Also known as: just compensation clauses · just compensation
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional command requiring the government to pay fair value when it appropriates private property for public use. The command applies to both physical appropriations and regulations that eliminate all economically beneficial use of land. Compensation is measured by the owner's loss rather than the government's gain.
The City of Knoxville rezoned Pine Assurance's vacant lot from commercial office use to public open space only. Pine Assurance could no longer develop or sell the parcel for any productive purpose. The city provided no payment. Pine Assurance sued, asserting that the total deprivation of economic value required just compensation.
Imperial Buildings operated a mobile home park for forty years under prior zoning. The City of Norfolk enacted an ordinance requiring all such parks to cease within ten years. Imperial Buildings had recently spent over $800,000 on upgrades in reliance on the existing permit. The city offered no compensation for the forced termination of the use.
Luis Grape Growers received an order from the Federal Food Program Office to divert thirty percent of each harvest into a government pipeline for school lunches. Luis retained only warehouse receipts that might yield later surplus proceeds. The government took physical possession of the grapes without any payment.
Aurora Energy owned a riverside power plant that the State Heritage Council designated a protected industrial site. The designation barred demolition and major exterior changes, leaving Aurora with only smaller-scale generation and limited solar leasing. Aurora could no longer pursue its planned larger facility and received no compensation.
The City of New London condemned Joanna Jung's waterfront home as part of an economic revitalization plan. The city planned to transfer the parcel to a private developer for a research facility expected to increase tax revenue. Jung received an offer below market value and challenged the taking.
In the late 1990s the city of New London, Connecticut, confronted severe economic decline after the 1996 closure of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, which had employed more than 1,500 people. The city's unemployment rate stood nearly double the state average and its population had dropped below 24,000 residents from a 1970 high of 30,000. State and local officials therefore designated the Fort Trumbull peninsula for targeted economic revitalization. In 1998 the New London Development Corporation, a private nonprofit entity, was reactivated to prepare a redevelopment plan covering roughly 90 acres. The plan divided the area into seven parcels designated for a waterfront conference hotel and marinas, retail and entertainment space, research and office facilities, parking and park support, residential units, a Coast Guard museum, and additional office and retail uses. The city council formally approved the plan in January 2000 and authorized the NLDC to acquire needed parcels by purchase or, if necessary, by eminent domain. Petitioners Susette Kelo, Wilhelmina Dery, and seven other owners held fifteen properties within parcels 3 and 4A; ten of those parcels were occupied by the owners or their family members and none was alleged to be blighted. After negotiations with the NLDC failed, the corporation initiated condemnation proceedings against the remaining properties in November 2000. In December 2000 the petitioners filed suit in New London Superior Court asserting that the proposed takings violated the public-use limitation of the Fifth Amendment. Following a seven-day bench trial the Superior Court entered a permanent restraining order barring condemnation of the parcel 4A properties but denied relief as to the parcel 3 properties. Both sides appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, which upheld the validity of all challenged takings. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the federal constitutional question.
View caseThe City of Chicago widened a street by taking a strip of land owned by Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. The city paid nothing for the strip. The railroad sued the city in state court seeking compensation for the appropriation.
The City of Chicago, acting under an 1872 Illinois statute that became part of its charter in 1875, passed an ordinance on October 9, 1880, to open and widen Rockwell Street from West 18th Street to West 19th Street by condemning parcels of land owned by individuals and parts of the right of way of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company within the city limits. On November 12, 1890, the city filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking condemnation of the property and asking that just compensation be ascertained by a jury, with the railroad company admitted as a defendant along with other interested parties. The jury awarded one dollar as just compensation to the railroad company for the parts of its right of way to be used for the street, while awarding compensation to individual owners for their parcels. The railroad moved for a new trial, which was overruled, and final judgment was entered in execution of the award. The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Illinois in 149 Illinois 457. After affirmance the railroad company sued out a writ of error to the United States Supreme Court. The railroad had raised claims under the Fourteenth Amendment in its motion for new trial and in its assignment of errors filed in the state supreme court. The Illinois statute provided no provision for an answer by defendants in condemnation proceedings, but the railroad asserted its federal claims in the written motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial.
View caseYes. The requirement of just compensation for takings applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. State and local governments must therefore pay just compensation when they take private property for public use.
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Yes. A regulation that deprives a landowner of all economically beneficial or productive use of land is a per se taking requiring just compensation unless the proscribed use was already prohibited under background principles of nuisance or property law.
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Yes. The Takings Clause protects personal property and mandates compensation when the government appropriates it, even if the owner retains a contingent interest in the reserved portion.
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Amortization is a limit on protection of pre-existing property rights and must not amount to a taking without just compensation. Reasonableness depends on the nature of the use, the owner's investment, and the period allowed.
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