Also known as: neutral explanations
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A justification offered by a party during the second step of the Batson inquiry after a prima facie showing of discriminatory peremptory strikes. The explanation must be facially unrelated to race or gender and connected to the facts of the particular case rather than a bare denial of discriminatory intent.
In a robbery trial, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove all Black members of the venire. After the defendant made a prima facie showing of racial discrimination, the prosecutor stated that each struck juror had prior contact with law enforcement that might create bias. The trial court accepted the explanation as race neutral and allowed the strikes to stand.
A defendant convicted before the Batson decision sought collateral review and argued that the prosecutor had failed to supply neutral explanations for striking Black jurors. The court held that the new requirement for neutral explanations did not apply retroactively on collateral review of final convictions.
Petitioner Teague, a black man, was convicted in an Illinois state court of three counts of attempted murder, two counts of armed robbery, and one count of aggravated battery by an all-white jury. During jury selection for petitioner's trial, the prosecutor used all 10 of his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks. Petitioner's counsel used one of his 10 peremptory challenges to exclude a black woman who was married to a police officer. After the prosecutor had struck six blacks, petitioner's counsel moved for a mistrial. When the prosecutor struck four more blacks, petitioner's counsel again moved for a mistrial, arguing that petitioner was entitled to a jury of his peers. The prosecutor defended the challenges by stating that he was trying to achieve a balance of men and women on the jury. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the jury appeared to be a fair one. On appeal, petitioner argued that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges denied him the right to be tried by a jury that was representative of the community. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected petitioner's fair cross section claim. The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1983. Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Petitioner repeated his fair cross section claim, and argued that the opinions of several Justices concurring in, or dissenting from, the denial of certiorari in McCray v. New York had invited a reexamination of Swain v. Alabama. The District Court, though sympathetic to petitioner's arguments, held that it was bound by Swain and Circuit precedent. On appeal, petitioner repeated his fair cross section claim and his McCray argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner that the Sixth Amendment's fair cross section requirement applied to the petit jury and held that petitioner had made out a prima facie case of discrimination. A majority of the judges on the Court of Appeals voted to rehear the case en banc, and the panel opinion was vacated. Rehearing was postponed until after Batson v. Kentucky was decided. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner could not benefit from the rule in that case because Allen v. Hardy had held that Batson would not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. The Court of Appeals also held that petitioner's Swain claim was procedurally barred and in any event meritless. The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's fair cross section claim, holding that the fair cross section requirement was limited to the jury venire. Petitioner's conviction became final two and a half years prior to Batson.
View caseIn a contract dispute, the private defendant used peremptory challenges to remove two Black prospective jurors. The plaintiff objected and the defendant offered the explanation that the jurors lacked experience with commercial construction projects. The court treated the explanation as race neutral and denied the objection.
Thaddeus Donald Edmonson, a black construction worker, was injured in a jobsite accident at Fort Polk, Louisiana, a federal enclave, when a Leesville Concrete Company employee permitted one of the company's trucks to roll backward and pin him against some construction equipment. Edmonson sued Leesville Concrete Company for negligence in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana and invoked his Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury. During voir dire, Leesville used two of its three peremptory challenges authorized by statute to remove black persons from the prospective jury. Edmonson, who is himself black, requested that the District Court require Leesville to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the two jurors, but the District Court denied the request on the ground that Batson does not apply in civil proceedings. As empaneled, the jury included 11 white persons and 1 black person. The jury rendered a verdict for Edmonson, assessing his total damages at $90,000, but attributed 80% of the fault to Edmonson's contributory negligence and awarded him the sum of $18,000. Edmonson appealed, and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Batson applies to private litigants in civil trials. The full court then ordered rehearing en banc and affirmed the judgment of the District Court, holding that a private litigant in a civil case can exercise peremptory challenges without accountability for alleged racial classifications. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue.
View caseDuring a paternity suit, the state used peremptory challenges to remove all male jurors, explaining that men would be less sympathetic to claims of child support. The defendant objected on equal protection grounds. The court required a gender neutral explanation and found the offered reason insufficient.
The State of Alabama filed a complaint for paternity and child support against J. E. B. on behalf of T. B., the mother of a minor child, in the District Court of Jackson County, Alabama. On October 21, 1991, the matter was called for trial and jury selection began with a panel of 36 potential jurors, 12 males and 24 females. After the court excused three jurors for cause, only 10 of the remaining 33 jurors were male. The State then used 9 of its 10 peremptory strikes to remove male jurors, while petitioner used all but one of his strikes to remove female jurors, resulting in an all-female jury. Before the jury was empaneled, petitioner objected to the State's peremptory challenges on the ground that they were exercised against male jurors solely on the basis of gender. The court rejected the objection and empaneled the all-female jury, which found petitioner to be the father of the child and ordered him to pay child support. On postjudgment motion, the court reaffirmed its ruling. The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment at 606 So. 2d 156 (1992), and the Supreme Court of Alabama denied certiorari. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari at 508 U. S. 905 (1993) to resolve the question of whether the Equal Protection Clause forbids peremptory challenges on the basis of gender.
View caseIn a criminal trial, the defense used peremptory challenges to remove all White members of the venire. The prosecutor objected and the defense offered the explanation that the jurors had ties to law enforcement that could favor the state. The trial court accepted the explanation as race neutral.
On August 10, 1990, a grand jury sitting in Dougherty County, Georgia, returned a six-count indictment charging respondents with aggravated assault and simple battery. The indictment alleged that respondents beat and assaulted Jerry and Myra Collins. Respondents are white; the alleged victims are African-Americans. Shortly after the events, a leaflet was widely distributed in the local African-American community reporting the assault and urging community residents not to patronize respondents' business. Before jury selection began, the prosecution moved to prohibit respondents from exercising peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. The State explained that it expected to show that the victims' race was a factor in the alleged assault. According to the State, counsel for respondents had indicated a clear intention to use peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner, arguing that the circumstances of their case gave them the right to exclude African-American citizens from participating as jurors in the trial. Observing that 43 percent of the county's population is African-American, the State contended that, if a statistically representative panel is assembled for jury selection, 18 of the potential 42 jurors would be African-American. With 20 peremptory challenges, respondents therefore would be able to remove all the African-American potential jurors. The trial judge denied the State's motion, holding that neither Georgia nor federal law prohibits criminal defendants from exercising peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. The issue was certified for immediate appeal. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court's ruling. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the state and federal courts on the issue.
View caseThe explanation must be facially unrelated to race or gender and tied to the facts of the particular case. A bare denial of discriminatory motive or an assumption that jurors of the defendant's race will favor the defendant is insufficient.
Supporting sources
No. At the second step the explanation need only be facially race or gender neutral. The persuasiveness of the explanation is assessed at the third step when the court decides whether purposeful discrimination has been proven.
No. The reasons must be those the striking party actually entertained at the time the challenge was exercised. Post hoc justifications supplied by reviewing courts do not meet the second step requirement.
Yes. Jury selection is a traditional governmental function conducted with significant court participation, so private litigants exercising peremptory challenges are treated as state actors and must supply neutral explanations when discrimination is alleged.
Supporting sources
…purposeful discrimination. Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors. The prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant's race on the assumption that they…