Also known as: less-restrictive alternative · less restrictive alternative · least restrictive means · LRA · least restrictive alternative
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A requirement that government action or regulation be the least burdensome means of achieving its objective. Under strict scrutiny the government must demonstrate that no alternative would serve the interest as effectively while imposing less restriction on protected rights or conduct.
Congress enacts a law requiring commercial websites to verify users are adults before displaying material that is harmful to minors and imposes criminal penalties for noncompliance. Parents propose installing filtering software on home computers as an alternative. A court finds the statute unconstitutional because the government has not shown that filters would be less effective at protecting children while burdening far less speech.
A city denies a church's permit to expand its building citing traffic concerns. Church members show that a smaller addition plus off-site parking would achieve the same traffic reduction. The court invalidates the denial because the city failed to prove that its outright refusal was the least restrictive means of addressing congestion.
St. Peter Catholic Church was built in 1923 in Boerne, Texas. Its structure replicates the mission style of the region's earlier history. The church seats about 230 worshippers, a number too small for its growing parish. Some 40 to 60 parishioners cannot be accommodated at some Sunday masses. To meet the needs of the congregation, the Archbishop of San Antonio gave permission to the parish to plan alterations to enlarge the building. A few months later, the Boerne City Council passed an ordinance authorizing the city's Historic Landmark Commission to prepare a preservation plan with proposed historic landmarks and districts. Under the ordinance, the commission must preapprove construction affecting historic landmarks or buildings in a historic district. Soon afterwards, the Archbishop applied for a building permit so construction to enlarge the church could proceed. City authorities, relying on the ordinance and the designation of a historic district which they argued included the church, denied the application. The Archbishop brought this suit challenging the permit denial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The complaint contained multiple claims, but to this point the litigation has centered on RFRA and the question of its constitutionality. The District Court concluded that by enacting RFRA Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court certified its order for interlocutory appeal and the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding RFRA to be constitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and now reverses. Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith. RFRA prohibits government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. Unless the government can demonstrate that the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, it must also show that the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The Act applies to all federal and state law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the enactment of RFRA.
View caseA city bans ritual animal sacrifice after residents complain about sanitation. Practitioners demonstrate that requiring sanitary disposal methods and designated areas would address the concerns without banning the practice. The court strikes down the ban because less restrictive sanitation rules would achieve the city's interest.
In April 1987 the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation organized under Florida law in 1973 whose president is Ernesto Pichardo, leased land in Hialeah, Florida, and announced plans to build a house of worship, school, cultural center, and museum at which members would practice Santeria. Santeria originated in nineteenth-century Cuba as a fusion of Yoruba traditions and Roman Catholicism. It centers on animal sacrifice performed by cutting the carotid arteries, after which the animals are usually cooked and eaten except in healing and death rituals. The announcement prompted the Hialeah City Council to convene an emergency public session on June 9, 1987. At that session residents and council members voiced strong opposition to Santeria practices. The council then adopted Resolution 87-66 declaring opposition to religious acts inconsistent with public morals, peace, or safety and passed Ordinance 87-40 incorporating Florida's animal-cruelty statute that criminalizes unnecessary or cruel killing of animals. After the Florida attorney general issued an opinion that ritual animal sacrifice other than for food consumption violated state law, the council in August 1987 adopted Resolution 87-90 opposing ritual animal sacrifice. In September 1987 the council enacted three further ordinances. Ordinance 87-52 barred possession of animals with intent to use them for ritual sacrifice except by licensed food establishments. Ordinance 87-71 directly prohibited any person from sacrificing an animal within city limits. Ordinance 87-72 restricted slaughter of animals to properly zoned slaughterhouse premises while exempting small-scale commercial hog and cattle operations. The Church and Pichardo filed suit against the city and its officials in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They alleged that the ordinances violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. After granting summary judgment to the individual defendants on immunity grounds, the district court conducted a nine-day bench trial on the remaining claims and entered judgment for the city. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA federal statute criminalizes transmission of indecent material to minors over the internet. Providers show that blocking software installed by parents would protect children while allowing adults full access. The court holds the statute invalid because the government did not prove that blocking software is less effective than the criminal prohibition.
