Also known as: militates · militated · militating · militare · weigh against · tell against
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
To exert influence or weight in favor of or against a particular outcome or decision.
Police officers enter Michael Miller's home without a warrant after a neighbor reports a loud argument over a parking space. The government later argues that the need to prevent evidence destruction justified the entry. The minor nature of the underlying offense militates against finding sufficient exigency to overcome the presumption of unreasonableness.
Parklane Hosiery faces a private damages suit after an SEC judgment. The plaintiff seeks to use offensive collateral estoppel on the violation issue. The strong federal policy favoring jury trials militates against applying estoppel where the defendant lacked a jury in the first proceeding.
Parklane Hosiery Company, Inc., and eleven of its officers and directors issued a proxy statement in connection with a merger between Parklane and another corporation. Leo Shore, a stockholder of Parklane, filed a class action on behalf of stockholders in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against Parklane and the individual defendants. The complaint alleged that the proxy statement was false and misleading in violation of sections 14(a), 10(b), and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and related SEC rules. The complaint sought damages for the class, rescission of the merger, and recovery of costs. Before Shore’s action came to trial, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed a separate suit against the same defendants in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The SEC complaint alleged that the proxy statement that had been issued by Parklane was materially false and misleading in essentially the same respects as those that had been alleged in the respondent's complaint. After a four-day trial, the District Court found that the proxy statement was materially false and misleading in the respects alleged, and entered a declaratory judgment to that effect. The court permanently enjoined the defendants from further violations of the securities laws and ordered them to offer rescission to shareholders who had tendered shares. The defendants did not appeal this judgment. Shore then moved for partial summary judgment in the Eastern District of New York action, asserting that the defendants were collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues resolved against them in the SEC action. The District Court denied the motion on the ground that application of collateral estoppel would deny the defendants their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that a party who has had issues of fact determined against him after a full and fair opportunity to litigate in a nonjury trial is collaterally estopped from obtaining a subsequent jury trial of these same issues of fact. Because of an intercircuit conflict with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Rachal v. Hill, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA grand jury subpoenas a reporter's notes about confidential sources in a criminal investigation. The reporter moves to quash the subpoena on First Amendment grounds. The requirement of narrow tailoring to avoid chilling protected activity militates against enforcement of the subpoena.
In November 1969, Paul Branzburg, a staff reporter for the Courier-Journal newspaper in Louisville, Kentucky, published an article describing his observations of two individuals synthesizing hashish from marijuana in Jefferson County. The article included a photograph and stated that Branzburg had promised not to reveal the identities of the two. He was subsequently subpoenaed by the Jefferson County grand jury and refused to identify the individuals he had observed. A state trial court ordered him to answer, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals denied his petition for relief. In January 1971, Branzburg published a second article detailing drug use in Frankfort, Kentucky, based on interviews with several dozen users over two weeks. He was subpoenaed by the Franklin County grand jury to testify about violations of drug statutes. The Court of Appeals denied the requested writs and rejected his First Amendment claim. This Court granted certiorari. In July 1970, Paul Pappas, a television newsman-photographer, was assigned to cover civil disorders in New Bedford, Massachusetts, involving the Black Panthers. He entered Panther headquarters under an agreement not to disclose what he saw or heard inside except for an anticipated police raid, which did not occur. Two months later, he was summoned before the Bristol County grand jury but refused to answer questions about his observations inside the headquarters. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that he must appear and testify. In February 1970, Earl Caldwell, a New York Times reporter covering the Black Panther Party in San Francisco, received a subpoena to appear before a federal grand jury investigating possible violations of federal law by the group, including threats against the President. The District Court denied the motion to quash but issued a protective order. Caldwell refused to appear and was held in contempt. The Court of Appeals reversed, recognizing a qualified privilege. This Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases.
View caseCongress enacts a statute creating a federal civil remedy for gender-motivated violence. A defendant challenges the law as exceeding Commerce Clause authority. The noneconomic character of the regulated conduct militates against upholding the statute under the commerce power.
