Also known as: knock and announce rule · knock-and-announce · knock and announce · knock-and-announce requirement
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A Fourth Amendment rule requiring officers executing a search warrant at a dwelling to knock, announce their presence and purpose, and wait a reasonable time before forcing entry. The rule protects occupants' privacy, dignity, property, and safety from sudden intrusions. Officers may dispense with compliance upon reasonable suspicion that announcement would be dangerous, futile, or lead to evidence destruction.
Detectives approached Kendra Kowalski's apartment with probable cause to believe she was destroying digital files tied to an extortion scheme. They knocked and announced their presence. Moments later they heard typing and a shredder activate. Officers forced entry without a warrant and seized the computers. The court upheld the entry because the sounds supplied an objectively reasonable belief of imminent destruction that arose after a lawful announcement.
Officers with a valid warrant for Kinetic Solutions' office used a battering ram to enter without knocking or announcing. They seized servers containing evidence of data theft. The company moved to suppress the evidence solely on the knock-and-announce violation. The court denied the motion because exclusion is unavailable as a remedy for that type of violation even when the entry was forceful.
Officers responded to a loud fight inside Kai Kwon's home. One officer opened the screen door, yelled 'police,' and stepped inside after no one responded. The disturbance ended once the announcement was heard. The court found no knock-and-announce violation because the verbal identification served the same protective function as a knock under the chaotic circumstances.
In the early morning hours of July 23, 2000, four police officers in Brigham City, Utah responded to a call regarding a loud party at a residence. Upon arriving at the house around 3 a.m., the officers heard shouting from inside and proceeded down the driveway to investigate. They observed two juveniles drinking beer in the backyard and then saw through a screen door and windows an altercation taking place in the kitchen. Four adults were attempting to restrain a juvenile who eventually broke free, swung a fist, and struck one of the adults in the face. The officer testified that he observed the victim of the blow spitting blood into a nearby sink. The other adults continued to try to restrain the juvenile, pressing him up against a refrigerator with such force that the refrigerator began moving across the floor. One officer opened the screen door and announced the officers' presence, but amid the tumult nobody noticed, so the officer entered the kitchen and announced again until the occupants became aware of the police and the altercation ceased. The officers arrested respondents and charged them with contributing to the delinquency of a minor, disorderly conduct, and intoxication. In the trial court respondents filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained after the officers entered the home, arguing that the warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment. The court granted the motion. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression ruling. Before the Supreme Court of Utah, Brigham City argued that the entry was reasonable under the emergency aid doctrine or the exigent circumstances exception, but the court rejected both contentions and affirmed over two dissenters. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in light of differences among state courts and the Courts of Appeals concerning the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard governing warrantless entry by law enforcement in an emergency situation.
View caseDetectives lacked an arrest warrant when they entered Kelvin Kimura's apartment to arrest him for check fraud. They walked through an unlocked side door without knocking or announcing and found Kimura on the phone. The court suppressed statements made after the entry because, absent exigent circumstances, officers must obtain a warrant before entering a suspect's home to effect an arrest.
In January 1970, New York detectives conducted a two-day investigation into the murder of a gas station manager. On January 14 they assembled evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that Theodore Payton had committed the crime. On the morning of January 15 at about 7:30 a.m., six officers went to Payton’s apartment in the Bronx without having obtained a warrant. Although light and music emanated from inside, there was no response to their knock on the metal door. They summoned emergency assistance and approximately thirty minutes later used crowbars to break open the door and enter. No one was present, but the officers seized a .30-caliber shell casing that lay in plain view and that was later admitted into evidence at Payton’s murder trial. In a companion case, on March 14, 1974, police officers acting with probable cause went to the Queens house where Obie Riddick was living to arrest him for two armed robberies that had occurred in 1971. When Riddick’s young son opened the door the officers saw Riddick sitting in bed. They entered the house, placed him under arrest, and before permitting him to dress opened a chest of drawers two feet from the bed. They discovered narcotics and related paraphernalia that were later admitted at his trial on narcotics charges. In both cases the New York trial courts upheld the warrantless entries and plain-view seizures under provisions of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure that authorized such actions, and the Appellate Divisions affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals, in a single 4-3 opinion, affirmed the convictions of both Payton and Riddick. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases, which were argued together.
