Also known as: deference · Chevron deference · Skidmore deference
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A principle under which courts give weight to the judgments of the political branches or administrative agencies when reviewing constitutional or regulatory challenges. The principle calls for rational-basis review or acceptance of agency credibility findings unless contradicted by uncontroverted evidence. It yields when core individual liberties or structural constitutional limits are directly implicated.
President issues an order barring entry of construction workers from several majority-Muslim nations after intelligence reports flag sabotage risks at ports in State A. Alpha Framing, a firm relying on those workers, sues claiming religious animus. The district court sustains the order because its stated national-security purpose is rationally related to the restriction, even though earlier presidential remarks suggested bias.
Assistant district attorney James Johnson circulates a petition protesting internal transfer policies within his office. The district attorney fires him, citing disruption to workplace efficiency. Johnson sues under the First Amendment. The court upholds the discharge because the speech addressed only personnel matters and receives minimal protection.
City of East Cleveland enforces an ordinance that prevents grandmother Jacqueline Juarez from living with her grandson because he is the child of a deceased daughter rather than a son. Juarez is convicted and appeals. The Supreme Court invalidates the ordinance, refusing usual deference because the measure intrudes on family living arrangements rooted in national tradition.
In early 1973, Mrs. Inez Moore received a notice of violation from the city of East Cleveland. The notice stated that her grandson John Moore, Jr., was an illegal occupant of her home. It directed her to comply with the housing ordinance. Mrs. Moore lived in her East Cleveland home together with her son Dale Moore, Sr., and her two grandsons Dale Moore, Jr., and John Moore, Jr. John came to live with her after his mother's death when he was less than one year old. When she failed to remove John from the home, the city filed a criminal charge against her. Mrs. Moore moved to dismiss the charge. She claimed that the ordinance was constitutionally invalid on its face. Her motion was overruled. Upon conviction she was sentenced to five days in jail and a $25 fine. The East Cleveland ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. The ordinance defined family to include only a husband or wife of the nominal head of the household, unmarried children of the head or spouse provided they have no children residing with them, a parent of the head or spouse, or not more than one dependent child of the head or spouse along with that child's spouse and dependent children. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction after giving full consideration to her constitutional claims. The Ohio Supreme Court denied review of the case. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of her appeal.
View caseConnecticut prosecutes a married couple and their physician for using contraceptives in violation of a state statute. The defendants challenge the law as invading marital privacy. The Court declines to defer to legislative judgment and holds the statute unconstitutional because it burdens a fundamental liberty interest.
Estelle Griswold served as Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Dr. C. Lee Buxton served as the League's Medical Director and was a professor at Yale Medical School. Together they opened and operated a center in New Haven that was open from November 1 to November 10, 1961. At the center they gave information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the means of preventing conception. They examined the wife and prescribed the best contraceptive device or material for her use. Fees were usually charged, although some couples were serviced free. The statutes involved were sections 53-32 and 54-196 of the General Statutes of Connecticut (1958 rev.). Section 53-32 made it a crime to use any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception. Section 54-196 punished accessories as principals. The appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each. The Appellate Division of the Circuit Court affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut affirmed that judgment in State v. Griswold, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A. 2d 479. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The appellants asserted standing to raise the constitutional rights of the married persons with whom they had a professional relationship. A criminal conviction for serving married couples removes doubts about case or controversy. The rights of husband and wife would be diluted unless considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them.
View caseNew York Public Service Commission bans promotional advertising by electric utilities to conserve energy. Central Hudson Gas challenges the ban as violating commercial-speech protections. The Court applies intermediate scrutiny rather than deferring outright, striking the ban because it is more extensive than necessary to serve the conservation interest.
In December 1973, the Public Service Commission ordered electric utilities in New York State to cease all advertising that promoted the use of electricity because the interconnected utility system lacked sufficient fuel stocks for the 1973-1974 winter. The order rested on the Commission's finding that the system did not have sufficient fuel stocks or sources of supply to meet customer demands. Three years later, when the fuel shortage had eased, the Commission requested comments from the public on its proposal to continue the ban on promotional advertising. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. opposed the ban on First Amendment grounds. After reviewing the public comments, the Commission extended the prohibition in a Policy Statement issued on February 25, 1977. The Policy Statement divided advertising expenses into promotional and institutional categories. It permitted informational advertising designed to encourage shifts of consumption from peak demand times to periods of low electricity demand. The Commission banned promotional advertising because additional electricity would be more expensive to produce and promotional advertising would give misleading signals to the public. Central Hudson challenged the order in state court. The order was upheld through the New York Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and reversed.
View caseCalifornia Coastal Commission grants Nollans a permit to rebuild their beachfront home only if they dedicate a public easement across their property. The Nollans sue, arguing the condition lacks a sufficient nexus to the impact of their project. The Court refuses deference and invalidates the condition because it does not substantially advance the legitimate state interest in beach access.
The Nollans own a beachfront lot in Ventura County, California. A concrete seawall approximately eight feet high separates the beach portion of their property from the rest of the lot. The historic mean high tide line determines the lot's oceanside boundary. The Nollans originally leased their property with an option to buy, and the building on the lot was a small bungalow totaling 504 square feet. The Nollans' option to purchase was conditioned on their promise to demolish the bungalow and replace it. On February 25, 1982, they submitted a permit application to the California Coastal Commission proposing to demolish the existing structure and replace it with a three-bedroom house. The Commission informed them that the permit would be granted subject to the condition that they allow the public an easement to pass across a portion of their property bounded by the mean high tide line and their seawall. On June 3, 1982, the Nollans filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in the Ventura County Superior Court to invalidate the access condition. The court remanded the case to the Commission for a full evidentiary hearing. After the hearing, the Commission reaffirmed the condition. The Superior Court ruled in favor of the Nollans on statutory grounds and directed that the permit condition be struck. While the Commission's appeal to the California Court of Appeal was pending, the Nollans tore down the bungalow, built the new house, and bought the property. The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court. The Nollans appealed to this Court, raising only the constitutional question.
View caseDeference is inappropriate when a law intrudes on family living arrangements deeply rooted in national tradition or burdens fundamental liberties such as marital privacy. Courts also withhold deference when reviewing conditions on land-use permits that lack an essential nexus to the development's impact.
Courts apply at most rational-basis review to such orders and uphold them when they recite a legitimate national-security purpose rationally related to the restriction, even if extrinsic statements suggest improper motive.
Substantial deference is given to the employer's judgment that internal personnel speech will cause disruption, resulting in minimal First Amendment protection for the employee.
No. Deference is strongest in foreign affairs and employment contexts but weakens when core due-process or equal-protection interests in family structure or privacy are at stake.
…must be changed from time to time and that this Court is charged with a duty to make those changes. For myself, I must with all deference reject that philosophy. The Constitution makers knew the need for change and provided for it. Amendments suggested by the people's elected representatives can be submitted to the people or…