Also known as: lacks subject matter jurisdiction · lacking subject matter jurisdiction · lack of SMJ · no subject matter jurisdiction · subject-matter jurisdiction absent · SMJ defect
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A fundamental defect preventing a federal court from exercising authority over a case because the dispute falls outside the constitutional and statutory grants of federal judicial power. The defect may be raised at any time before final judgment and requires remand when discovered after removal.
Lucia Lopez sued a state-court defendant in State A court. The defendant removed to federal court on diversity grounds. After removal, the court discovered that one party destroyed complete diversity. The federal court remanded the action and ordered the removing party to pay the plaintiff's costs and attorney fees incurred because of the removal.
Levi Lowe, an Australian investor, sued National Australian Bank in federal court alleging securities fraud based entirely on conduct in Australia. The defendants moved to dismiss. The court dismissed the action because the claims did not arise under domestic federal law and therefore fell outside federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
In February 1998 National Australia Bank Limited acquired HomeSide Lending, Inc., a mortgage-servicing company headquartered in Florida. HomeSide's business was to receive fees for servicing mortgages, essentially the administrative tasks associated with collecting mortgage payments. HomeSide calculated the present value of its mortgage-servicing rights by using valuation models designed to take the likelihood of early repayment into account. From 1998 until 2001 National's annual reports and other public documents touted the success of HomeSide's business, and respondents Frank Cicutto, Kevin Race, and Hugh Harris did the same in public statements. HomeSide, Race, Harris, and another HomeSide senior executive manipulated HomeSide's financial models, thereby making the rates of early repayment unrealistically low and causing the mortgage-servicing rights to appear more valuable than they really were. On July 5, 2001 National announced that it was writing down the value of HomeSide's assets by $450 million, and then again on September 3 by another $1.75 billion. The prices of both Ordinary Shares and ADRs slumped. As relevant here, petitioners Russell Leslie Owen and Brian and Geraldine Silverlock, all Australians, purchased National's Ordinary Shares in 2000 and 2001 before the write-downs. Robert Morrison, an American investor in National's ADRs, also brought suit, but his claims were dismissed by the District Court because he failed to allege damages. Petitioners did not appeal that decision. They sued National, HomeSide, Cicutto, and the three HomeSide executives in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for alleged violations of sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5. Respondents moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The District Court granted the former motion. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed on similar grounds. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseLogan Lane sued the Secretary of State seeking a passport notation listing Israel as his birthplace. The district court dismissed the suit. The court held that resolving the claim would require deciding the political status of Jerusalem, a matter outside judicial competence and therefore beyond subject-matter jurisdiction.
In 2002, Congress enacted the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, including section 214(d), which provides that for purposes of the registration of birth, certification of nationality, or issuance of a passport of a United States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary shall, upon the request of the citizen or the citizen’s legal guardian, record the place of birth as Israel. The State Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual directs that passport officials enter JERUSALEM and should not write Israel or Jordan when recording the birthplace of a person born in Jerusalem on a passport. Petitioner Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky was born in Jerusalem on October 17, 2002. His mother filed an application for a consular report of birth abroad and a United States passport, requesting that his place of birth be listed as Jerusalem, Israel on both documents. U.S. officials issued the documents listing only Jerusalem, consistent with State Department policy. Zivotofsky’s parents filed a complaint on his behalf against the Secretary of State in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction ordering the Secretary to identify his place of birth as Jerusalem, Israel in the official documents. The District Court granted the Secretary’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that Zivotofsky lacked standing and that the complaint presented a nonjusticiable political question. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the standing determination and remanded the case. On remand, the District Court again dismissed the case, concluding that resolving the claim would require deciding the political status of Jerusalem. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Constitution gives the Executive the exclusive power to recognize foreign sovereigns and that the exercise of that power cannot be reviewed by the courts. Zivotofsky petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.
View caseLucy Liu, a state university employee, sued the Florida Board of Regents in federal court under the ADEA. The Board moved to dismiss. The court granted the motion because the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal claim and therefore the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action.
