unnecessary or cruel killing of animals. After the Florida attorney general issued an opinion that ritual animal sacrifice other than for food consumption violated state law, the council in August 1987 adopted Resolution 87-90 opposing ritual animal sacrifice. In September 1987 the council enacted three further ordinances. Ordinance 87-52 barred possession of animals with intent to use them for ritual sacrifice except by licensed food establishments. Ordinance 87-71 directly prohibited any person from sacrificing an animal within city limits. Ordinance 87-72 restricted slaughter of animals to properly zoned slaughterhouse premises while exempting small-scale commercial hog and cattle operations. The Church and Pichardo filed suit against the city and its officials in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They alleged that the ordinances violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. After granting summary judgment to the individual defendants on immunity grounds, the district court conducted a nine-day bench trial on the remaining claims and entered judgment for the city. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Joseph Kennedy began working as a football coach at Bremerton High School in 2008 after nearly two decades of service in the Marine Corps. Mr. Kennedy made it a practice to give thanks through prayer on the playing field at the conclusion of each game he coaches. He offered his prayers after the players and coaches had shaken hands, by taking a knee at the 50-yard line and praying quietly for approximately 30 seconds. Initially Kennedy prayed on his own. Over time some players asked whether they could pray alongside him. The number of players who joined him eventually grew to include most of the team after some games. In September 2015 the District's superintendent first learned of these practices after an employee from another school commented positively on them to Bremerton's principal. On September 17 the superintendent sent Kennedy a letter identifying two problematic practices in which Kennedy had engaged. These included providing inspirational talks with overtly religious references likely constituting prayer with students at midfield following games. They also included leading students and coaching staff in a prayer in the locker-room tradition that predated his involvement. The District instructed Kennedy to avoid any motivational talks with students that included religious expression including prayer. It also instructed him to avoid suggesting encouraging or discouraging or supervising any prayers of students. After receiving the letter Kennedy ended the tradition of offering locker-room prayers. He ended his practice of incorporating religious references or prayer into his postgame motivational talks to his team on the field. On October 14 through counsel Kennedy sent a letter to school officials informing them that because of his sincerely-held religious beliefs he felt compelled to offer a post-game personal prayer of thanks at midfield. He asked the District to allow him to continue that private religious expression alone. He emphasized that he sought only the opportunity to wait until the game is over and the players have left the field and then walk to mid-field to say a short private personal prayer. On October 16 shortly before the game that day the District responded with another letter. It acknowledged that Kennedy had complied with the directives in its September 17 letter. Yet it forbade him from engaging in any overt actions that could appear to a reasonable observer to endorse prayer while he is on duty as a District-paid coach. After receiving this letter Kennedy offered a brief prayer following the October 16 game when most Bremerton players were engaged in the traditional singing of the school fight song to the audience. Though Kennedy was alone when he began to pray players from the other team and members of the community joined him before he finished. After the October 23 game ended Kennedy knelt at the 50-yard line where no one joined him and bowed his head for a brief quiet prayer. After the final relevant football game on October 26 Kennedy again knelt alone to offer a brief prayer as the players engaged in postgame traditions while other adults gathered around him on the field. Shortly after the October 26 game the District placed Kennedy on paid administrative leave and prohibited him from participating in any capacity in football program activities. In a letter explaining the reasons for this disciplinary action the superintendent criticized Kennedy for engaging in public and demonstrative religious conduct while still on duty as an assistant coach by offering a prayer following the games on October 16 23 and 26. While Kennedy received uniformly positive evaluations every other year of his coaching career after the 2015 season ended in November the District gave him a poor performance evaluation advising against rehiring him on the grounds that he failed to follow district policy regarding religious expression and failed to supervise student-athletes after games. Kennedy did not return for the next season. After these events Kennedy sued in federal court alleging that the District's actions violated the First Amendment's Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses and moved for a preliminary injunction requiring the District to reinstate him. The District Court denied that motion and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. After the parties engaged in discovery they filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment to the District and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Ninth Circuit denied a petition to rehear the case en banc over the dissents of 11 judges. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

St. Peter Catholic Church was built in 1923 in Boerne, Texas. Its structure replicates the mission style of the region's earlier history. The church seats about 230 worshippers, a number too small for its growing parish. Some 40 to 60 parishioners cannot be accommodated at some Sunday masses. To meet the needs of the congregation, the Archbishop of San Antonio gave permission to the parish to plan alterations to enlarge the building. A few months later, the Boerne City Council passed an ordinance authorizing the city's Historic Landmark Commission to prepare a preservation plan with proposed historic landmarks and districts. Under the ordinance, the commission must preapprove construction affecting historic landmarks or buildings in a historic district. Soon afterwards, the Archbishop applied for a building permit so construction to enlarge the church could proceed. City authorities, relying on the ordinance and the designation of a historic district which they argued included the church, denied the application. The Archbishop brought this suit challenging the permit denial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The complaint contained multiple claims, but to this point the litigation has centered on RFRA and the question of its constitutionality. The District Court concluded that by enacting RFRA Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court certified its order for interlocutory appeal and the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding RFRA to be constitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and now reverses. Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith. RFRA prohibits government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. Unless the government can demonstrate that the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, it must also show that the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The Act applies to all federal and state law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the enactment of RFRA.

Stephen J. Roy and Karen Miller are Native American descendants of the Abenaki Tribe. They applied for and received benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program and the Food Stamp program for their household, which included their two-year-old daughter Little Bird of the Snow. Roy and Miller refused to furnish a Social Security number for the daughter. They stated that obtaining one would violate their religious beliefs that the unique identifier would rob her spirit of uniqueness and power and prevent her from attaining greater spiritual strength. The Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare terminated AFDC and medical benefits payable on the child's behalf. It also reduced the level of food stamps the household received. Roy and Miller filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. They sued the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Secretary of Agriculture. In their complaint they alleged that the sole basis for the denial of benefits was Roy's refusal to obtain a Social Security number for Little Bird of the Snow. They requested injunctive relief, damages, and restoration of benefits. The parties stipulated that Little Bird of the Snow did not have a Social Security number at the time the suit was filed. At trial Roy testified that he had developed a religious objection after conversations with an Abenaki chief. He explained that technology robs the spirit and that the uniqueness of a Social Security number applied solely to his daughter would harm her spiritual development. On the final day of trial a federal officer determined during a recess that Little Bird of the Snow had in fact been assigned a Social Security number at birth under the name Little Bird of the Snow Roy. Roy was recalled and testified that harm would result only from use of the number, not from its mere assignment. The District Court found the case was not moot on that basis. After receiving testimony from government experts on the administrative necessity of Social Security numbers for preventing fraud and duplication in programs serving millions of recipients, the District Court denied damages and benefits. It entered an injunction that permanently restrained the Secretary of Health and Human Services from making any use of or disseminating the assigned number. The injunction also enjoined the federal and state defendants from denying benefits to the child until her sixteenth birthday because of the parents' refusal to provide a Social Security number. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.