In 1996 Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act as Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Immediately after the President signed the bill, twenty plaintiffs including the American Civil Liberties Union filed suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the Attorney General challenging the constitutionality of 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a)(1)(B) and 223(d). A week later a second suit was filed by twenty-seven additional plaintiffs; the cases were consolidated and a three-judge district court was convened. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing based on a detailed stipulation of 356 paragraphs plus live testimony and made 410 findings of fact. Those findings described the Internet as an international network of interconnected computers that had grown from roughly 300 host computers in 1981 to approximately 9,400,000 by the time of trial, with about 40 million users expected to reach 200 million by 1999. The findings detailed communication methods including e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups, chat rooms, and the World Wide Web, noting that any person or organization with Internet access could publish information and that the content available was as diverse as human thought. The district court further found that sexually explicit material on the Internet included text, pictures, and chat extending from the modestly titillating to the hardest-core, that such material was widely available but users seldom encountered it accidentally because a series of affirmative steps was required to access specific content, and that almost all sexually explicit images were preceded by warnings. The court determined there was no effective way to determine the identity or age of a user accessing material through e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups, or chat rooms and that credit-card or adult-password verification systems were not economically feasible for most noncommercial providers and would impose significant burdens including the exclusion of adults without credit cards. The district court entered a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the two challenged provisions. The Government appealed directly to the Supreme Court under the CDA's special review provisions, and the Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseA state funds schools primarily through local property taxes, creating large spending gaps between wealthy and poor districts. Parents in poor districts propose a statewide funding formula that equalizes resources without eliminating local control. The court upholds the system under rational-basis review and does not require the state to prove that its chosen means are the least restrictive available.
In the summer of 1968 Mexican-American parents whose children attended elementary and secondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School District in San Antonio Texas brought a class action. They sued on behalf of schoolchildren throughout the state who were members of minority groups or who were poor and resided in school districts having a low property tax base. Named as defendants were the State Board of Education the Commissioner of Education the State Attorney General and the Bexar County Board of Trustees. The complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. A three-judge court was impaneled in January 1969. The Texas system of financing public education originated with the state's first constitution in 1845. It evolved through constitutional amendments permitting local school districts to levy ad valorem taxes for school buildings and maintenance. These local revenues were supplemented by distributions from the state's Permanent School Fund established in 1854 and the Available School Fund. In the late 1940s the legislature enacted the Minimum Foundation School Program. Under the program the state supplies approximately 80 percent of the cost of teacher salaries operating expenses and transportation. Each district contributes the remaining 20 percent through a Local Fund Assignment. The assignment is calculated by an economic index reflecting relative taxpaying ability. Every district also levies additional local property taxes beyond the assignment to supplement its foundation grant. For the 1967-1968 school year the Edgewood Independent School District had an average assessed property value of $5960 per pupil and a median family income of $4686. It raised $26 per pupil through local taxation at a rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed valuation. It received $222 per pupil from the Foundation Program and obtained $108 in federal funds for a total of $356 per pupil. By comparison the Alamo Heights Independent School District had an assessed property value exceeding $49000 per pupil and a median family income of $8001. It raised $333 per pupil locally at a rate of $0.85 per $100 received $225 from the Foundation Program and $36 in federal funds for a total of $594 per pupil. Similar disparities in per-pupil expenditures existed throughout the state. They were largely attributable to differences in the amount of taxable property within each district. In December 1971 the three-judge District Court rendered judgment holding the Texas school finance system unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State appealed. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1972 to consider the constitutional questions presented.
View caseA city bans possession of handguns in the home for public safety. Residents demonstrate that requiring trigger locks and background checks would reduce accidents and crime while preserving the right to self-defense. The court invalidates the ban on Second Amendment grounds without applying a formal least-restrictive-alternatives inquiry.
The District of Columbia generally prohibits the possession of handguns. It is a crime to carry an unregistered firearm, and the registration of handguns is prohibited. Wholly apart from that prohibition, no person may carry a handgun without a license, but the chief of police may issue licenses for one-year periods. District of Columbia law also requires residents to keep their lawfully owned firearms unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device unless they are located in a place of business or are being used for lawful recreational activities. Respondent Dick Heller is a D.C. special police officer authorized to carry a handgun while on duty at the Federal Judicial Center. He applied for a registration certificate for a handgun that he wished to keep at home, but the District refused. He thereafter filed a lawsuit in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia seeking, on Second Amendment grounds, to enjoin the city from enforcing the bar on the registration of handguns, the licensing requirement insofar as it prohibits the carrying of a firearm in the home without a license, and the trigger-lock requirement insofar as it prohibits the use of functional firearms within the home. The District Court dismissed respondent's complaint. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, construing his complaint as seeking the right to render a firearm operable and carry it about his home in that condition only when necessary for self-defense. The Court of Appeals directed the District Court to enter summary judgment for respondent. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseThe government must prove that its chosen measure is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling interest and that proposed alternatives would be less effective.
No. The alternative must be both less restrictive and at least as effective at serving the government's interest.
Under intermediate scrutiny the government need only show a substantial relationship to an important interest. It is not required to prove that its means are the least restrictive possible.
Yes. Courts also apply a less-restrictive-alternatives inquiry in antitrust rule-of-reason analysis and under statutes such as RLUIPA when evaluating substantial burdens on religious exercise.
…of serving the asserted government interest; existence of an analogous, but more narrowly drawn, federal statute showed that “a less restrictive alternative is readily available”). Dissenting opinions Dissenting — Justice Blackmun 279 U. S. App. D. C., at 6, 7, 878 F. 2d, at 1463, 1467 (quoting DEA Final Order to the effect that total…