Revoked Consent Ends Entry Privilege
Ivan Ivanov receives permission from the owner to enter a warehouse to inspect goods. After completing the inspection, the owner revokes consent. Ivan must leave promptly using the ordinary exit route.
Also known as: ingress · egress · regress · ingress and egress · right of ingress egress and regress · right of access · easement of access
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A right of access allowing entry onto, departure from, and reentry to land or premises. The right arises by grant, prescription, necessity, or consent and is limited to the scope of its creation.
Ivan Ivanov receives permission from the owner to enter a warehouse to inspect goods. After completing the inspection, the owner revokes consent. Ivan must leave promptly using the ordinary exit route.
Isla Ireland attends a criminal trial as a member of the public. The judge attempts to close the courtroom during testimony. The closure order fails because the public holds a right of access to the proceedings.
Ibrahim Iqbal purchases a parcel that lacks road frontage. The deed includes an easement across adjacent land for ingress and egress. The easement permits reasonable use to reach the new parcel for construction.
In the late 1990s the city of New London, Connecticut, confronted severe economic decline after the 1996 closure of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, which had employed more than 1,500 people. The city's unemployment rate stood nearly double the state average and its population had dropped below 24,000 residents from a 1970 high of 30,000. State and local officials therefore designated the Fort Trumbull peninsula for targeted economic revitalization. In 1998 the New London Development Corporation, a private nonprofit entity, was reactivated to prepare a redevelopment plan covering roughly 90 acres. The plan divided the area into seven parcels designated for a waterfront conference hotel and marinas, retail and entertainment space, research and office facilities, parking and park support, residential units, a Coast Guard museum, and additional office and retail uses. The city council formally approved the plan in January 2000 and authorized the NLDC to acquire needed parcels by purchase or, if necessary, by eminent domain. Petitioners Susette Kelo, Wilhelmina Dery, and seven other owners held fifteen properties within parcels 3 and 4A; ten of those parcels were occupied by the owners or their family members and none was alleged to be blighted. After negotiations with the NLDC failed, the corporation initiated condemnation proceedings against the remaining properties in November 2000. In December 2000 the petitioners filed suit in New London Superior Court asserting that the proposed takings violated the public-use limitation of the Fifth Amendment. Following a seven-day bench trial the Superior Court entered a permanent restraining order barring condemnation of the parcel 4A properties but denied relief as to the parcel 3 properties. Both sides appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, which upheld the validity of all challenged takings. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the federal constitutional question.
View caseIris Energy operates vessels on navigable waters. It claims a right to cross private land to reach the waterway. The claim rests on the historic right of access tied to navigation.
In 1798 the New York Legislature granted Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton the exclusive right for twenty years to navigate the waters within the jurisdiction of the state with boats moved by fire or steam, a privilege later renewed and extended in 1803 and 1807. The right was assigned first to John R. Livingston and then to Aaron Ogden, who thereby claimed authority to operate steamboats between Elizabethtown, New Jersey, and New York City. Thomas Gibbons, meanwhile, took possession of two steamboats, the Stoudinger and the Bellona, which he employed in the same waters while holding a license issued under the federal Act of February 18, 1793, for enrolling and licensing vessels to be employed in the coasting trade and fisheries. Gibbons filed a bill in the Court of Chancery of New York against Ogden seeking an injunction to restrain Ogden from navigating those waters with steamboats. The bill recited the state grants and the assignment to Ogden, alleged that Ogden was violating the exclusive privilege, and prayed for injunctive relief. Gibbons answered that his vessels were duly enrolled and licensed under the 1793 federal statute and insisted on his right to navigate between Elizabethtown and New York notwithstanding the state legislation. The Chancellor awarded the injunction and, after hearing, perpetuated it on the ground that the New York acts were valid. The Court for the Trial of Impeachments and Correction of Errors, the highest court of the state to which the cause could be carried, affirmed the decree. Gibbons then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.
View caseIdeal Solutions challenges a zoning rule that blocks its planned driveway. The company must show that the rule directly impairs its own ingress and egress rights to establish standing.