In September 1994 Christy Brzonkala enrolled as a student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. Within thirty minutes of meeting fellow students Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, both members of the varsity football team, Brzonkala alleges that the two men assaulted and repeatedly raped her. Morrison allegedly told Brzonkala after the attack that she had better not have any diseases. He later announced in a dormitory dining room that he liked to get girls drunk and made other vulgar remarks about women. Brzonkala became severely emotionally disturbed and depressed after the incident. She sought assistance from a university psychiatrist who prescribed antidepressant medication. She stopped attending classes and withdrew from the university. In early 1995 she filed a complaint against Morrison and Crawford under the university's Sexual Assault Policy. Virginia Tech conducted a hearing under its Sexual Assault Policy and a second hearing under its Abusive Conduct Policy. The first found Morrison guilty of sexual assault and suspended him for two semesters. The second hearing again found him guilty but changed the offense description to using abusive language. University officials later set aside the punishment. In December 1995 Brzonkala sued Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. Her complaint alleged that the attack violated 42 U.S.C. §13981, the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, which creates a federal cause of action for compensatory and punitive damages against persons who commit crimes of violence motivated by gender. She also asserted Title IX claims against the university. The district court dismissed the Title IX claims for failure to state a claim. It also dismissed the §13981 claim on the ground that Congress lacked authority to enact the provision under either the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed in part, but the en banc Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact §13981. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the constitutionality of the civil remedy provision.
View caseThe coastal commission conditions a building permit on the owners granting a public easement across their beachfront lot. The owners challenge the condition as an unconstitutional taking. The lack of a nexus between the permit condition and the stated regulatory purpose militates against upholding the requirement.
The Nollans own a beachfront lot in Ventura County, California. A concrete seawall approximately eight feet high separates the beach portion of their property from the rest of the lot. The historic mean high tide line determines the lot's oceanside boundary. The Nollans originally leased their property with an option to buy, and the building on the lot was a small bungalow totaling 504 square feet. The Nollans' option to purchase was conditioned on their promise to demolish the bungalow and replace it. On February 25, 1982, they submitted a permit application to the California Coastal Commission proposing to demolish the existing structure and replace it with a three-bedroom house. The Commission informed them that the permit would be granted subject to the condition that they allow the public an easement to pass across a portion of their property bounded by the mean high tide line and their seawall. On June 3, 1982, the Nollans filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in the Ventura County Superior Court to invalidate the access condition. The court remanded the case to the Commission for a full evidentiary hearing. After the hearing, the Commission reaffirmed the condition. The Superior Court ruled in favor of the Nollans on statutory grounds and directed that the permit condition be struck. While the Commission's appeal to the California Court of Appeal was pending, the Nollans tore down the bungalow, built the new house, and bought the property. The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court. The Nollans appealed to this Court, raising only the constitutional question.
View caseA union sues an employer in federal court for breach of a collective bargaining agreement. The employer argues that state contract law should govern the dispute. The need for uniform interpretation of labor agreements militates against applying varying state rules.
In 1953 the Textile Workers Union of America entered into a collective bargaining agreement with Lincoln Mills of Alabama. The agreement was to run for one year and from year to year thereafter unless terminated on specified notices. It contained a no-strike clause and established a multi-step grievance procedure whose final step, available to either party, was arbitration. Several grievances concerning work loads and work assignments arose under the agreement. The union processed the grievances through every step of the contractual procedure, after which the employer denied them. The union then requested arbitration, but the employer refused. The union filed suit in federal district court seeking an order compelling the employer to arbitrate the grievances. The district court held that it possessed jurisdiction and directed the employer to comply with the arbitration provisions of the agreement. On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed by a divided vote, concluding that the district court lacked authority under either federal or state law to grant the requested relief. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. After the Court of Appeals decision but before oral argument, Lincoln Mills terminated its operations, ceased all work at the mill in March 1957, and contracted to sell its mill properties. Some of the grievances sought back pay for increased workloads, and the collective bargaining agreement authorized the arbitration board to adjust compensation retroactively.
View caseMilitate means to exert influence or weight for or against an outcome. Mitigate means to lessen the severity of something. The two terms are not interchangeable despite occasional confusion in drafting.
It means those factors weigh against granting injunctive relief. In nuisance cases, for example, harm to third parties or employees can militate against an injunction even if the plaintiff shows a trespass or nuisance.
Yes. Employee interests can militate against an injunction that would cause job losses but can militate in favor of an injunction that improves working conditions by reducing noise or hazards.