Also known as: knock and announce doctrine · knock-and-announce doctrine · knock and announce rule · knock-and-announce rule · knock-and-announce · Wilson v. Arkansas
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A Fourth Amendment principle requiring law enforcement officers to knock and announce their presence and purpose before forcing entry to execute a search warrant unless exigent circumstances justify immediate entry. Violation of the requirement does not trigger the exclusionary rule because the interests protected remain too attenuated from the later evidentiary use of items seized under a valid warrant.
Narcotics officers obtained a warrant for Dana's apartment. They forced the door without knocking or announcing and seized pill bottles inside. Dana moved to suppress the evidence solely on the manner of entry. The court denied the motion because the violation supplied no basis for exclusion of items seized under the valid warrant.
Detectives followed Paul to his residence and observed him inside on the phone. They entered through an unlocked side door without knocking or announcing and arrested him. Paul moved to suppress statements made after the entry. The court evaluated whether the absence of an arrest warrant rendered the entry unconstitutional under the circumstances shown.
In January 1970, New York detectives conducted a two-day investigation into the murder of a gas station manager. On January 14 they assembled evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that Theodore Payton had committed the crime. On the morning of January 15 at about 7:30 a.m., six officers went to Payton’s apartment in the Bronx without having obtained a warrant. Although light and music emanated from inside, there was no response to their knock on the metal door. They summoned emergency assistance and approximately thirty minutes later used crowbars to break open the door and enter. No one was present, but the officers seized a .30-caliber shell casing that lay in plain view and that was later admitted into evidence at Payton’s murder trial. In a companion case, on March 14, 1974, police officers acting with probable cause went to the Queens house where Obie Riddick was living to arrest him for two armed robberies that had occurred in 1971. When Riddick’s young son opened the door the officers saw Riddick sitting in bed. They entered the house, placed him under arrest, and before permitting him to dress opened a chest of drawers two feet from the bed. They discovered narcotics and related paraphernalia that were later admitted at his trial on narcotics charges. In both cases the New York trial courts upheld the warrantless entries and plain-view seizures under provisions of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure that authorized such actions, and the Appellate Divisions affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals, in a single 4-3 opinion, affirmed the convictions of both Payton and Riddick. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases, which were argued together.
View caseOfficers saw a juvenile strike an adult inside a kitchen. They entered the home without knocking or announcing to stop the assault. The adult moved to suppress evidence discovered after entry. The court assessed whether the visible violence supplied an objectively reasonable basis for immediate entry.
In the early morning hours of July 23, 2000, four police officers in Brigham City, Utah responded to a call regarding a loud party at a residence. Upon arriving at the house around 3 a.m., the officers heard shouting from inside and proceeded down the driveway to investigate. They observed two juveniles drinking beer in the backyard and then saw through a screen door and windows an altercation taking place in the kitchen. Four adults were attempting to restrain a juvenile who eventually broke free, swung a fist, and struck one of the adults in the face. The officer testified that he observed the victim of the blow spitting blood into a nearby sink. The other adults continued to try to restrain the juvenile, pressing him up against a refrigerator with such force that the refrigerator began moving across the floor. One officer opened the screen door and announced the officers' presence, but amid the tumult nobody noticed, so the officer entered the kitchen and announced again until the occupants became aware of the police and the altercation ceased. The officers arrested respondents and charged them with contributing to the delinquency of a minor, disorderly conduct, and intoxication. In the trial court respondents filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained after the officers entered the home, arguing that the warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment. The court granted the motion. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression ruling. Before the Supreme Court of Utah, Brigham City argued that the entry was reasonable under the emergency aid doctrine or the exigent circumstances exception, but the court rejected both contentions and affirmed over two dissenters. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in light of differences among state courts and the Courts of Appeals concerning the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard governing warrantless entry by law enforcement in an emergency situation.
View caseAn officer stopped Strieff without reasonable suspicion and learned of an outstanding warrant. The officer then arrested Strieff and discovered drugs during a search incident to arrest. Strieff moved to suppress the drugs. The court examined whether the discovery of the warrant sufficiently attenuated the connection between the initial stop and the evidence.
In December 2006, an anonymous tipster contacted the South Salt Lake City police department's drug-tip line to report narcotics activity at a particular residence, specifying that the activity involved a white male and providing a physical description of the man and his car. Detective Douglas Fackrell was assigned to investigate the tip and conducted intermittent surveillance of the home over the course of about a week. During this period, Fackrell observed visitors who would frequently enter the residence and leave after short periods of time, a pattern consistent with drug dealing in his experience. One of the visitors was Edward Strieff. Officer Fackrell observed Strieff exit the house and walk toward a nearby convenience store. In the store's parking lot, Fackrell detained Strieff without reasonable suspicion, identified himself as a police officer, and asked what Strieff was doing at the residence. As part of the stop, Fackrell requested Strieff's identification, and Strieff produced his Utah identification card. Fackrell relayed the information to a police dispatcher, who reported that Strieff had an outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic violation. Fackrell arrested Strieff pursuant to the warrant. When Fackrell searched Strieff incident to the arrest, he discovered a baggie of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. The State of Utah charged Strieff with unlawful possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Strieff moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that it was obtained by exploitation of an unlawful investigatory stop. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the suppression motion. The Utah Supreme Court reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseOfficers stopped a vehicle for a minor traffic violation they suspected was a pretext for a drug investigation. They observed drugs in plain view during the stop. The driver moved to suppress the drugs. The court considered whether the officers' subjective motive affected the constitutionality of the stop supported by probable cause.
