Also known as: mere rationality · mere-rationality review · mere rationality review · rational basis · rational basis review
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A standard of judicial review under which legislation or a classification is upheld if rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. The standard presumes constitutionality unless the government has acted arbitrarily or irrationally.
The President issues an order barring entry by nationals of several majority-Muslim countries after intelligence reports flag airport security risks. Foreign nationals denied visas sue, citing prior statements suggesting religious bias. The court applies the mere-rationality standard and sustains the order because its stated national-security purpose is rationally related to the restrictions imposed.
A victim of gender-motivated violence sues her attacker under a federal civil remedy provision. The defendant moves to dismiss, arguing Congress lacked power under the Commerce Clause. The court applies mere-rationality review to the equal-protection claim and finds the statute exceeds congressional authority because the remedy is not rationally related to any documented pattern of state irrationality.
In September 1994 Christy Brzonkala enrolled as a student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. Within thirty minutes of meeting fellow students Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, both members of the varsity football team, Brzonkala alleges that the two men assaulted and repeatedly raped her. Morrison allegedly told Brzonkala after the attack that she had better not have any diseases. He later announced in a dormitory dining room that he liked to get girls drunk and made other vulgar remarks about women. Brzonkala became severely emotionally disturbed and depressed after the incident. She sought assistance from a university psychiatrist who prescribed antidepressant medication. She stopped attending classes and withdrew from the university. In early 1995 she filed a complaint against Morrison and Crawford under the university's Sexual Assault Policy. Virginia Tech conducted a hearing under its Sexual Assault Policy and a second hearing under its Abusive Conduct Policy. The first found Morrison guilty of sexual assault and suspended him for two semesters. The second hearing again found him guilty but changed the offense description to using abusive language. University officials later set aside the punishment. In December 1995 Brzonkala sued Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. Her complaint alleged that the attack violated 42 U.S.C. §13981, the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, which creates a federal cause of action for compensatory and punitive damages against persons who commit crimes of violence motivated by gender. She also asserted Title IX claims against the university. The district court dismissed the Title IX claims for failure to state a claim. It also dismissed the §13981 claim on the ground that Congress lacked authority to enact the provision under either the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed in part, but the en banc Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact §13981. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the constitutionality of the civil remedy provision.
View caseTwo men are prosecuted under a state law criminalizing private consensual sodomy. They challenge the statute on substantive due-process grounds. The court applies the mere-rationality standard and upholds the law because moral disapproval supplies a rational basis for the prohibition.
In August 1982, respondent Michael Hardwick was charged with violating the Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy by committing that act with another adult male in the bedroom of respondent's home. After a preliminary hearing, the District Attorney decided not to present the matter to the grand jury unless further evidence developed. Hardwick, who identified as a practicing homosexual, then brought suit in the Federal District Court challenging the constitutionality of the statute insofar as it criminalized consensual sodomy. He asserted that the Georgia sodomy statute, as administered by the defendants, placed him in imminent danger of arrest. The District Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, relying on Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Richmond, which the Supreme Court had summarily affirmed. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that the Georgia statute violated respondent's fundamental rights because his homosexual activity is a private and intimate association beyond the reach of state regulation by reason of the Ninth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It remanded for trial. John and Mary Doe were also plaintiffs in the action. They alleged that they wished to engage in sexual activity proscribed by the statute in the privacy of their home and that they had been chilled and deterred from engaging in such activity by both the existence of the statute and Hardwick's arrest. The District Court held that because they had neither sustained, nor were in immediate danger of sustaining, any direct injury from the enforcement of the statute, they did not have proper standing to maintain the action. The Court of Appeals affirmed that dismissal. The Georgia statute at issue, Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2, provides that a person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another. A person convicted shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than twenty years. Because other Courts of Appeals had arrived at judgments contrary to that of the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court granted the Attorney General's petition for certiorari questioning the holding that the sodomy statute violates the fundamental rights of homosexuals.
View caseA metropolitan transit authority refuses to pay overtime required by federal statute, claiming Tenth Amendment immunity. Employees sue for back wages. The court applies mere-rationality review to the commerce-power claim and holds that Congress may regulate the authority because the wage rules are rationally related to interstate commerce.