In January 1972, Metro-Act of Rochester, Inc., and eight individual plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York against the Town of Penfield and members of its Zoning, Planning, and Town Boards. The individual plaintiffs included Rochester residents who owned property and paid taxes there, as well as low and moderate income persons, some of whom were members of racial or ethnic minority groups, who sought to live in Penfield. Organizational plaintiffs included Metro-Act of Rochester, Inc., a nonprofit corporation focused on housing issues for low and moderate income persons. Penfield's zoning ordinance, adopted in 1962, allocated 98 percent of the town's vacant land to single-family detached housing and imposed requirements relating to lot size, setback, floor area, and habitable space that increased the cost of such housing beyond the means of persons of low and moderate income. Only 0.3 percent of land available for residential construction was allocated to multifamily structures, and even on that limited space low density and other requirements made low and moderate income housing economically infeasible. No land was zoned for apartments or mobile homes. The plaintiffs alleged that the ordinance and its enforcement, including delays on proposals, denials of variances and permits, refusals to allow tax abatements, and failures to provide support services, had the purpose and effect of excluding low and moderate income persons and members of minority groups from residing in Penfield. Low and moderate income plaintiffs claimed they had attempted to locate suitable housing in Penfield but could not due to the restrictions, resulting in higher commuting costs, substandard living conditions, and fewer municipal services. Rochester taxpayer plaintiffs alleged that Penfield's practices forced Rochester to provide more low and moderate income housing than it otherwise would, requiring tax abatements that increased their own tax burdens. The record referenced two specific development efforts: Penfield Better Homes Corp. applied in late 1969 for rezoning to build subsidized cooperative townhouses for moderate income persons but was denied a variance, and O'Brien Homes, Inc. proposed a project in late 1971 that was also denied or remained under consideration. Affidavits from individual plaintiffs detailed their income levels, family sizes, maximum affordable housing payments, and unsuccessful searches for housing in Penfield through newspaper ads and other means. On May 2, 1972, Rochester Home Builders Association moved to intervene as a plaintiff, alleging that its member firms had been prevented from building low and moderate income housing in Penfield and had lost profits. On June 7, 1972, the original plaintiffs moved to add Housing Council in the Monroe County Area, Inc., as a plaintiff; an accompanying affidavit stated that one of its members, Penfield Better Homes Corp., had been actively attempting to develop moderate income housing in Penfield but had been unable to secure approvals. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, denied the motions to add parties, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseInnova Pharmaceuticals owns a shopping center. State law requires it to allow leafleting on its walkways. The requirement preserves public access without converting the property into a public forum.
PruneYard Shopping Center is a privately owned shopping center in Campbell, California. It covers approximately 21 acres with 5 acres devoted to parking and 16 acres occupied by walkways, plazas, sidewalks, and buildings. These buildings contain more than 65 specialty shops, 10 restaurants, and a movie theater. The center is open to the public for the purpose of encouraging the patronizing of its commercial establishments. The center maintains a policy of not permitting any visitor or tenant to engage in any publicly expressive activity. This includes the circulation of petitions that is not directly related to its commercial purposes. The policy has been strictly enforced in a nondiscriminatory fashion by a security force. The center is owned by appellant Fred Sahadi. In December 1975, appellees who are high school students sought to solicit support for their opposition to a United Nations resolution against Zionism. On a Saturday afternoon they set up a card table in a corner of PruneYard's central courtyard. They distributed pamphlets and asked passersby to sign petitions that were to be sent to the President and Members of Congress. Their activity was peaceful and orderly and so far as the record indicates it was not objected to by PruneYard's patrons. Soon after the students had begun soliciting signatures a security guard informed them that they would have to leave because their activity violated PruneYard regulations. The guard suggested that they move to the public sidewalk at the PruneYard's perimeter. The students immediately left the premises and later filed this lawsuit in the California Superior Court of Santa Clara County. They sought to enjoin the shopping center owners from denying them access to the PruneYard for the purpose of circulating their petitions. The Superior Court held that the students were not entitled under either the Federal or California Constitution to exercise their asserted rights on the shopping center property. It concluded that there were adequate effective channels of communication available to them other than soliciting on the private property. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court reversed. It held that the California Constitution protects speech and petitioning reasonably exercised in shopping centers even when the centers are privately owned. It concluded that the students were entitled to conduct their activity on PruneYard property. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseThe scope is fixed by the language of the grant or by the historic use that created the right. Later changes in intensity are permitted only if they remain reasonably necessary and do not unreasonably burden the servient estate.
Yes. Once consent is revoked and the entrant knows or has reason to know of the revocation, the privilege to remain ends. The entrant retains only a limited privilege of reasonable egress.
A court may adopt the code provision when it was designed to protect the class of persons injured, the interest invaded, and the precise hazard that occurred. Violation then constitutes negligence per se if causation and damages are shown.
…not force the newspaper to print a retraction, because a judicially compelled retraction, like a "remedy such as an enforceable right of access," entails "governmental coercion" as to content, which "at once brings about a confrontation with the express provisions of the First Amendment and the judicial gloss on that Amendment…