Also known as: newly-discovered evidence · fresh evidence
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Evidence that with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under the governing procedural rules.
Nigel Nelson sued Nexus Technologies for patent infringement. Six months after judgment he received internal emails from a former engineer showing the defendant had concealed prior art during discovery. The court granted relief because the emails could not have been found earlier despite diligent efforts.
Nina Nielsen was convicted after a bench trial. Just under three years after the verdict her counsel obtained newly decrypted chat logs showing the key government witness had discussed only public information. The motion for a new trial was filed within the three-year window.
Noreen Nguyen moved for a new trial twenty days after verdict citing the judge's mid-trial comments. Because the claim rested on grounds other than newly discovered evidence the fourteen-day deadline barred consideration of the motion.
Natasha Nielsen challenged her conviction on ineffective-assistance grounds. The court compared the prejudice standard to the high bar applied when a defendant seeks relief based on newly discovered evidence that would probably have changed the outcome.
In September 1976, respondent David Washington committed a series of crimes over a ten-day period in the Miami area that included three brutal stabbing murders along with torture, kidnapping, severe assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion, and theft. After his two accomplices were arrested, Washington surrendered to police and gave a lengthy statement confessing to the third criminal episode. The State of Florida indicted him for kidnapping and murder and appointed an experienced criminal lawyer to represent him. Washington waived his right to a jury trial against counsel's advice and pleaded guilty to all charges, including the three capital murder counts. In the plea colloquy he stated that he had committed a string of burglaries but had no significant prior criminal record and that he had been under extreme stress caused by his inability to support his family. Counsel spoke with Washington about his background, contacted his wife and mother by telephone, but did not seek out character witnesses or request a psychiatric examination. At the sentencing hearing before the trial judge, counsel's strategy relied primarily on the plea colloquy to convey remorse and emotional stress and argued that these factors justified sparing Washington the death penalty. Counsel successfully moved to exclude Washington's rap sheet and decided not to request a presentence report because it would have included his criminal history. The trial judge found multiple aggravating circumstances for each murder and no mitigating circumstances, sentencing Washington to death on each of the three murder counts. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Washington sought collateral relief in state court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on six grounds including failure to request a psychiatric report, investigate and present character witnesses, and seek a presentence investigation report. He submitted fourteen affidavits from friends, neighbors, and relatives willing to testify and two reports from a psychiatrist and psychologist. The state trial court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. Washington then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. After an evidentiary hearing at which trial counsel testified, the District Court denied relief, concluding that although counsel made errors in judgment by failing to investigate mitigating evidence further, no prejudice resulted. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for application of a new framework it developed for analyzing ineffectiveness claims. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the proper standards for judging claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a capital sentencing proceeding.
View caseNestor Navarro obtained a final judgment. Congress later enacted a statute directing courts to reopen certain cases on the basis of newly discovered evidence. The Court held that such a command impermissibly required Article III courts to revise their own final judgments.
In 1987 petitioners filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky against respondents. The complaint alleged that respondents had committed fraud and deceit in the sale of stock in 1983 and 1984 in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. The District Court dismissed the action as time barred under the then-applicable Kentucky statute of limitations. While petitioners' appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court decided Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson on June 20, 1991. The next day the Court applied that decision to dismiss another pending appeal. The Sixth Circuit remanded petitioners' case to the District Court for further proceedings in light of Lampf. On August 13, 1991, the District Court dismissed the action with prejudice under the Lampf statute of limitations. Petitioners filed no appeal, and the judgment became final thirty days later on December 18, 1991. On December 19, 1991, the President signed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991. Section 476 of that Act added section 27A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Subsection (b) provides that any private civil action under section 10(b) commenced on or before June 19, 1991, which was dismissed as time barred after that date and which would have been timely under the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction as such laws existed on June 19, 1991, shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than sixty days after December 19, 1991. Petitioners promptly filed a motion under section 27A(b) to reinstate their action. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseNathaniel Newman was convicted on the testimony of a cooperating witness. After trial the defense learned the government had failed to disclose the witness's plea agreement. The nondisclosure of this impeachment evidence supported a new-trial claim.
Petitioner John Giglio was convicted of passing forged money orders and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. While his appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, defense counsel discovered new evidence. This evidence indicated that the Government had failed to disclose an alleged promise made to its key witness that he would not be prosecuted if he testified for the Government. In June 1966, officials at the Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. discovered that Robert Taliento, a teller at the bank, had cashed several forged money orders. Upon questioning by FBI agents, Taliento confessed to supplying Giglio with one of the bank’s customer signature cards used to forge $2,300 in money orders, which Taliento then processed through the regular channels of the bank. Taliento related this story to the grand jury, resulting in Giglio's indictment, after which Taliento was named as a coconspirator but not indicted. At trial, which commenced two years after indictment, Taliento testified identifying Giglio as the instigator of the scheme. Defense counsel cross-examined Taliento about possible agreements for prosecutorial leniency, and Taliento stated that nobody told him he would not be prosecuted and that he believed he still could be prosecuted. In summation, the Government attorney stated that Taliento received no promises that he would not be indicted. The issue arose on Giglio's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. An affidavit from Assistant United States Attorney DiPaola confirmed that he had promised Taliento that if he testified before the grand jury and at trial he would not be prosecuted. Assistant Golden, who handled the trial, filed an affidavit stating that DiPaola had assured him before trial that no promises of immunity had been made to Taliento. The United States Attorney Hoey filed an affidavit stating that he had personally consulted with Taliento and his attorney shortly before trial. He emphasized that Taliento would definitely be prosecuted if he did not testify. If he did testify he would be obliged to rely on the good judgment and conscience of the Government as to whether he would be prosecuted. The District Court did not resolve the apparent conflict between the two assistants. It proceeded on the theory that even if a promise had been made, it was not authorized and its disclosure would not have affected the verdict.
View caseIn civil cases the motion must be filed within one year of judgment under Rule 60(b). In criminal cases the motion must be filed within three years after the verdict or finding of guilty. If an appeal is pending the district court may not grant the motion until the appellate court remands the case.
The evidence must be something that could not have been discovered earlier with reasonable diligence. Courts deny relief when the moving party could have uncovered the material through ordinary discovery or investigation before judgment.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1) a second or successive motion may be certified if it contains newly discovered evidence that, viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty.