Also known as: Miranda rule · Miranda warning · Miranda warnings · Miranda rights
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A set of constitutional safeguards requiring that a suspect in custody receive specific warnings about the rights to remain silent and to have counsel present before any interrogation begins. Statements obtained in violation of these safeguards are generally inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief. The warnings need not follow a rigid script so long as they convey the essential rights, and routine traffic stops ordinarily fall outside the custodial interrogation trigger.
Mason McCarthy was pulled over for a broken taillight. The officer asked him whether he had been drinking and where he was coming from. McCarthy answered without receiving any warnings. The answers are admissible because the brief roadside detention did not place McCarthy in custody for Miranda purposes.
Maria Morales was arrested and told by the detective that she had the right to remain silent, that anything she said could be used against her, and that the police had no way of giving her a lawyer but one would be appointed if and when she went to court. Morales then confessed. The confession is admissible because the warnings conveyed the substance of the required rights even though the phrasing was not verbatim.
Michelle Murphy was arrested and given Miranda warnings. Her family had retained counsel who tried to reach her, but police did not inform Murphy of the lawyer's efforts. Murphy waived her rights and confessed. The confession is admissible because the failure to disclose the lawyer's attempts did not invalidate an otherwise knowing and voluntary waiver.
On the evening of June 29, 1977, Brian Burbine was arrested by Cranston, Rhode Island, police officers in connection with a local burglary after Detective Ferranti received information from a confidential informant linking a man known as "Butch" living at a specific address to an earlier murder. Burbine, who lived at that address and was known by that name, was taken to the Cranston police station where Cranston detectives advised him of his Miranda rights; he initially refused to sign a written waiver form. At approximately 7:45 p.m. that same evening, Burbine's sister telephoned the Public Defender's Office in Providence to request legal assistance for her brother on the breaking-and-entering charge. Attorney Allegra Munson from that office telephoned the Cranston police station at 8:15 p.m., identified herself as Burbine's counsel, and was told by an officer that the police would not be questioning Burbine or placing him in a lineup and that they were through with him for the night. Munson was not informed that Providence police were present or that Burbine was a suspect in the murder of Mary Jo Hickey. Less than an hour later, three Providence detectives arrived at the Cranston station and began questioning Burbine about the murder. Prior to each of three interview sessions, Burbine was advised of his Miranda rights, and on three separate occasions he signed written forms acknowledging that he understood his rights and expressly waiving them; he then provided three written statements admitting responsibility for the murder. At no time during the questioning was Burbine informed that his sister had retained an attorney for him or that Attorney Munson had telephoned the station. Prior to trial in Rhode Island Superior Court, Burbine moved to suppress the statements. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Burbine had been fully advised of his Miranda rights, had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived them, and that the statements were voluntary. Burbine was convicted of first-degree murder. The Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the conviction, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseMadison Meyers was arrested, given Miranda warnings, and remained silent when questioned. At trial she testified to an exculpatory version of events. The prosecutor cross-examined her about the earlier silence. The cross-examination is improper because post-Miranda silence may not be used against the defendant.
Petitioners Jefferson Doyle and Richard Wood were arrested together in Tuscarawas County, Ohio, and charged with selling ten pounds of marijuana to William Bonnell, an informant working with the local narcotics unit. The evidence presented at their separate trials, held about one week apart in the Common Pleas Court, was identical in all material respects. Narcotics agents had arranged with Bonnell to set up a purchase using $1,320 collected from the unit, which Bonnell took to a bar in Dover, Ohio, where he met the petitioners. Subsequently, Doyle obtained the marijuana and met Bonnell and Wood at a parking lot in New Philadelphia, Ohio, where the transaction occurred under surveillance by four agents. After discovering they had been paid $430 less than agreed, Doyle and Wood chased Bonnell but were stopped by local police acting on instructions from the agents. Agent Kenneth Beamer arrived, arrested both petitioners, and administered Miranda warnings before a search of the car uncovered the $1,320. At trial, each petitioner testified that Bonnell had framed them by attempting to sell the marijuana to Doyle, who had changed his mind about the quantity, leading Bonnell to throw the money into the car and take the drugs back. During cross-examination, the prosecutor in each trial asked why the petitioner had not told this story to Agent Beamer at the time of arrest, and the trial court overruled defense objections to these questions. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District affirmed the convictions, and the Supreme Court of Ohio denied further review before the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseAll interrogation must cease. Officers may not reinitiate questioning about any offense until counsel is provided or the suspect initiates further communication and validly waives the right.
No. Once Miranda warnings are given, the implicit assurance that silence will carry no penalty bars the government from using that silence as substantive evidence against the defendant, including to undermine an insanity claim.
Later questioning is permissible if officers scrupulously honor the invocation by immediately stopping, allowing a significant time gap, administering fresh warnings, and limiting the new session to a different offense.
No. Only an unambiguous request that a reasonable officer would understand as invoking the right to counsel halts interrogation. Equivocal remarks leave officers free to continue.