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A natural person who has not reached the age of majority. An infant lacks full legal capacity to incur contractual duties, so agreements are voidable at the infant's election. The legal representative of an infant is deemed a citizen only of the same state as the infant for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
Ines Ibarra, an infant domiciled in State X since birth, suffers injuries at a local hospital. Her uncle Igor Ito, a citizen of State Y, obtains appointment as guardian ad litem in State X court and files a malpractice action exceeding $75,000 in federal court against the State X hospital. The court deems Igor a citizen of State X under the governing statute, so complete diversity is absent and the case is dismissed.
Ian Iverson, age sixteen and living at home, signs a four-month lease for specialized power tools required for his part-time construction job. He uses the tools under supervision, makes two payments from wages, then returns them and seeks to disaffirm. Because Ian is an infant, the lease is voidable at his option and the company cannot enforce continued payments.
Isaiah Ishikawa dies intestate, leaving a child born outside marriage. The child's mother petitions for workers' compensation benefits on the infant's behalf. The court holds that denying benefits to the infant based solely on the parents' marital status violates equal protection, allowing the infant to recover.
Deta Mona Trimble is the illegitimate daughter of Jessie Trimble and Sherman Gordon. Trimble and Gordon lived together in Chicago with Deta Mona from 1970 until Gordon died in 1974 as the victim of a homicide. On January 2, 1973, the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, entered a paternity order finding Gordon to be the father of Deta Mona and ordering him to pay fifteen dollars per week for her support. Gordon thereafter supported Deta Mona in accordance with the paternity order and openly acknowledged her as his child. Gordon died intestate at the age of twenty-eight, leaving an estate consisting only of a 1974 Plymouth automobile worth approximately twenty-five hundred dollars. Shortly after Gordon's death, Trimble, as the mother and next friend of Deta Mona, filed a petition for letters of administration, determination of heirship, and declaratory relief in the Probate Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County. That court entered an order determining heirship, identifying as the only heirs of Gordon his father Joseph Gordon, his mother Ethel King, and his brother, two sisters, and a half brother. The Circuit Court excluded Deta Mona on the authority of section twelve of the Illinois Probate Act. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court on the authority of its earlier decision in In re Estate of Karas. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to consider the arguments that section twelve violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by invidiously discriminating on the basis of illegitimacy and sex.
View caseA state statute prohibits abortion after quickening except to preserve the mother's life. A physician challenges the law after performing a procedure on a patient carrying a viable fetus. The court examines whether the statute adequately protects the infant's potential life while respecting the mother's rights.
In March 1970, Jane Roe, a single woman residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted a federal action against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face. She also sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the statutes. Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant. She wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. She was unable to obtain a legal abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by continuation of the pregnancy. She could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction to secure a legal abortion. James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes. Two such prosecutions were pending against him in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions. He claimed that for many cases he was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196 of the Texas Penal Code. John and Mary Doe, a married couple, filed a companion complaint also naming the District Attorney as defendant. The Does alleged that they were a childless couple. Mrs. Doe was suffering from a neural-chemical disorder. Her physician had advised her to avoid pregnancy until her condition materially improved. She had discontinued use of birth control pills pursuant to medical advice. If she should become pregnant she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district court for the Northern District of Texas. Upon the filing of affidavits, motions were made for dismissal and for summary judgment. The court held that Roe and members of her class and Dr. Hallford had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies. The Does had failed to allege facts sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have standing. It concluded that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face. The court dismissed the Does' complaint while denying injunctive relief. The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford appealed to the Supreme Court from that part of the District Court's judgment denying the injunction. The defendant District Attorney cross-appealed from the grant of declaratory relief. Both sides also took protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision by the Supreme Court.
View caseIsmael Ibrahim, an infant, is named as a defendant in a tort suit. The plaintiff serves process by leaving copies at the family home with the infant's mother. The defendant moves to dismiss, arguing that service failed to comply with the federal rule requiring personal delivery or suitable substitute service for an infant.
On February 6, 1963, petitioner, a citizen of Ohio, filed her complaint in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts, claiming damages in excess of $10,000 for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident in South Carolina, allegedly caused by the negligence of one Louise Plumer Osgood, a Massachusetts citizen deceased at the time of the filing of the complaint. Respondent, Mrs. Osgood's executor and also a Massachusetts citizen, was named as defendant. On February 8, service was made by leaving copies of the summons and the complaint with respondent's wife at his residence, concededly in compliance with Rule 4 (d) (1). Respondent filed his answer on February 26, alleging, inter alia, that the action could not be maintained because it had been brought contrary to and in violation of the provisions of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 197, Section 9. On October 17, 1963, the District Court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the threat to the goal of uniformity of federal procedure posed by the decision below.
View caseInes Ibarra's grandmother takes the infant into her home after the mother's death to provide daily care. City housing inspectors cite the grandmother for violating a single-family zoning ordinance that limits unrelated occupants. The court considers whether the ordinance unconstitutionally burdens the grandmother's right to maintain the household for the infant.
In early 1973, Mrs. Inez Moore received a notice of violation from the city of East Cleveland. The notice stated that her grandson John Moore, Jr., was an illegal occupant of her home. It directed her to comply with the housing ordinance. Mrs. Moore lived in her East Cleveland home together with her son Dale Moore, Sr., and her two grandsons Dale Moore, Jr., and John Moore, Jr. John came to live with her after his mother's death when he was less than one year old. When she failed to remove John from the home, the city filed a criminal charge against her. Mrs. Moore moved to dismiss the charge. She claimed that the ordinance was constitutionally invalid on its face. Her motion was overruled. Upon conviction she was sentenced to five days in jail and a $25 fine. The East Cleveland ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. The ordinance defined family to include only a husband or wife of the nominal head of the household, unmarried children of the head or spouse provided they have no children residing with them, a parent of the head or spouse, or not more than one dependent child of the head or spouse along with that child's spouse and dependent children. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction after giving full consideration to her constitutional claims. The Ohio Supreme Court denied review of the case. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of her appeal.
View caseAn infant may disaffirm any contract at any time before reaching majority or within a reasonable time after. Disaffirmance restores the parties as nearly as possible to their pre-contract positions, as illustrated when a minor returns goods and recovers payments made.
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No. Even when a lease or agreement is tied to lawful employment, the infant's status controls and the contract remains voidable absent parental consent or court approval. The protective policy of the infancy doctrine prevails over transaction-specific necessity.
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The statute deems the legal representative a citizen only of the infant's state. This prevents manufactured diversity and requires complete diversity to be measured by the infant's domicile rather than the representative's actual citizenship.
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Voidability turns on whether the infant lacked capacity at signing. Evidence of orientation and active participation may support enforcement, but the infant's minority alone supplies an independent ground for disaffirmance.
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