motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

Dennis Burnham married Francie Burnham in 1976 in West Virginia. In 1977 the couple moved to New Jersey, where their two children were born. In July 1987 the Burnhams separated. Mrs. Burnham, who intended to move to California, was visiting her parents in that State when she filed for divorce in New Jersey on grounds of extreme cruelty, seeking spousal and child support, custody of the children, and possession of the family home. In early August 1987 petitioner visited Mrs. Burnham in California to discuss the children and the separation. He took the children to San Francisco for a few days. Upon returning the children to Mrs. Burnham, petitioner was served with a summons and complaint for divorce filed in California Superior Court that also sought custody of the children. After being served, petitioner returned to New Jersey. In January 1988 petitioner made a special appearance in the California action and moved to quash service of process on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The Superior Court denied the motion, and the State Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the state and federal courts.

Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc., which operates care homes that provide assisted living to their residents, failed an inspection by the West Virginia Office of the State Fire Marshal because some of the residents were incapable of "self-preservation" as defined under state law. On October 28, 1997, after receiving cease-and-desist orders requiring the closure of its residential care facilities within 30 days, Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc., on behalf of itself and other similarly situated homes and residents, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia against the State of West Virginia, two of its agencies, and 18 individuals, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that the self-preservation requirement violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Respondents agreed to stay enforcement of the cease-and-desist orders pending resolution of the case and the parties began discovery. In 1998, the West Virginia Legislature enacted two bills eliminating the self-preservation requirement, and respondents moved to dismiss the case as moot. The District Court granted the motion, finding that the 1998 legislation had eliminated the allegedly offensive provisions and that there was no indication that the West Virginia Legislature would repeal the amendments. Petitioners requested attorney's fees as the prevailing party under the FHAA and ADA. They argued that they were entitled to attorney's fees under the catalyst theory. This theory posits that a plaintiff is a prevailing party if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct. The District Court accordingly denied the motion and, for the same reason, the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished, per curiam opinion. To resolve the disagreement amongst the Courts of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and now affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the FBI dedicated more than 4,000 special agents and 3,000 support personnel to an investigation that by September 18 had received more than 96,000 tips or potential leads from the public. In the ensuing months the FBI questioned more than 1,000 people with suspected links to the attacks or to terrorism in general. Of those individuals, 762 were held on immigration charges, and a 184-member subset of that group was deemed to be of high interest to the investigation and held under restrictive conditions designed to prevent communication with the general prison population or the outside world. Javaid Iqbal, a citizen of Pakistan and a Muslim, was arrested in November 2001 by agents of the FBI and Immigration and Naturalization Service on charges of fraud in relation to identification documents and conspiracy to defraud the United States. Pending trial, he was housed at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York. In January 2002 he was designated a person of high interest and placed in the Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit, where detainees were kept in lock-down 23 hours a day and spent the remaining hour outside their cells in handcuffs and leg irons accompanied by a four-officer escort. Iqbal pleaded guilty to the criminal charges, served a term of imprisonment, and was removed to Pakistan. He then filed a Bivens action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against 34 current and former federal officials, including former Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller, as well as 19 John Doe corrections officers. The complaint concentrated on his treatment while confined to the ADMAX SHU and alleged that petitioners designated him a person of high interest on account of his race, religion, or national origin. The complaint alleged that the FBI under Mueller’s direction arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men as part of the September 11 investigation, that the policy of holding post-September-11 detainees in highly restrictive conditions until cleared by the FBI was approved by Ashcroft and Mueller in discussions in the weeks after September 11, and that petitioners each knew of, condoned, and willfully agreed to subject Iqbal to harsh conditions solely on account of his religion, race, and national origin. It named Ashcroft as the principal architect of the policy and identified Mueller as instrumental in its adoption, promulgation, and implementation. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state sufficient allegations showing their own involvement in clearly established unconstitutional conduct. The District Court denied the motion. Petitioners brought an interlocutory appeal, and while the appeal was pending the Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

The petitioners, Negro members of the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, brought this class suit in a Federal District Court in Texas on behalf of themselves and other Negro employees similarly situated. They sued the Brotherhood, its Local Union No. 28, and officers of both the Brotherhood and Local Union No. 28. The petitioners worked for the Texas and New Orleans Railroad at its Houston Freight House, where Local 28 acted as the designated bargaining agent for their unit under the Railway Labor Act. A contract between the Union and the Railroad protected employees in the unit from discharge and loss of seniority. In May 1954 the Railroad claimed to abolish 45 jobs held by the petitioners or other Negroes, leading to their discharge or demotion. The jobs were actually filled by white employees, although a few Negroes were rehired without their prior seniority. The Union, following a plan, ignored the petitioners' repeated requests for protection and declined to offer them the same safeguards provided to white employees. The complaint also asserted that the Union had failed overall to represent Negro employees equally and in good faith, seeking declaratory judgment, injunction, and damages for the alleged violation of fair representation rights under the Railway Labor Act. The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that the National Railroad Adjustment Board possessed exclusive jurisdiction, that the Railroad was an indispensable party not joined as a defendant, and that the complaint did not state a claim for relief. The District Court dismissed the action on the basis of the Adjustment Board's exclusive jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed that dismissal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the case presented an important question about employee rights under the Railway Labor Act.

Petitioner Semtek International Inc. filed a complaint against respondent Lockheed Martin Corp. in California state court, alleging inducement of breach of contract and business torts. Respondent removed the case to the United States District Court for the Central District of California on the basis of diversity of citizenship. The district court dismissed petitioner’s claims as barred by California’s 2-year statute of limitations, adopting language suggested by respondent to dismiss the claims “in [their] entirety on the merits and with prejudice.” Petitioner appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s order. Petitioner subsequently brought suit against respondent in the State Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland, alleging the same causes of action. These claims were not time barred under Maryland’s 3-year statute of limitations. Respondent removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland on federal-question grounds, but that court remanded the case to state court. The Maryland state court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. Petitioner returned to the California federal court and the Ninth Circuit, moving unsuccessfully to amend the earlier order to indicate that the dismissal was not “on the merits.” Petitioner appealed the Maryland trial court’s order to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the dismissal. After the Maryland Court of Appeals declined to review the case, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.