landed estate

In 1966 the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act to address land subsidence caused by underground coal mining. The Act authorizes the Department of Environmental Resources to implement and enforce a comprehensive program preventing or minimizing subsidence and consequent damage to surface structures. Section 4 prohibits mining that causes subsidence damage to public buildings, dwellings used for human habitation, and cemeteries, and generally requires that 50 percent of the coal beneath such structures remain in place to provide surface support. Petitioners are an association of coal producers and several of its member corporations engaged in underground bituminous coal mining in western Pennsylvania. They own, lease, or control substantial coal reserves and associated support estates beneath surface properties affected by the Subsidence Act. Many of these interests were severed from the surface estate between 1890 and 1920, and petitioners or their predecessors typically acquired waivers of liability for subsidence damage along with rights to deposit wastes, provide drainage and ventilation, and erect surface facilities. In 1982 petitioners filed a civil rights action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against the Secretary of the Department of Environmental Resources and other officials. They sought to enjoin enforcement of the Subsidence Act and its implementing regulations, alleging that Section 4 and Section 6 effected a taking of their property without compensation and that Section 6 impaired their contractual obligations. The parties entered a stipulation of facts concerning the facial challenge and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department officials. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutional challenges to the Subsidence Act. Petitioners have never claimed that the Subsidence Act makes it commercially impracticable for them to continue mining their bituminous coal interests in western Pennsylvania, nor have they identified any specific mine rendered unprofitable by the statute. The evidence in the record shows that enforcement of the 50 percent rule has required petitioners to leave less than 27 million tons of coal in place. This applies across 13 mines containing over 1.46 billion tons. It amounts to less than 2 percent of the total coal in those operations.

In 1878 the Pennsylvania Coal Company executed a deed that conveyed the surface of property but reserved in express terms the right to remove all the coal under the same. The grantee took the premises with the risk and waived all claim for damages that might arise from mining out the coal. The plaintiffs claim under this deed. On May 27, 1921, the Pennsylvania legislature approved the Kohler Act. The statute forbids the mining of anthracite coal in such way as to cause the subsidence of any structure used as a human habitation. The statute provides exceptions for land where the surface is owned by the owner of the underlying coal and is distant more than one hundred and fifty feet from any improved property belonging to any other person. The plaintiffs brought a bill in equity to prevent the Pennsylvania Coal Company from mining under their property in such way as to remove the supports and cause a subsidence of the surface and of their house. The Court of Common Pleas found that if not restrained the defendant would cause the damage to prevent which the bill was brought. It denied an injunction, holding that the statute if applied to this case would be unconstitutional. On appeal the Supreme Court of the State agreed that the defendant had contract and property rights protected by the Constitution of the United States. It held that the statute was a legitimate exercise of the police power and directed a decree for the plaintiffs. A writ of error was granted bringing the case to this Court. As applied to this case the statute is admitted to destroy previously existing rights of property and contract. The case involves a single private house. The statute ordinarily does not apply to land when the surface is owned by the owner of the coal. The Attorney General of the State, the City of Scranton, and the representatives of other extensive interests were allowed to take part in the argument below and have submitted their contentions here. The statute purports to abolish what is recognized in Pennsylvania as an estate in land. The question presented concerns mining of coal under streets or cities in places where the right to mine such coal has been reserved.

In Florida, the State owns in trust for the public the land permanently submerged beneath navigable waters and the foreshore, making the mean high-water line the ordinary boundary between private beachfront property and state-owned land. Littoral owners hold special rights with regard to the water and foreshore, including the right to receive accretions and relictions to their property. In 1961, Florida’s Legislature passed the Beach and Shore Preservation Act, which sets procedures for beach restoration and nourishment projects to deposit sand on eroded beaches. A local government may apply to the Department of Environmental Protection for funds and permits, and when placing fill on the State’s submerged lands, authorization from the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund is required. Once a beach restoration is determined to be undertaken, the Board sets an erosion control line that replaces the fluctuating mean high-water line as the boundary between privately owned littoral property and state property, after which the common law ceases to increase upland property by accretion. In 2003, the city of Destin and Walton County applied for permits to restore 6.9 miles of beach within their jurisdictions that had been eroded by several hurricanes. The project would add about 75 feet of dry sand seaward of the mean high-water line. The Department issued a notice of intent to award the permits, and the Board approved the erosion-control line. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., a nonprofit corporation formed by people who own beachfront property bordering the project area, brought an administrative challenge to the proposed project. After the challenge proved unsuccessful and the Department approved the permits, the corporation challenged the action in state court under the Florida Administrative Procedure Act. The District Court of Appeal for the First District set aside the Department’s final order and certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court. The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative and quashed the First District’s remand. Petitioner sought rehearing on the ground that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision itself effected a taking of the Members’ littoral rights contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, but the request for rehearing was denied. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.

In June 1918, James A. Halsey, an old man and a widower, was living without family or housekeeper in his house in Hornell, New York. He told the plaintiffs that if they gave up their home and business in Andover, New York, and boarded and cared for him during his life, the house and lot with its furniture and equipment would be theirs upon his death. The plaintiffs did as he asked, selling out an interest in a little draying business in Andover and boarding and tending him until he died about five months after their coming. Neither deed nor will nor memorandum subscribed by the promisor exists to authenticate the promise, and the plaintiffs ask specific performance. During Halsey's lifetime the plaintiffs had no possession of the property and did not occupy it as owners. Halsey retained possession, and the plaintiffs lived with him merely as his servants or guests who could be asked to leave at any time. The plaintiffs paid food bills and performed housekeeping work while Halsey paid the taxes and upkeep costs. There were ties of kinship between one of the plaintiffs and Halsey.