View caseOfficers had probable cause that Kelsey Kirk was selling narcotics from her apartment. They knocked, announced, and then secured the premises from the outside while obtaining a warrant. They prevented Kirk from re-entering until the warrant arrived. The court upheld the temporary seizure because it was a reasonable means to preserve evidence while complying with the warrant requirement.
On April 2, 1997, Tera McArthur asked two police officers, Assistant Chief John Love and Officer Richard Skidis, to accompany her to the trailer where she lived with her husband Charles McArthur so that they could keep the peace while she removed her belongings. The officers arrived with Tera at the trailer at about 3:15 p.m. Tera went inside while the officers remained outside. After collecting her possessions, Tera emerged and told Chief Love that Charles had marijuana in the trailer and that she had seen him slide some dope underneath the couch. Love knocked on the door, informed Charles of Tera's statements, and requested permission to search the trailer, which Charles denied. Love then sent Officer Skidis with Tera to obtain a search warrant. Love informed Charles, who was on the porch, that he could not reenter the trailer unless accompanied by a police officer. Charles reentered the trailer two or three times to get cigarettes and make phone calls, and each time Love stood just inside the door to observe him. Officer Skidis obtained the warrant by about 5 p.m. and returned with other officers to search the trailer. The officers found a marijuana pipe, a one-hitter box, and a small amount of marijuana under the sofa, leading to Charles McArthur's arrest. Illinois charged McArthur with unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia and marijuana, both misdemeanors under Illinois law. McArthur moved to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an unlawful seizure. The trial court granted the suppression motion. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the decision. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the State's petition for leave to appeal.
View caseAfter arresting Kamala Krishnan for drunk driving, officers sought a warrant before drawing her blood. They did not rely on a categorical claim that alcohol dissipation always creates an exigency. The court held that the natural dissipation of alcohol does not automatically excuse the warrant requirement in every case.
In the early morning hours, a Missouri police officer on highway patrol stopped Tyler McNeely’s truck at approximately 2:08 a.m. after observing it exceed the posted speed limit and repeatedly cross the centerline. The officer noticed several signs that McNeely was intoxicated, including bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and the smell of alcohol on his breath. McNeely acknowledged that he had consumed a couple of beers at a bar, appeared unsteady on his feet when he exited the truck, and performed poorly on a battery of field-sobriety tests before declining to use a portable breath-test device. The officer placed McNeely under arrest and began transporting him to the station house. When McNeely indicated that he would again refuse to provide a breath sample, the officer changed course and took him to a nearby hospital for blood testing without attempting to secure a warrant. Upon arrival at the hospital, the officer read McNeely a standard implied consent form explaining that refusal to submit voluntarily to the test would lead to immediate revocation of his driver’s license for one year and could be used against him in a future prosecution under Missouri law. McNeely nonetheless refused consent. The officer then directed a hospital lab technician to take a blood sample, which was secured at approximately 2:35 a.m. Subsequent laboratory testing measured McNeely’s blood alcohol concentration at 0.154 percent. McNeely was charged with driving while intoxicated. He moved to suppress the blood test result, arguing that taking his blood without a warrant violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that the exigency exception did not apply because, apart from the natural dissipation of blood alcohol, no circumstances suggested that the officer faced an emergency in which he could not practicably obtain a warrant. The Missouri Court of Appeals stated an intention to reverse but transferred the case directly to the Missouri Supreme Court, which affirmed the suppression order. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.
View caseNo. The exclusionary rule does not apply to violations of the knock-and-announce requirement during execution of a valid warrant. The interests protected by the rule, such as safety, property, privacy, and dignity, are too attenuated from the later evidentiary use of seized items. Alternative remedies such as civil suits and internal discipline remain available.
Supporting sources
Officers may make a no-knock entry when they have reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing would be dangerous, futile, or would lead to destruction of evidence. The determination must be made case by case rather than by a blanket exception for an entire category of cases such as drug warrants.
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Yes. When officers lawfully knock and announce and then hear sounds indicating imminent destruction of evidence, they may enter without a warrant. The exigency must not have been created by an actual or threatened Fourth Amendment violation by the officers themselves.
Supporting sources
…rule. The Michigan Supreme Court also affirmed. Held: The exclusionary rule does not apply to violations of the knock-and-announce requirement. Majority opinion Opinion of Justice Scalia The common-law principle that law enforcement officers must announce their presence before entering a dwelling has long been part of…