Also known as: Miranda rules · Miranda warning · Miranda warnings · Miranda rights
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional doctrine requiring that a suspect in police custody receive specific warnings about the right to remain silent, the right to counsel, and the consequences of waiving those rights before any custodial interrogation begins. Statements obtained without the warnings or a valid waiver are inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief. The doctrine protects the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by ensuring that any waiver is knowing and voluntary.
Musa Mensah was pulled over for a broken taillight. An officer approached the car, asked whether Mensah had been drinking, and received an incriminating answer. No warnings were given. Because the stop was brief and the driver was not taken into custody, the statements were admissible even without Miranda warnings.
Megan Moore was arrested and told she had the right to remain silent and that anything she said could be used against her. The officer added that the department had no lawyer on call but one would be appointed if she went to court. Moore then confessed. The warnings conveyed the required rights in substance, so the confession was admissible.
Melanie Morris was arrested for murder. Her family retained counsel who called the station, but officers did not tell Morris about the call. After receiving and waiving Miranda warnings, Morris confessed. The undisclosed attorney contact did not invalidate the waiver, so the confession remained admissible.
On the evening of June 29, 1977, Brian Burbine was arrested by Cranston, Rhode Island, police officers in connection with a local burglary after Detective Ferranti received information from a confidential informant linking a man known as "Butch" living at a specific address to an earlier murder. Burbine, who lived at that address and was known by that name, was taken to the Cranston police station where Cranston detectives advised him of his Miranda rights; he initially refused to sign a written waiver form. At approximately 7:45 p.m. that same evening, Burbine's sister telephoned the Public Defender's Office in Providence to request legal assistance for her brother on the breaking-and-entering charge. Attorney Allegra Munson from that office telephoned the Cranston police station at 8:15 p.m., identified herself as Burbine's counsel, and was told by an officer that the police would not be questioning Burbine or placing him in a lineup and that they were through with him for the night. Munson was not informed that Providence police were present or that Burbine was a suspect in the murder of Mary Jo Hickey. Less than an hour later, three Providence detectives arrived at the Cranston station and began questioning Burbine about the murder. Prior to each of three interview sessions, Burbine was advised of his Miranda rights, and on three separate occasions he signed written forms acknowledging that he understood his rights and expressly waiving them; he then provided three written statements admitting responsibility for the murder. At no time during the questioning was Burbine informed that his sister had retained an attorney for him or that Attorney Munson had telephoned the station. Prior to trial in Rhode Island Superior Court, Burbine moved to suppress the statements. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Burbine had been fully advised of his Miranda rights, had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived them, and that the statements were voluntary. Burbine was convicted of first-degree murder. The Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the conviction, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseMaya Malik was arrested, given Miranda warnings, and remained silent when questioned. At trial she testified to an exculpatory story. The prosecutor cross-examined her about the earlier silence. The use of post-warning silence for impeachment violated due process, requiring reversal.
Petitioners Jefferson Doyle and Richard Wood were arrested together in Tuscarawas County, Ohio, and charged with selling ten pounds of marijuana to William Bonnell, an informant working with the local narcotics unit. The evidence presented at their separate trials, held about one week apart in the Common Pleas Court, was identical in all material respects. Narcotics agents had arranged with Bonnell to set up a purchase using $1,320 collected from the unit, which Bonnell took to a bar in Dover, Ohio, where he met the petitioners. Subsequently, Doyle obtained the marijuana and met Bonnell and Wood at a parking lot in New Philadelphia, Ohio, where the transaction occurred under surveillance by four agents. After discovering they had been paid $430 less than agreed, Doyle and Wood chased Bonnell but were stopped by local police acting on instructions from the agents. Agent Kenneth Beamer arrived, arrested both petitioners, and administered Miranda warnings before a search of the car uncovered the $1,320. At trial, each petitioner testified that Bonnell had framed them by attempting to sell the marijuana to Doyle, who had changed his mind about the quantity, leading Bonnell to throw the money into the car and take the drugs back. During cross-examination, the prosecutor in each trial asked why the petitioner had not told this story to Agent Beamer at the time of arrest, and the trial court overruled defense objections to these questions. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District affirmed the convictions, and the Supreme Court of Ohio denied further review before the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseNo. Once a suspect in custody clearly requests counsel, all interrogation must cease. Officers may not reinitiate questioning about any offense until counsel is provided or the suspect initiates further communication and validly waives the right.
No. Miranda warnings carry an implicit assurance that silence will not be penalized. Using post-warning silence as substantive evidence of sanity or consciousness of guilt violates due process.
Yes, provided officers scrupulously honor the invocation by immediately stopping the first interrogation, allowing a significant time gap, administering fresh warnings, and limiting the new questions to a different crime.
Generally no. A routine traffic stop is temporary and brief, so it is not custodial interrogation that triggers the Miranda rule.