On the evening of June 10, 1993, plainclothes vice-squad officers of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department were patrolling a high drug area of the city in an unmarked car. Their suspicions were aroused when they passed a dark Pathfinder truck with temporary license plates and youthful occupants waiting at a stop sign. The driver was looking down into the lap of the passenger at his right. The truck remained stopped at the intersection for more than 20 seconds. When the police car executed a U-turn to head back toward the truck, the Pathfinder turned suddenly to its right without signaling and sped off at an unreasonable speed. The policemen followed and overtook the Pathfinder when it stopped behind other traffic at a red light. Officer Ephraim Soto stepped out and approached the driver’s door, identifying himself as a police officer and directing the driver, petitioner Brown, to put the vehicle in park. When Soto drew up to the driver’s window, he immediately observed two large plastic bags of what appeared to be crack cocaine in petitioner Whren’s hands. Petitioners were arrested, and quantities of several types of illegal drugs were retrieved from the vehicle. Petitioners were charged in a four-count indictment with violating federal drug laws, including 21 U.S.C. §§ 844(a) and 860(a). At a pretrial suppression hearing, they challenged the legality of the stop and the resulting seizure of the drugs. They argued that the stop had not been justified by probable cause or reasonable suspicion of illegal drug-dealing activity and that Officer Soto’s asserted ground for approaching the vehicle was pretextual. The District Court denied the suppression motion. Petitioners were convicted of the counts at issue. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseOfficers arrested McNeely for drunk driving and directed a warrantless blood draw at the hospital. McNeely moved to suppress the blood test results. The court evaluated whether the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream created a per se exigency justifying the warrantless procedure.
In the early morning hours, a Missouri police officer on highway patrol stopped Tyler McNeely’s truck at approximately 2:08 a.m. after observing it exceed the posted speed limit and repeatedly cross the centerline. The officer noticed several signs that McNeely was intoxicated, including bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and the smell of alcohol on his breath. McNeely acknowledged that he had consumed a couple of beers at a bar, appeared unsteady on his feet when he exited the truck, and performed poorly on a battery of field-sobriety tests before declining to use a portable breath-test device. The officer placed McNeely under arrest and began transporting him to the station house. When McNeely indicated that he would again refuse to provide a breath sample, the officer changed course and took him to a nearby hospital for blood testing without attempting to secure a warrant. Upon arrival at the hospital, the officer read McNeely a standard implied consent form explaining that refusal to submit voluntarily to the test would lead to immediate revocation of his driver’s license for one year and could be used against him in a future prosecution under Missouri law. McNeely nonetheless refused consent. The officer then directed a hospital lab technician to take a blood sample, which was secured at approximately 2:35 a.m. Subsequent laboratory testing measured McNeely’s blood alcohol concentration at 0.154 percent. McNeely was charged with driving while intoxicated. He moved to suppress the blood test result, arguing that taking his blood without a warrant violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that the exigency exception did not apply because, apart from the natural dissipation of blood alcohol, no circumstances suggested that the officer faced an emergency in which he could not practicably obtain a warrant. The Missouri Court of Appeals stated an intention to reverse but transferred the case directly to the Missouri Supreme Court, which affirmed the suppression order. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.
View caseNo. The exclusionary rule does not apply because the interests protected by the knock-and-announce requirement remain too attenuated from the later evidentiary use of the items seized. Alternative remedies such as civil suits and internal discipline supply adequate deterrence.
The requirement protects life, property, privacy, and dignity by giving occupants notice and an opportunity to answer the door peacefully before officers force entry.
Officers may enter without knocking or announcing when exigent circumstances, such as imminent destruction of evidence or danger to officers, make immediate entry reasonable.
The rule applies to dwellings and also extends to commercial premises where occupants hold a reasonable expectation of privacy, though the expectation may be diminished in heavily regulated businesses.
…requisite constitutional (say, warrant or knock-andannounce) compliance. Cf. Mericli, The Apprehension of Peril Exception to the Knock and Announce Rule—Part I, 16 Search and Seizure L. Rep. 129, 130 (1989) (hereinafter Mericli) (noting that some "[d]rug enforcement authorities believe that safety for the police lies in a swift, surprising…