The history of public transportation in San Antonio began with private operators. In 1959 the City of San Antonio purchased the privately owned San Antonio Transit Company and replaced it with the publicly owned San Antonio Transit System. In 1978 the city transferred its facilities and equipment to appellee San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, a public mass-transit authority organized on a countywide basis. SAMTA became the major provider of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area. Between 1978 and 1980 its vehicles traveled over 26 million route miles and carried over 63 million passengers. San Antonio began receiving federal subsidies under the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964. SATS and SAMTA received over $51 million in UMTA grants from December 1970 through February 1980. This total included $12.5 million in operating grants during SAMTA's first two fiscal years. The Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted in 1938 without applying to local mass-transit employees. Congress amended the statute in 1961 to extend minimum-wage coverage to private mass-transit carriers with annual gross revenue of at least $1 million. In 1966 Congress withdrew exemptions from public hospitals, schools, and mass-transit carriers whose rates and services were subject to state regulation. The 1974 amendments provided for the progressive repeal of the surviving overtime exemption for mass-transit employees while extending FLSA coverage to virtually all state and local government employees. Following the 1976 decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, SATS informed its employees that the decision relieved it of overtime obligations under the FLSA. On September 17, 1979, the Wage and Hour Administration of the Department of Labor issued an opinion that SAMTA's operations were not constitutionally immune from the FLSA. On November 21, 1979, SAMTA filed suit against the Secretary of Labor in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas seeking declaratory relief. On the same day appellant Garcia and other SAMTA employees sued SAMTA in the same court for overtime pay under the FLSA. On November 17, 1981, the District Court granted SAMTA's motion for summary judgment. The court held that local public mass-transit systems constitute integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions. After the Supreme Court decided Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co. in 1982, the District Court's judgment was vacated and remanded. On remand the District Court adhered to its original view and again entered judgment for SAMTA in 1983. The Secretary and Garcia took direct appeals. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, restored the cases for reargument after initial argument, and requested briefing on whether the principles of the Tenth Amendment as set forth in National League of Cities v. Usery should be reconsidered.
View caseA high-school senior is charged with possessing a firearm near school grounds under a federal statute. He moves to dismiss, asserting the law exceeds Congress's commerce power. The court applies mere-rationality review and invalidates the statute because possession of a gun in a school zone is not rationally related to interstate commerce.
In March 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a twelfth-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, arrived at school carrying a concealed .38-caliber handgun and five bullets. Acting on an anonymous tip, school authorities confronted Lopez, who admitted possessing the weapon. Local police arrested him and charged him under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The following day, state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. A federal grand jury indicted him on one count of knowing possession of a firearm at a school zone. Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress's power to legislate control over public schools. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the statute was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate activities affecting commerce because the business of schools affects interstate commerce. After a bench trial, the court found Lopez guilty and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and two years of supervised release. Lopez appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the conviction, holding that the statute was beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
View caseA state statute bars remarriage by noncustodial parents who owe child-support arrears. A father denied a marriage license challenges the law on equal-protection grounds. The court applies the mere-rationality standard to determine whether the restriction is rationally related to the state's interest in ensuring support payments.
In January 1972 a paternity action was instituted against Roger G. Redhail in Milwaukee County Court alleging that he was the father of a baby girl born out of wedlock on July 5, 1971. After Redhail admitted paternity the court entered an order on May 12, 1972 adjudging him the father and ordering him to pay $109 per month as support until the child reached age eighteen. From May 1972 until August 1974 Redhail was unemployed and indigent and consequently was unable to make any support payments. As of December 1974 there was an arrearage in excess of $3,700. The child had been a public charge since her birth receiving benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. In September 1974 Redhail applied for a marriage license in Milwaukee County. County Clerk Thomas E. Zablocki denied the application because Redhail had not obtained a court order pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 245.10(1). Redhail would not have been able to satisfy either statutory prerequisite for permission to marry. After the license denial Redhail filed a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The complaint alleged that the statute violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284. The plaintiff class was certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). After the parties filed a stipulation of facts and briefs were submitted the three-judge court held the statute unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause and enjoined its enforcement. Zablocki brought a direct appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and affirmed the District Court judgment.
View caseThe mere-rationality standard applies to classifications that are neither suspect nor semi-suspect and that do not burden a fundamental right. Courts therefore use it for most economic and social-welfare legislation.
Yes. Under mere-rationality review a statute may be underinclusive or overinclusive so long as it remains rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.
Federal alienage classifications receive deferential rational-basis review because Congress possesses plenary power over immigration. State alienage classifications generally trigger strict scrutiny except in narrow governmental-function contexts.
No. When the measure itself articulates a legitimate purpose rationally related to the classification, courts applying mere-rationality review uphold the law even if extrinsic statements suggest an improper motive.
…(1996); Nordlinger v. Hahn , 505 U. S. 1, 11-12 (1992). Laws such as economic or tax legislation that are scrutinized under rational basis review normally pass constitutional muster, since "the Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes." Cleburne v. Cleburne Living…