In 1967 Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which initially applied only to private employers. In 1974 Congress amended the Act through the Fair Labor Standards Amendments to extend its substantive requirements to the States. Congress redefined the term employer to include a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State. The same legislation also amended the incorporated Fair Labor Standards Act enforcement provision to authorize suits against any employer including a public agency in federal or state court. In December 1994 Roderick MacPherson and Marvin Narz, associate professors ages 57 and 58 at the University of Montevallo in Alabama, filed suit alleging age discrimination, retaliation for filing charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and disparate impact from an evaluation system. In April 1995 J. Daniel Kimel, Jr., and other current and former faculty and librarians over age 40 at Florida State University and Florida International University filed suit against the Florida Board of Regents alleging that the failure to allocate previously agreed market-adjustment salary funds had a disparate impact on employees with longer service records. In May 1996 Wellington Dickson filed suit against the Florida Department of Corrections alleging failure to promote him because of his age and in retaliation for grievances concerning age discrimination. The District Court in the MacPherson case granted the university's motion to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds. The District Courts in the Kimel and Dickson cases denied the state defendants' motions to dismiss. The United States intervened in all three cases. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit consolidated the appeals and held that the ADEA does not abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals.
View caseLena Lawson sued a state agency seeking injunctive relief. After the agency voluntarily changed its policy, Lawson sought attorney fees as a prevailing party. The court denied fees because the voluntary change did not produce a judicially sanctioned alteration in the parties' legal relationship and therefore the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to award fees.
Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc., which operates care homes that provide assisted living to their residents, failed an inspection by the West Virginia Office of the State Fire Marshal because some of the residents were incapable of "self-preservation" as defined under state law. On October 28, 1997, after receiving cease-and-desist orders requiring the closure of its residential care facilities within 30 days, Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc., on behalf of itself and other similarly situated homes and residents, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia against the State of West Virginia, two of its agencies, and 18 individuals, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that the self-preservation requirement violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Respondents agreed to stay enforcement of the cease-and-desist orders pending resolution of the case and the parties began discovery. In 1998, the West Virginia Legislature enacted two bills eliminating the self-preservation requirement, and respondents moved to dismiss the case as moot. The District Court granted the motion, finding that the 1998 legislation had eliminated the allegedly offensive provisions and that there was no indication that the West Virginia Legislature would repeal the amendments. Petitioners requested attorney's fees as the prevailing party under the FHAA and ADA. They argued that they were entitled to attorney's fees under the catalyst theory. This theory posits that a plaintiff is a prevailing party if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct. The District Court accordingly denied the motion and, for the same reason, the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished, per curiam opinion. To resolve the disagreement amongst the Courts of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and now affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
View caseLance Lee challenged the House of Representatives' refusal to seat him. The House moved to dismiss. The court dismissed the action because the Constitution commits the issue of membership qualifications to Congress alone, placing the dispute outside the judicial power and depriving the court of subject-matter jurisdiction.
In November 1966 Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., was duly elected from New York's Eighteenth Congressional District to serve in the 90th Congress. During the preceding Congress a Special Subcommittee on Contracts of the Committee on House Administration investigated expenditures of the Committee on Education and Labor. The subcommittee issued a report concluding that Powell had deceived House authorities about travel expenses and that illegal salary payments had been made to his wife at his direction. The report also found that Powell met the standing qualifications of age, citizenship, and residence. When the 90th Congress organized in January 1967 the House adopted House Resolution No. 1 by a vote of 363 to 65. The resolution appointed a nine-member Select Committee to inquire into Powell's qualifications and alleged misconduct. Powell appeared before the committee but, on advice of counsel, limited his testimony to the three standing qualifications and refused to answer questions about other matters. The Select Committee issued a report finding that Powell met the standing qualifications yet recommending that he be seated, censured, fined $40,000, and deprived of seniority. On March 1, 1967, the House rejected a motion to vote on that recommendation. The House then adopted an amendment calling for exclusion by a vote of 248 to 176 and passed House Resolution No. 278 by a vote of 307 to 116, thereby excluding Powell and declaring the seat vacant. Powell and thirteen voters from his district filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against Speaker John W. McCormack, four other House members, and the Clerk, Sergeant at Arms, and Doorkeeper. The complaint alleged that House Resolution No. 278 violated the Constitution because Powell satisfied the standing qualifications and requested declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and mandamus to compel seating and payment of salary. The district court dismissed the complaint for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. While the case was pending the 90th Congress ended. Powell was reelected in November 1968 and seated in the 91st Congress under a resolution that imposed a $25,000 fine. Respondents filed a suggestion of mootness, but Powell's claim for back salary from the period of exclusion remained unresolved.
View caseA party may raise lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any time before final judgment. The defect is never waived and may be noticed by the court on its own motion.
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The court must remand the case to state court. The remand order is generally not reviewable on appeal.
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Yes. The permanent-resident exception treats the alien as a citizen of that state, eliminating complete diversity and depriving the federal court of subject-matter jurisdiction.
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No. Jurisdiction depends on the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint. A federal issue raised only as a defense does not confer subject-matter jurisdiction.
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Yes, when the state and federal claims form part of the same case or controversy. The court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim.
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