Also known as: legislative purposes · legislative intent
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An objective or intent of the legislature, appearing from the statute defining the offense, that excludes a claimed justification for otherwise criminal conduct.
Levi Lowe, facing a trespass charge after entering a neighbor's property to rescue a child from a fire, claims necessity. The court finds that the statute defining trespass contains no exception for emergencies and that a legislative purpose to exclude the justification plainly appears from the narrow wording of the offense. The defense is therefore unavailable.
Legacy Motors launches a tender offer for shares of a target incorporated in Illinois. The state act requires lengthy pre-offer disclosures and administrative review that apply only to out-of-state bidders. The court concludes that the statute's asserted purpose of protecting shareholders is undermined by its exemption for a local company's self-tender, revealing an improper purpose that burdens interstate commerce.
MITE Corp. and its wholly owned subsidiary MITE Holdings, Inc., both Delaware corporations with principal executive offices in Connecticut, initiated a cash tender offer for all outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet & Machine Co., a publicly held Illinois corporation, on January 19, 1979, by filing a Schedule 14D-1 with the Securities and Exchange Commission. MITE offered $28 per share, approximately $4 above the prevailing market price, but did not register the offer under the Illinois Business Take-Over Act. On the same day MITE filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against Illinois Secretary of State James Edgar, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Illinois Act was preempted by the Williams Act and violated the Commerce Clause, together with temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief. Chicago Rivet responded three days later by suing in Pennsylvania to enjoin the offer under that state's takeover disclosure law, but its efforts there proved unsuccessful. On February 1, 1979, the Illinois Secretary of State notified MITE of his intent to issue a cease-and-desist order. The following day Chicago Rivet informed MITE it would file suit in Illinois state court, and the district court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Secretary from enforcing the Illinois Act against MITE's tender offer. MITE published its nationwide tender offer in the February 5, 1979, edition of the Wall Street Journal. Chicago Rivet simultaneously offered to purchase approximately 40 percent of its own shares at $30 per share. On February 9 the district court entered final judgment declaring the Illinois Act preempted by the Williams Act and violative of the Commerce Clause, and permanently enjoined its enforcement. The parties then entered an agreement withdrawing both offers and granting MITE thirty days to examine Chicago Rivet's books and records. On March 2, 1979, MITE announced it would not proceed with any tender offer. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
Luna Lang lives with her grandson and two great-grandchildren in a single-family zone. The city ordinance defines family to exclude this arrangement. The court determines that the ordinance's stated purpose of preserving neighborhood character does not justify the burden on extended family living arrangements protected by due process.
In early 1973, Mrs. Inez Moore received a notice of violation from the city of East Cleveland. The notice stated that her grandson John Moore, Jr., was an illegal occupant of her home. It directed her to comply with the housing ordinance. Mrs. Moore lived in her East Cleveland home together with her son Dale Moore, Sr., and her two grandsons Dale Moore, Jr., and John Moore, Jr. John came to live with her after his mother's death when he was less than one year old. When she failed to remove John from the home, the city filed a criminal charge against her. Mrs. Moore moved to dismiss the charge. She claimed that the ordinance was constitutionally invalid on its face. Her motion was overruled. Upon conviction she was sentenced to five days in jail and a $25 fine. The East Cleveland ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. The ordinance defined family to include only a husband or wife of the nominal head of the household, unmarried children of the head or spouse provided they have no children residing with them, a parent of the head or spouse, or not more than one dependent child of the head or spouse along with that child's spouse and dependent children. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction after giving full consideration to her constitutional claims. The Ohio Supreme Court denied review of the case. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of her appeal.
Logan Lane, a journalist, refuses to reveal sources to a grand jury investigating a crime. The court finds that the state's interest in obtaining evidence for criminal prosecutions outweighs any asserted legislative purpose to protect newsgathering, so the First Amendment claim fails.
In November 1969, Paul Branzburg, a staff reporter for the Courier-Journal newspaper in Louisville, Kentucky, published an article describing his observations of two individuals synthesizing hashish from marijuana in Jefferson County. The article included a photograph and stated that Branzburg had promised not to reveal the identities of the two. He was subsequently subpoenaed by the Jefferson County grand jury and refused to identify the individuals he had observed. A state trial court ordered him to answer, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals denied his petition for relief. In January 1971, Branzburg published a second article detailing drug use in Frankfort, Kentucky, based on interviews with several dozen users over two weeks. He was subpoenaed by the Franklin County grand jury to testify about violations of drug statutes. The Court of Appeals denied the requested writs and rejected his First Amendment claim. This Court granted certiorari. In July 1970, Paul Pappas, a television newsman-photographer, was assigned to cover civil disorders in New Bedford, Massachusetts, involving the Black Panthers. He entered Panther headquarters under an agreement not to disclose what he saw or heard inside except for an anticipated police raid, which did not occur. Two months later, he was summoned before the Bristol County grand jury but refused to answer questions about his observations inside the headquarters. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that he must appear and testify. In February 1970, Earl Caldwell, a New York Times reporter covering the Black Panther Party in San Francisco, received a subpoena to appear before a federal grand jury investigating possible violations of federal law by the group, including threats against the President. The District Court denied the motion to quash but issued a protective order. Caldwell refused to appear and was held in contempt. The Court of Appeals reversed, recognizing a qualified privilege. This Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases.
Lumen Capital challenges a state commission order banning promotional advertising by electric utilities. The court examines whether the order advances the asserted legislative purpose of energy conservation and whether that purpose could be served by less restrictive means.
In December 1973, the Public Service Commission ordered electric utilities in New York State to cease all advertising that promoted the use of electricity because the interconnected utility system lacked sufficient fuel stocks for the 1973-1974 winter. The order rested on the Commission's finding that the system did not have sufficient fuel stocks or sources of supply to meet customer demands. Three years later, when the fuel shortage had eased, the Commission requested comments from the public on its proposal to continue the ban on promotional advertising. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. opposed the ban on First Amendment grounds. After reviewing the public comments, the Commission extended the prohibition in a Policy Statement issued on February 25, 1977. The Policy Statement divided advertising expenses into promotional and institutional categories. It permitted informational advertising designed to encourage shifts of consumption from peak demand times to periods of low electricity demand. The Commission banned promotional advertising because additional electricity would be more expensive to produce and promotional advertising would give misleading signals to the public. Central Hudson challenged the order in state court. The order was upheld through the New York Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and reversed.
Lorenzo Lugo, an alien facing deportation, challenges a one-house resolution that blocks suspension of his removal. The court concludes that the legislative veto mechanism serves no legitimate legislative purpose that justifies bypassing bicameralism and presentment requirements.
In 1966 Jagdish Rai Chadha, an East Indian born in Kenya who held a British passport, was lawfully admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa that expired on June 30, 1972. In October 1973, the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service informed Chadha that he had remained longer than permitted and was therefore deportable. Chadha conceded deportability but applied for suspension under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. On June 25, 1974, an Immigration Judge acting on behalf of the Attorney General suspended Chadha's deportation and adjusted his status to permanent resident after finding that he satisfied the statutory criteria of seven years' continuous presence, good moral character, and extreme hardship. A report of the suspension was transmitted to Congress as required by the Act. On December 16, 1975, the House of Representatives passed a resolution disapproving the suspension for Chadha and five other aliens on the ground that they did not meet the statutory requirements, particularly as to hardship. Pursuant to the House resolution, the Immigration Judge reopened the deportation proceedings. Chadha moved to terminate them on constitutional grounds, but the Immigration Judge ruled that he lacked authority to declare the resolution unconstitutional and ordered Chadha deported. Chadha appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which likewise held that it had no authority to pass on the constitutionality of the resolution and dismissed the appeal. Chadha then filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Immigration and Naturalization Service appeared and urged the court to hold the House resolution unconstitutional. After inviting briefs from the Senate and House as amici curiae, the Court of Appeals held the resolution unconstitutional because it was a legislative act that failed to satisfy the requirements of Article I, sections 1 and 7, and set aside the deportation order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the consolidated cases to address the constitutional question.
Under Model Penal Code section 3.02(1)(c), a justification is unavailable if a legislative purpose to exclude the claimed justification plainly appears from the statute defining the offense. The court looks to the text and structure of the offense to determine whether the legislature intended to foreclose the defense in that situation.
Supporting sources
…new Connecticut Statute, Pub. Act No. 1 (May 1972 special session), declaring it to be the public policy of the State and the legislative intent "to protect and preserve human life from the moment of conception." : Edelstein 16. : Lader 97-99; D. Feldman, Birth Control in Jewish Law 251-294 (1968). For a stricter…
…of longtime friends? The point is that any definition would produce hardships in some cases without materially advancing the legislative purpose. That this ordinance also does so is no reason to hold it unconstitutional, unless we are to use our power to interpret the United States Constitution as a sort of generalized authority to…
…is made to enact what confessedly the legislature never meant. It confers upon the statute a positive operation beyond the legislative intent
…Illinois views as inadequate to protect investors in other contexts. This distinction is at variance with Illinois' asserted legislative purpose, and tends to undermine appellant's justification for the burdens the statute imposes on interstate commerce. We are also unconvinced that the Illinois Act substantially enhances the…
…and intellectual relationships in the myriad of such societies and groups that exist in this country, regardless of the legislative purpose sought to be served. . . . If that is not true, I see no barrier to investigation of newspapers, churches, political parties, clubs, societies, unions, and any other association for their…
Model Penal Code section 2.05(1)(b) provides that culpability requirements do not apply to offenses defined by non-Code statutes when a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability plainly appears. When conviction rests on that absolute-liability element, the offense is reclassified as a violation rather than a higher-grade crime.
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Each inquiry must be tied to a valid legislative purpose such as oversight of existing laws, consideration of new legislation, or exposure of government waste. Investigations lacking any connection to a legitimate legislative function exceed Congress's authority.
No. A facially neutral statute is not treated as a suspect classification merely because it produces a disparate impact. The plaintiff must show that the legislature adopted the law at least in part because of its adverse effect on the protected class, not merely in spite of that effect.
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Retroactive application satisfies due process when it is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means. A short period of retroactivity used to close a loophole or correct a mistake in the tax code is ordinarily constitutional.
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